Egypt After the January 25th Revolution: Speculum Doc. 1821
Politics and Economy in an Uncertain Field Feb.12, 2011
1. The eighteen days of continual protest involving about 1 million Egyptians, proved successful when President Hosni Mubarak resigned, on February 10th.
His successor, Ahmed Shafiq, resigned on March 2. Now the arena becomes quiet with suspense. Who's sleeping with whom intellectually is already coming to light. Anyone hoping to put together a political party has less than 6 months to do so.
2. The Egyptians all want freedom, and believe they got it with the resignation of a few officials. Democrats in Cairo are jockeying for power. Strange bedfellows, like the Muslim Brotherhood sleeping with M. al Baradei, indicates not some middle ground worked out in discussions, but a glossing over of core ideological divergences.
3. All through history it seems that the politics of symbolic appeal (or 'identity') trump the actual needs and aspirations of a populace. A group or nation might quickly blame and even attack another, often a neighbor, often the precise one who could offer the most help. In modern times, with its acceleration, one look at almost any nation and see therein a clash of ideas and men: not just the left/right divide but deeper - the emotional mind that responds to symbols, as opposed to the simple awareness of what folks need.
4. The Egyptians have matured, opened, many educated in the West. They've had a long time to observe the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Army's corporate pretensions, the bankruptcy of the socialists, and the Washington Consensus. Now they deserve to just focus on reality – objective needs, and the inner synergies. We will look at some of those. We'll assume that those masterful political abilities behind the revolution, now carry over into the post-revolutionary period.
5. So we will follow their own bid to be competent rather than dreamy. Will factions now integrate with other factions? Should they form a a single national party, to be a tent for many other smaller groups. And will they focus on the environmental and economic realities, seeking possible prescriptions?
6.The IMF and West, following the Washington consensus, must link up with NGOs, government and Islamic networks to deploy needed food, clean water and give Egypt's poor a chance to see a doctor.
7. Before 1952, Egypt was a feudal state. Six per cent of the people owned 68% of the fertile land. Debt bondage made slaves of many families, whole towns. The British shared rule with the last Mameluke king, Farouk. And some Egyptians look back at the last royal age of Fuad and Farouk, as a golden age of democracy.
8. The main party was the old Wafd, the party of aristocrats, of English educated government employees and students of the fine literature. The Wafd were charming old democrats, and the Egyptians loved them. The Free Officers, taking charge on July 23, 1952, were a quick sharp contrast.
9. The Euro-American texts say Gamal Abdul Nasser banned all political parties in order to turn Egypt into a military state, but he moved on the Wafd. Those gentlemen were such a corrupt bunch, just puppets to the wealthy, who usually were not Egyptians.
10. Nasser had no intention to move against them. He made sure General Naguib (Naqib) was prime minister then president. Naguib was an avuncular war hero who was tied in with Wafd leadership. Even Nasser was fooled for two years.
11. Nasser had his early experience in the army while serving with the British in Khartoum, Sudan. He knew all about the Mahdi and the mass slaughter at Omdurman. Nasser was not one of the Free Officers who worked clandestinely for the German Nazis during WWII. The army he would come to lead had definite scruples, a kind of discipline, a stiff upper lip. But it had no real equipment.
12. The English kept 80,000 soldiers camped in the desert along the Suez Canal. The canal was vital because it cut a month off the sailing time of many ships. Britain was still getting most of its oil from Iran. The Muslim Brotherhood and other fedayeen mounted night raids on British positions. Nasser put a stop to that in 1953. He would negotiate the departure of the British.
13. Today we would recommend land reform, since the gap between the rich and poor was way too wide and because feudalism is not compatible with democratic theory and practice. But back then, in America, land reform was seen as communism pure and simple. That was a stupid error. A clutch of unseen wars have broken out because obvious land reform was not carried through (e.g. India, Nicaragua, Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan.)
14. Nasser's land reform strategy was rather ingenious. He limited farms to 200 hectares, 300 for a family. The government would pay the landlords a fair price, while asking them to establish construction businesses, in and around the cities. It was a desperate bid to build enough houses for Egypt's swelling population. Nasser could see the plight of his people accurately.
15. Egyptians can be pro and anti army. Back in 1952, it was the only instrument available. After peace with Israel was signed, the army 're-deployed' to the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts, as they say. In other words, the army is fully invested in the tourist industry, sharing the same kind of resorts as the tourist stay in. The army has much experience building luxury villas and lush apartment complexes, resorts, special hospitals, and so the army can certainly help auto-construction projects. They have much experience cornering markets, so they should be straight players at last.
16. It is too late for re-tooling heavy industry, and I hope no American suggests that the standard IMF / Washington 'Consensus' should be applied to Egypt again. Any 'cure' that starves a fourth of the population, fails to build more homes, creates far too few jobs, and makes just a few wealthy – obviously such a remedy is not appropriate. Though I am not a Muslim, I know Arabic and studied its laws and can suggest this: that a few Islamic economic laws and institutions need be recognized, used by the new government, to bring services and economic exchanges down to the street level, to build new 'smart towns,' and to incubate and sponsor capitalist plots. In a real Islamic society, even the poorest person will usually own shares in property or some joint venture.
17. Consumerism is no longer seen as a viable engine-of-economy in nations as poor as Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Sudan, rural Tunisia and Mauritania. Egypt's economy should not be 'primed' and 'revved up' on or by the consumption of luxury imports. Import substitution is a way to national wealth. The oil has been pumped out almost, but NG should be coming on line in 2014, which, together with revenues from the Suez canal ($11 b), and tourism ($9 b.), provide 90% of the requisite funds for new economic projects. I am talking capitalism, many thousands of small businesses.
18.The army infrastructure and assets must be harnessed for development. And those in the army might relish the idea of actually doing things for the people. I'm speaking about the army assisting in auto-construction projects – new smart towns. That's an art that's almost forgotten. Of course, the Arabs were past masters at setting up cities in just a few months, Fustat being a prime example. (Note: The area of the Ishma'ili Maydan was originally the no man's zone between the Arab armies in Fustat and the Byzantine rulers of the Copt, Jewish and 'pagan' population settled along the Nile.
19. Cairo has no more space for more cars and trucks. Some 40% of its population suffers from a respiratory ailment. The poison is the equivalent of smoking two packs of cigarettes a day. A sudden high dose of CO, say from a traffic jam, will dumb down people without anybody noticing. These factors, together with the looming shortfalls of refined petroleum products, require that Egypt evolve into a 'smart' country. The recent breakthrough in solar cells has increased their efficiency and lowered their cost. (Of course Egypt should have its own solar cell companies. Almost all Middle Eastern, North African and Southwest Asian regions receive at least 320 days of direct sun light, so a great comparative advantage will eventually accrue to most villages, towns, cities. Many if not most families already use solar energy to heat water, on their roofs. They often set up satellite dishes next to them.
20. Investors have fled, taking much money. In Tunisia the family and friends of Zine Ben Ali have taken between $4 and $16 billion. In Egypt an estimated ten billion was extracted, legally. Illegal transfers could exceed $12 billion. Whatever the figure, it is several times larger than the $1.3 billion given to Egypt (to the army, only some $200 million being directed towards economic development in 2010.
21. It is as if we betrayed our own principles, preferring a corrupt elite few running an economy of military privilege. Where is our free market commitment? Our democracy? We were spooked by the Ikhwan, so they won that round. But now this round?
22. It is possible to mobilize capital and NGOs and small construction firms and hundreds of other companies related to construction, to create affordable housing. Cairo reminds me Kabul in this:. There's no way to meet housing imperatives without using auto-construction methods.
23. Auto-construction is almost lost as a collective skill, except amongst indigenous folk. There are serious and clear reasons to think carefully about establishing, from scratch, new towns. One starts small. They are much cheaper to build because they build with materials found at the site and because most labor will free. There all sorts of reasons – over twenty – why 'smart' towns are requisite. And there are some 21 dimensions, requirements, all necessary. These rural hubs are the only way to 'gently' reverse the trend of urbanization. Note: Morocco during the 1950s built a whole suburb of Casablanca, using the medina as a format. French architects helped them design other new towns and traditional structures. Si it has been done.
24. Of course many nations have created villages, even towns, from scratch. The Soviets paired these towns to one or two big industries, or they were set up as gulags. There is a third kind of Soviet new town, the sheraga, which was paired to the development of a technology, incubating its applications for later manufacture.
25. In 19989-90, while doing my dissertation at NYU, I worked with Prof. Charles Issawi on putting together the 'Islamic Smart Town.' It combined the oldest Muslim legislation re the built environment, with a step-by-step process, to create from mud brick or stone or mud itself, a little village, auto-constructed by the residents, assisted by the government, chiefly the army. This will soon become a town, and maybe even a small city a century later. For it would designed so well that it could feed and fuel itself, and thereby survive when other towns perish.
26. Western economists and financial authorities, including all bankers, would quickly tell you that creating a town from scratch requires way too much money up front. We cannot imagine founding a town from scratch. We don't let ourselves dream about that.
27. But of course it is, with a little help, not expensive to auto-construct a town: the labor and the building materials are almost free. The new Islamic smart town will attract many specialists, most as volunteers. For many are the experiments, many the cross-connections. The smart town becomes a hotbed of capitalist plots, a model farm, a platform for many small businesses, and schools. It will take advantage of the many new inventions available and appropriate, such as hand-cranked wireless computers, LEDs, cheaper and more efficient solar cells, special compounds that can be used to seal mud and mud-brick structures. The possibilities are amazing in their details.
28. Just as Nasser was able to re-arrange the plumbing in the Egyptian economy, turning many rich farmers into urban capitalists, the new democratic leaders must soon plan to construct some 2 million houses and flats around Cairo alone. For many poorer citizens, the need for food and clean water and medical care is more immediate. Humanitarian assistance first, then development.
29. Since all sectors and sections of the Egyptian society should have a place at the proverbial table, and then share rule, we figure that the Muslim organs can be of great assistance in bring social services to the street.. Of course the outsider will react to the phrase 'the Muslim Brotherhood' like a reflex, when in fact there are some 200 large Muslim groups in Cairo. Most have nothing to do with the MB. Many are Sufi schools, others literary associations. Some of the best are Muslims 'heresies,' sects following, for example, Nifari, that great 11th C. Egyptian mystic who, like Muhammed, spoke through a medium. His Mawaqif is a better, higher read than some other popular scripture. My point is that the Muslims really can help in the social service sector. But they need be vetted for top jobs. (Note: we have a short list of questions which will tell if a person really understands Islam).
30. If the US is going to give the army some billions, the army should be up and ready to do whatever it could to ease Egypt's very painful cramps, collective dyspepsia, and bad air. Of course the armed forces are active in all kinds of industries. Some 300 of these industries have been sold off to private investors. But just because Mr. Mubarak was slowly complying with IMF austerity measures, that does not mean that the army should just keep divesting itself, as Americans prefer. There are a some industries and services and agencies that need be supported, expanded, re-deployed, and followed up, adding growth factors (cash and skilled personnel).
31. The new government will be unable for years to gather together the financial and material and labor resources to construct low-income housing. The financial system worldwide is in disarray, a dearth of trust match with a lack of imagination.
32.The private construction companies have often been brought in to housing projects related to a government low-income housing scheme; but incredibly, some three quarters of these projects ended up as luxury housing units. Builders and speculators make more that way. Just another way to rip off the state (and the people).
33. But enough of this. None of the Arab nations can afford big companies that betray their own poor. Over the past decade, we've seen the middle class dry up
like a waterhole during drought. Prices for food are soaring. One Egyptian said he was happy that food prices fell back to where they were before the revolution. But those prices are double what they were just three years ago.
34. High prices for food were caused directly by the terrible heat wave in Central Russia in the summer of 2010. But austerity measures prompted by the IMF also raised the price. Obviously failure to bring food prices down will trigger new waves of unrest. Children are sent out to beg in any case.
35. Just as the January 25th Revolution at the Ishma'ili Maydan (Tahrir Sq.), appeared to rise spontaneously, so too the food (and water) distribution networks can and should begin to ramify and work their way down to the poor Egyptian. What I am saying is that there does not exist the time to spend years discussing elements and ideas. Cairo's population needs help now, especially just after the revolution. Businesses may bounce back fast enough, but prices remain high.
36. Here experts might not want to tinker with Egypt's bizarre economy. Adapting comparative advantages, certain army and Muslim humanitarian and service organs can re-configure their operations, aiming at delivering food, water and eventually, new housing to the poorer half. Over half of adult Cairenes live on less than $2 a day.
37. The delicate political situation also depends of grass-roots organization. The revolution may not have had a leader, but it needs elect or select representatives. Some of the reps need be technocrats, scientists, others representing the best of the Muslims. Some from the army, some from the professions. Some Muslims. Some Coptic Christians. Some from the city, some from the country.
38. Since there is no leader, the various reps can gather around a table and work out appointments and policies and actions and initiatives, rather than trust a heavy hierarchy, where a few determine the leader's policies behind the scenes, while the hierarchy perpetuates the errors.
39. It may be too much to ask that the new political affiliations, proto-parties, become so locally oriented, so close to their constituents, that they can also use these new cross-contacts to organize to deliver food and water and build more houses and flats.
40. At the moment, writing on February 11th, just a day after Mubarak resigned, the emphasis is still on symbols – the symbol of freedom, of the state, of human rights. Israel and America remain enemies, Israel for enforcing a comprehensive blockade against Gaza, America for being so entranced by its war on terror, that it ignored the weight, the urgency, of then people's needs.
41. Egyptians prefer to model their new government on North American democracy; they've had bad experiences with parliamentary forms of governance. Egypt needs a strong executive, and a bicameral parliament, but free of grandstanding and ideological critiques or posturing.
42. Egypt should be ruled by a thousand committees, each independent in the sense that it will not operate along narrow ideas, neither corrupted by the wealthy and the powerful, or absorbed into stupid Western economic plans featuring heavy industry, more infrastructure for autos and trucks, and a entire division of greed-besotted investment bankers, plus several for creed-besotted muftis.
43. Neither the West (carbon-heavy consumer capitalism) or the East (state-heavy socialism) will do. Each approach would lead to disaster. There cannot be real capitalism till there is real socialism, because such a large percentage of people are marginalized, made destitute or very poor. There cannot be real socialism with real capitalism because socialism needs lots of money for its programs. The state can either expropriate land and money, or make businesses just flower, so taxes soar and fill government coffers.
44.Is there a middle way? Yes. It does relate to Islam, but not the religion so much as the original practices of Muhammed at Medina. But only a few people understand these early laws and practices. Paradoxically, many nations loudly calling themselves Muslim do not have economies or laws or societies based on Islam.
45.For example, in Islamic law, private ownership is usually a shared claim. A family house belongs to women and children and old people, divvied up in shares according to mathematical proportions. But of course in all 'Muslim' societies, men own the homes and most of all else. This is not Islam.
46.For example, the law of auqaf or waqf (sing), though curtailed or banned in many countries, can permit a society to establish all kinds of social service institutions, with no state funds. But they need to be administered. He again the clergy can help, but they need to be vetted.
47. Islamic commerce is worthy of study in the West, because, in the West, the very poor are excluded from the market, while in Islam, definite laws permit the smallest vendor the same access to the market space as big corporations.
48. Readers of the Speculum Publications are well familiar with Muhammed's practices at Medina, how they differ from those of the religion. I can only assume the reader has studied Muhammed's Constitution of Medina. It is not a statement of religious dogma, but a practical way of bridging differences, ethnic and sectarian and economic.
49. Muhammed had no need or idea of a clerical hierarchy. He had no clergy. Fortunately, Egypt follows the Maliki legal tradition which is unique amongst the eight Muslim schools, for limiting clerical powers. For example, a family or individual who stakes out a piece of 'dead land,' and who is entitled in five years to a deed for that plot, must get final approval from the imam, to actually own the land. Only the Maliki school holds that the approval of any cleric is not required. The other schools developed under imperial pressures, while Malik ibn 'Anas, working in Medina with the descendents of the prophet and his companions, grew up with less imperial and/ordynastic pressures. (Malik was, like Abu Haifa Numa and ibn Shafi'i, and many other jurists were imprisoned by the emir or publicly flogged, Malik included.)
50. Far from being autocratic, Islamic law (fiqh and shari'a) grew up in opposition to self-selected authority. It has a real democratic streak. Muhammed said: “The government must consult with the people at every step.” This close-in cooperation is required for food and water distribution, security, the construction of housing, and for new town creation.
51. All through history we see the politics of symbolic appeal trumping the real needs of the people. Even the Israeli 'problem,' as disgraceful and as inhuman as is the Israeli grip on the Palestine, cannot be allowed to take up, consume, much-needed space and rationality.
52. Abandon the right and the wrong of it all. Just concentrate on the actual needs of people: the elderly, the sick, the single mother, the orphan, the student, the university student, the family's pressing needs for more space; and jobs. How to create jobs?
53. I recall Mikha'il Gorbachev saying “The greatest thing for our civilization to accomplish, is the creation of millions of jobs. And whoever figures out how to do that, deserves ten Nobel prizes.” (taken from a lecture given in 1988.)
54. The truth is neither the left or the right have the answers. The American Republicans insist that government has no role, that jobs will be created by the private sector. But businesses have been under-hiring for some years, because they figure they can double their profits by making each of their employees do three or four jobs. That's why productivity is so high in the US. (low wages is another).
55. The socialists of course think government should create jobs. In fact, not long ago, the Egyptian government hired every college graduate. Many of those jobs were needed, useful. Some were interesting. While these gov. jobs did not pay enough to really live on, they did offer the educated some sense that their degree meant something, that they meant something, that they had a relation with their government. For so many a job is a chance to get back to where they once were.
56. That nifty little policy, of the government hiring all the educated young adults, didn't cost all that much money, roughly $3 billion annually, in today's terms. But the IMF and World Bank and US economists pushed hard to shut down this kind of 'false' 'non-free-market' national employment scheme, which they called 'artificial manipulation' or 'distortion of the market.'
57. That phrase would make one laugh if it were not so tragic. All those businesses run by Mubarak's cronies and by the army, they were not only 'artificial,' they were illegal. Remember, any profiting from privilege, from special connections to or with any government department, by the family and friends of the officials, are illegal, all of them. And each of Egypt's three law codes (Islamic, Euro-influenced civil law, and international law) say this.
Let me close this economic section with some brief notes on the changing global energy situation.
58. Most analysts now admit that many of the estimates of oil given by Arab nations, the declared reserves in the ground, were way overblown. Egypt has already pumped out its oil, and is now looking to NG. Consumption by rising nations, India, China, Brazil, Russia, is rising and will keep rising till their autocratic regimes put their foot down. Curiously, the PRC declared driving illegal within town limits (unless you have special permission or the right license plate), on February 11th, 2011. (Note: China outlawed any mention of the word 'Egypt' in the press or on the air, after the Jan. 25th mass disobedience.)
59. Regrettably, people in Asia and Africa get to see photos and see private cars, and snazzy electronic equipment, and want to possess them. They see themselves as soaring over the land on sleek thoughways, or owning their home, or tuning in to the net. We in advanced countries need oil because we are built upon it, while the Egyptian or Chinese parvenu has no need, nor experience with, private automobiles.
60. The point is that the rising oil consumption means higher prices all around. There is not enough recoverable petroleum to fuel growth as the West knows and defines it – ie., petroleum-powered. Even in crowded Cairo, people dream and scheme to get their private cars. For that means they don't have to humiliate themselves by riding on the public buses or mix with others while taking a subway..
61, There is already an oil war going on. Sudan is on the verge of one. Oil has been found in Abiye, but the little town is right on the border between Northern and Southern Sudan. Nigeria of course has its little war. Iran, too. Pipelines are blown up by nomads. Last year the Saudis rolled back a large al Qaida cell planning to hit and set on fire the Ras Tanura refineries and tankers in the off-loading piers. Now revolution in the Arab is causing oil prices to rise.
62. It is no longer alarmist to say that, in ten years, gasoline and diesel and jet fuel will be too expensive for ordinary people to burn. So there goes the car, the heat for the house, all those plastic gadgets, and also, one might add, the grid. The electrical grid is dependent on petrol fuel and petro-materials and may not be able to be maintained everywhere, at all times. So new towns are those generating their own power and growing their own food.
63.Worldwide all these large cities will break into suburbs which then break into independent towns, municipalities. But these suburbs, sprawling as they do, were meant only as bedroom communities for the city. They were not organized to be independent municipalities. They lack the communal life and are unable to provide their food and fuel and clinics, or the money to build new housing.
64.When gasoline becomes too expensive, the links between communities will snap. Even buses can't carry all, and in some weeks, there just is not enough refined petroleum for any buses at all. People will no longer move around. Some trains and boats will bring in emergency food and firewood, some coal, and maybe a few manufactures. But people will be largely on their own.
65.Unlike America, Egypt is a very old civilization, so coming together into communities is not a big challenge. In just a few years, Cairo with all of its neighborhoods and sprawling suburbs, will break apart – the transport links will break or become intermittent. Then the River Nile will re-assume its place as the highway linking Upper and Lower Misr (Arabic for Egypt).
66. What seemed alarmist last year, seems common sense this year. Planning for the future must begin. It will be a very different future, one where heavy industry and big companies bow out. Energy needed for smelting, production, transport is just not there. So all those suburbs must be able to grow or raise or trade for, their own food and fuel. They must develop municipal centers open to all Egyptians regardless of faith or class. If they were smart, they'd bring in a little Islamic civilization, by setting up inns for travelers, soup kitchens, clinics, mental health sanctuaries, hospices for the dying, schools, and tijaret (trade) houses.
67.No doubt these master planners would use the law of 'ihya, or land-revivification, to set up beautiful new housing complexes built by residents, volunteers, the army and international low-tech specialists.
I see no way any of these North Africa and West Asia nations can meet their housing requirements except through massive auto-construction programs. Sounds weird to you, probably, to design and build a new city from scratch. You probably never let your imagination wander that way. Well, then good news is that is it possible to create a new town, a smart town, able to feed and fuel itself, while being connected to the world wirelessly.
68. The Group of Wise Men in Cairo have just a few weeks to put in place representatives from all of Egypt's factions. They must be the right people. The 'table' should seat some 24. Those factions include Egyptians educated in overseas, various Muslim groups including an al Aksa professor, lower-middle class street vendors, big capitalists and investors, secular moderns, women, and illiterate families who immigrated in from the countryside. Army and police officers, scientists and technocrats need be represented. Throw in a few poets, an economic historian, and there you have it. But will the youth settle on being excluded?
By John Paul Maynard, legal anthropologist Feb. 12 2011
Monday, February 28, 2011
Monday, February 21, 2011
Arab Revolutions 2011 - 21 Feb. 2011
Please refer to the list on the right to access earlier posts. They give a day-to-day account of the violent climaxes of the Arab revolutions in 2011. Plus there are more reflective guidelines for the future settlement of political and economic issues in the region.
ARAB REVOLUTIONS 201 The Middle East Speculum Report Feb. 21 2011
Libya in Extremis!
Heavy artillery and jet strafing of lines of protesters in the streets around Green Square Tripoli was Al Qaddafi's Parthian shot. If the US does not intervene, Libya may see another 42 years of Al Qadahfy darkness. Will the Libyan army turn on him? Some, the junior officers. Some have likely been already shot in their barracks by the authorities. An air-bridge of mercenaries arriving at Tripoli airport can easily be stopped, but the US is slow off the mark. Expect a concerted counterattack by Qadafy's goons.
Al Qadahfy deploys jet fighters to strafe demonstrators in Tripoli. We warned about just this vulnerability yesterday. Hundreds massacred in the streets. I can hope Euro-American teams are ready to deploy to Tripoli.
“The Game is Over! - 42 years of Hell Ended” they say in Benghazi. But not yet. Atrocity in Tripoli - the people are very afraid, may be cowed. What then? Military clamp down condemns Libya to another 42 years of oppression. Libyans call intervention - Speculum asked President Obama to launch US Navy aircraft over 20 hours ago, to sever east-west highway, enforce a no-fly zone, hit armor concentrations (if they deploy on the streets) and if necessary meet the Libyan air force in the skies.
One must understand mercenaries, how Qadahfy is using them, flown in to Sabha, then transported overland. These poor guys now find themselves dead if captured. Even the black African workers - close to a million - are trying to get out. Crowds surround the airport, which in Tripoli is some 40 km. south of the city.
Defections of Libyan units and agents now are in full flood. Embassies are going over as expat Libyans gather at their gates. The entire Libyan delegation at the UN has called for international intervention, a no-fly zone over Tripoli. In other words, they want the US Navy carriers to launch F-18Cs, which is exactly what we advised yesterday, Sunday the 20th, when Speculum sent seven critical e mails to select elected officials, asking that the war-hot US pilots be allowed to sever the Tripoli road, hit armor concentrations and meet the Libyan air force in the skies. (away from SAMs.) To do nothing forfeits a chance for the US gov. to regain Arab esteem. But I bet we blow it.
At the moment, an airlift of mercenaries from Africa, Syria, Yemen, and Eastern Europe is underway, and the foreign goons are deploying. Some have been hunted down and killed. Blood and revenge is in the air. Some are fleeing, driving madly down the long road to al Kufrah, that vital oasis, where they can hold hostage Libya's entire oil production. Yes, Qadahfy will blow a few wells, shoot up some pipelines, break some pumps, which will likely interrupt for three (3) months.
Will oil production be cut by the Libyan crisis? Yes. But already the Saudis and Kuwaitis are ramping up, to pump enough extra oil to bridge the Libyan shortfall. But it is not sweet crude. Though there are Americans working in Libya, almost all of Libya's oil exports go to Europe. Qadahfy has charged them extortionate royalties, just like he did in 1971. Military action is difficult with some 400,000 guest workers and students, any of whom can be held hostage.
Two days ago Libyan special police starting shooting people throwing stones. Now Benghazi is free. In the west, Tripoli erupts in street demonstrations on the 21st. But Qadafy deploys his goons who shoot to kill. The tribes and religious leaders all pull together and seem unanimous in their condemnation of the Al Qadafy apparat. Or do we have it wrong? Al Qadahfy is deploying fighter jets to strafe protesters, killing an estimated 300 and wounding some 3,000.
The big surprise was the uprising in Tripoli. Apparently not that many rallied at first, some 200, but soon there were running gun battles in several parts of town. People attacked with sticks and stones, driving them back. Now Green Square is littered with 300 dead and many injured who will die because hospitals just can't cope. Euro-US medical airlifts will follow US Navy air operations, but will these happen? Am I dreaming?
Saif Qadahfy made his dreadful speech on the night of the 20th, and soon a rumor went around that Qadahfy had resigned, crowds gathered in the streets to celebrate. Saif al Qadahfy 'the Sword' made his weird speech, and the army/police returned, and, using machine guns mounted on cut-out SUVs, killed many, prompting attacks by the shebab, and their deaths, probably some 100 or so. This uprising in Tripoli adds to the legends already emanating from Benghazi and Al Bayda. But at what cost?
Saif was correct in citing the tribes and the sects: “We are a nation of tribes and sects, like no other...” Incoming reports indicate that many Libyan tribes have declared rebellion, led by elders unanimously opting for the overthrow of the Qadahfy entity, its apparat, its murderous judiciary, and all the police/intel toughs, the mercs, and the rich beneficiaries, those involved in petroleum corruption, those who siphon off some 70% of state oil revenues.
Saif Al Qadahfy's speech on Feb. 20th reveals much and augurs poorly for a peaceful transfer of power. On the 20th, Speculum sent requests to elected reps to intervene: US carrier battle groups (2) are already within strike range of eastern Libya, and SF units are on alert. US F-18s can sever the road to Tripoli, and hit armor concentrations, should Qadahfy and his sons and killers opt to massacre his own people once again. Obviously the world just can't step aside when a whole army is turned on an unarmed people who are demonstrating peacefully.
Regrettably, petroleum is such a factor in our lives that all the nations have sidled up to tyrants, autocrats, even as these leaders do little with all the revenues they receive, for the people. The Arab malaise was imposed by our own dependence on oil.
Back in 1970, when we first studied Col. Mu'ammer Qadahfy, he was intent on distributing the oil wealth, and famously, he would hand out new appliances and electronic equipment. Apartments were the main means by which loyalty was rewarded, much like Soviet Russia. Qadahfy has been building infrastructure, and his 'coming over' against terrorism, has brought in some $25 b. in investments. People of Benghazi have a big new power plant, giving the people electricity 24/7. But look at photos from Libya and you'll see how few cars are on the streets, and those cars present are late-models, with tinted windows and special license plates.
Two weeks ago the leading Muslim clerics issued a warning to the government not to kill protesting citizens. This of course they did, wantonly slaying women and children. So the muftis issued a 'raft' of fatwas condemning the Qadahfy regime. Many followed their directives to rise up and slay the killers. Tank after tank was knocked out by Molotov cocktails in Benghazi. Automatic weapons were wrestled out of the hands of soldiers and the secret police. Apparently, demonstrators are still able to communicate after Qadahfy shut down all internet servers and cell phone towers. It is through the land lines and some satellites that these angry crowds can conduct complex maneuvers, feints, sudden targeted assaults, and feigned withdrawals.
ALGERIA -
A mature mob would be more patient than one led by teenagers. And so we see in Algeria, some communication between the various parties, legal and illegal. Mr. Bouteflika was made president by the army, in 1999, but he himself is not from the army. In 2004 he defeated the army FLN's Ali Benflis, and was elected in a landslide. Elections in 2009 saw him loose support, especially since rigging was strongly suspected. Strangely, he's been criticized by the FLN, that relic of the war against the French, and if Mr. Bouteflicka loses control of events on the ground, the army can step in. But will not that heavy-handed return to military law, prompt uprising and civil war?
The Algerians of course are wary of war. Some 250,000 died from 1992 to 1998 in a civil war notable in its brutality. A number of political parties have been pursuing prescriptions for the various issues facing the populace, but the shebab in the streets, reinforced by their mothers, can't tolerate curfews. Of course it the refusal of these young people to obey the army's curfew, which made folks in Tunisia realize that they, too, could successfully defy the army, demonstrate 24/7 and bring down the government. The Egyptian protesting democrats did the same thing, disobeying the army and police on the night of the Jan. 25th, which is why they call their revolution the January 25th Revolution.
Algeria gets money from oil and gas, but obligations like high pensions for retired army officers, just eat into the nation's discretionary spending.
Tunisia -
On the 6th of Feb. 2011 the ruling party of Zine Ben Ali was banned, forcing the exodus of hundreds of privileged friends, some $9 billion leaving the country in the two weeks since. The interim prime minister Ghannouchi, who like Ben Ali has served since 1989, is under enormous pressure to work out a new government, one that represents all those ignored. The youth, many organized by Islamicists, insist that all those associated with Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) be removed from office immediately. How fast can these prospective leaders move? Not fast enough.
Secondly, the rule of law has not returned to all places in Tunisia. Murders are up as thieves are resisted with force by neighborhood watch organs. We all recall the three days Feb. 4-6, when Tunisians had to fend off organized criminals driving stolen cars. Egypt has, or had, the same issues – organized criminal groups taking advantage of the commotion, the lack of police, to make their moves.
As we speak, various criminal and terrorist groups are watching closely to see if the shebab on the streets are vulnerable to impatience, and may prompt them. As the Ikhwan return to Tunisia and come out from then shadows in Egypt, we see their young being used as spear-points. Many amateur Mid East 'buffs' think the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) presents a serious threat, or that they are harmless social workers deserving a place at the table.
Our understanding of the Al Ikhwan al Muslimiyya is not so simple. It is and is not a unified organ. Which augurs poorly or well. We know that at least one cell of terrorists is actrive: the bombing of a Christian church in Alexandria in early January prompted violent riots, the burning of a mosque. You have your pick: it was either the Gama'a al Islamiyya or Hizb-e-Tahrir or Al Qaida.
The MB made one big mistake, back in 1929, when a presumptuous schoolteacher named Hassan al Banna, turned the established Muslim reform tradition on its head, rejecting everything western, and claiming that old Islamic ways of dress and speech and prayer-in-front-of-others, will lead to political mastery, the overthrow of secular regimes, and the rigorous implimentation of the Shari'a.
Speculum keeps pointing out the stupid error of the Ikhwan, why their work has been so destructive. It was Sayyid Qutb who, apeing the psycho-path ibn Taymiyya, told all Brothers to fight the Shi'i and to condemn other, more secular Muslims, to hell, licensing their murder.
Clearly the Brothers need to publicly renounce their dumbed-down innovation.
As Speculum readers well know, the authenitic Islamic reform tradition runs from Sheikh Ahmed in Iran, to Sayyid Jalalad Din al Afghani, also Iranian, to Muhammed Abduh, to Rashid Rida. All these men advocated non-violent solutions to colonial occupation, and a needed crititque of the clergy, the religion. They could see as few can, that Muhammed's practicdes at Medina, are not those proffered and enforcfed by the Islamic religion. I know of no place on earth where the simple laws of the Prophet determine land-ownership, relations with children and women, tolerance ethnic and sectarian, and the auto-construction of cities.
Tunisian Ikhwan leaders are returning from London, which of course incubates innumerable expats and opposition newspapers and media, from almost all nations.
Morocco -
King Muhammed has been granting reforms over the past decade, so the varied opposition, which demonstrated in Rabat on the 20th, is pressing for more limited changes, like a more representation in parliament, and less military involvement in southern adventures in the Spanish Sahara. Morocco has the most lively interplay of political parties – some 40 representing every niche, it seems – so change will be consensual. King Muhammed is known to be a modest man, who has been challenging his father's favorites, those rich young heirs, to invest in their country.
Egypt -
Will the people of Egypt be able to overcome Nasser's legacy? Though Nasser helped bring about Egyptian independence, he instituted a socialist plan, made the army the supreme power, banned parties, and chased out many 'foreigners' – talented and/or rich Turks, Jews, Greeks, English, Albanians, - thereby cutting available capital and emboldening a dumb-down version of Pan Arabism, which Nasser tried to promote.
The Egyptian people have had forty years to study Nasser's legacy, and few admire him now, having seen through and solved for themselves, state-heavy deviations, be it the mistakes of heavy industrial investment, or state-heavy institutional socialism. The limits of symbolic appeal became obvious, and the treaty with Israel was grudgingly accepted. Surely, any military moves towards war will cancel funds and labor necessary to make the economy viable.
Some protesters till believe that the army is their friends, but many more suspect the army. Field Marshall Tantawi Behind the scenes and not publicized, is the jockeying for power on behalf of some twenty 'players.' Many seem to be puppets with strings attached, that is, they carry ideological or class baggage, be it socialism or crony capitalism. The rivalry has only grown, encouraged no doubt by the military and prompted by the shebab on the street.
Muhammad Al Baradei has linked up with the Ikhwan and others, which casts suspicions on Al Baradei's image as a technocrat, a scientist. Is he going for symbols at this late date?
Palestine -
The Palestinian president, Mahmud Abbas, in Ramallah, asks for the resignation of his cabinet. He'll usher in a younger bunch. He acted very fast to head off popular anger. Meanwhile, in Gaza, Hamas 'Zeal' is following the Iranian line: an obvious attempt to take advantage of the unrest, while secretly worrying. The educated people of Teheran have been fighting in the streets for basic liberties since 2009.
The Palestinian issue becomes more not less relevant, now that Israelis need not worry about 'wayward crazies' blowing themselves up; or the world's demands for some chance for an independent country called Palestine. Maybe one out of ten feels for the Arabs.
So do not be surprised if other Arab movements become more and more anti-Israel, and anti-American. It's another tragic detour. If Jordan and Egypt shake free of their treaties with the Jewish state, then a military build-up will begin, and a different paradigm emerge.
As the Chinese master Sun Tzu said years ago “Do not corner your enemy. Always leave for him a way out.” Israeli greed for more land is the cause for this hatred of America, and Jews. The main cause of the rising anti-Semitism, is just theft of another nation. This whole idea, hatched after WWII, of forming two states, Israel and Palestine, was, of course, an American idea. But why can't the Americans enforce their own design and purpose?
Will this Arab uprising turn anti-American? It would be better to put like this: does American hypocrisy prelude future negotiations? Does the Israeli theft of land and water, approved recently by the Americans in a UN vote, cancel out any good will on behalf of the Arab people.
Iran sends two warships through the Suez canal, something that could not have happened last month. On Israel's northern border, Lebanon had just changed its government, admitting in a militant coalition of Hizbullah and Palestinian refugees.
Yemen -
Two weeks of violent protests and police attacks, has led the young democrats to adapt 'sit down' tactics. Less provocative, the protesters spare themselves the truncheons and gas, while narrowing their message – the entire regime of Ali Saleh has to go. That's too big a jump for this poor nation. Sana'a, al Hudaydah, Aden, al Mukalla, and Ta'izz may have a combined twenty thousand modern-minded protesters, a small minority. They'll help spread specific North American notions re democratic self-rule into the Hadramaut and along the western coast, the Tahima, both more sophisticated than Sana'a. Both are sophisticated cultures, quite different and diverging. But this demand for a complete surrender of Saleh, while he is making some concessions, augurs poorly for the future. Yemen's democratic movement is losing its secular features and falling under the sway of younger, militantly organized mock-Islamic shebab. Adolescents do not possess adult brains, the frontal cortex is still sorting itself out, so kids they just don't listen; they act impulsively, demonize older folk, people not like them; think in black-and-white terms. They are impatient and think magically, believing that removing the entire government will lead to the peaceful pursuit of western democracy. They can be manipulated, and are, by the Ikhwan, the Brothers.
Yemen needs science – and patience. Development assistance gives way to humanitarian relief. Sana'a is not the only city on the verge of running out of fresh water. Energy is another problem – too expensive. So most Yemenis live without electricity or supplies trucked in. Urban commuters have few buses, so can't to work, or to the cafes where, if unemployed, as most are, they hang out, provided they can afford a coffee or a tea.
South and North are so different, and the Saleh regime so alone in the middle. The South is over-sophisticated, open to South Asian culture, and Soviet socialism, while the north is solidly royal – the kingship of the Zaydi imams. To the east are the more remote regions beyond Ma'rib. Here the Saudi forces remain ready to strike mock-Muslims calling themselves al Qaidah of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi forces are ready to intervene in Bahrain and Kuwait, also. At the momdent, Adm. Mike Mullen is in Riyadh, not the best place to command US Navy intervention in Libya.
Bahrain -
The assault on peaceful demonstrators last week at night at the Pearl Circle was probably instigated from some older member of the the Khalifa clan, not 'King' i.e. Emir Salman Hamad al Khalifa. He has been the best of the monarchs, trying again and again to work things out with an obstreperous elected lower house. The Shi'a keep going for it – the complete removal of the Sunni Khalifa dynasty and cabinet. Who's right?
The Sunni Emir and all behind him. The Sunnis Khalifas have been in Bahrain for some 240 years. They were nomads who, like their Kuwaiti, Qatari and UAE counterparts, migrated to the coast from the Najd desert after three years of no water. The Shi'a were merchants coming from Iran and Iraq, or workers brought in by the British, to work in Manama's port. (Some were in Bahrain for generations also).
We in the West fall for our own assumptions, calling only Israel democratic, when in Arabia bedouin chiefs are usually elected, when most every shura or community meeting ends with a show of hands. We call this 'primitive' democracy, and discount it. Now, believing the Arabs have no experience with ruling themselves, Americans see monarchs and emirs and all those working for them, as anti-democratic, obsolete, and fated to pass. The Arab elected leader is proud to keep his doors open for anyone who needs help. Chivalric behavior (mur'u'a) amongst the Arabs is even deeper than the impulse of 'adab. If you don't know what 'adab is, you don't know anything about Muslim people.
The Bahrain mob has a front and a back. The front is full of liberal educated democrats, saying “We are neither Sunni or Shi'i. We are both together.” In the back, however, are the Shi'a radicals. They cannot claim poverty – the Emir has been generous – or even unemployment – Bahrain is bustling. It has long served as Saudis' No.1 vacation destination. Liquor and prostitutes has served the Bahrainis well, and this is one area where the Emir must reform its 'customs,' recognizing Muslim sensibilities.
I don't know if Shi'a clerics do the bidding of the Iranians. They may have in the past, but the Iranian regime has really been discredited, and these clerics have no doubt matured. The violence last week has turned these clerics into legal instruments, as fatwas are issued for the complete removal of the Sunni regime. Well, this will not fly. There are many pro-Khalifa citizens, including many Shi'a.
Kuwait -
On the 18th the Kuwaiti authorities moved to break up a spontaneous demonstration of some 1,000 'stateless persons,' using rubber bullets, water cannon and gas. Curiously, the demonstration was sited well outside Kuwait City.
Iran -
Just as in the early 19 C. Iranian Shi'a intellectuals designed and set in motion the modern Islamic reform tradition, so now does Iran remain the source and font of rebellion against usurping clerics bent on power. Where is Ruhollah Khomeini when we need him? He'd have no tolerance for the present regime, for he hated police repression. And he hated those who used Islam to further their selfish ideologies, and those who stole from the treasury, or wasted the public money and youth on needless wars and provocations.
Now the democrats of Teheran prepare to sacrifice themselves in a coming big protest. But look what's happening – the hard line clerics rallied and pledged to try and execute Iran beloved opposition leaders. That's Musavi and Khatami and Karrubi, and others. Heaven forbid!
As closet Zarathushtris, the Persians are primed for the final showdown.
Kazakhstan -
Lifer premier/president Nursultan Nazarbaiyev has been maneuvered into stepping down, granting needed democratic reforms. We are not clear why that happened. Apparently his security organs pushed him to resign to upstage the gathering mob.
By John Paul Maynard
ARAB REVOLUTIONS 201 The Middle East Speculum Report Feb. 21 2011
Libya in Extremis!
Heavy artillery and jet strafing of lines of protesters in the streets around Green Square Tripoli was Al Qaddafi's Parthian shot. If the US does not intervene, Libya may see another 42 years of Al Qadahfy darkness. Will the Libyan army turn on him? Some, the junior officers. Some have likely been already shot in their barracks by the authorities. An air-bridge of mercenaries arriving at Tripoli airport can easily be stopped, but the US is slow off the mark. Expect a concerted counterattack by Qadafy's goons.
Al Qadahfy deploys jet fighters to strafe demonstrators in Tripoli. We warned about just this vulnerability yesterday. Hundreds massacred in the streets. I can hope Euro-American teams are ready to deploy to Tripoli.
“The Game is Over! - 42 years of Hell Ended” they say in Benghazi. But not yet. Atrocity in Tripoli - the people are very afraid, may be cowed. What then? Military clamp down condemns Libya to another 42 years of oppression. Libyans call intervention - Speculum asked President Obama to launch US Navy aircraft over 20 hours ago, to sever east-west highway, enforce a no-fly zone, hit armor concentrations (if they deploy on the streets) and if necessary meet the Libyan air force in the skies.
One must understand mercenaries, how Qadahfy is using them, flown in to Sabha, then transported overland. These poor guys now find themselves dead if captured. Even the black African workers - close to a million - are trying to get out. Crowds surround the airport, which in Tripoli is some 40 km. south of the city.
Defections of Libyan units and agents now are in full flood. Embassies are going over as expat Libyans gather at their gates. The entire Libyan delegation at the UN has called for international intervention, a no-fly zone over Tripoli. In other words, they want the US Navy carriers to launch F-18Cs, which is exactly what we advised yesterday, Sunday the 20th, when Speculum sent seven critical e mails to select elected officials, asking that the war-hot US pilots be allowed to sever the Tripoli road, hit armor concentrations and meet the Libyan air force in the skies. (away from SAMs.) To do nothing forfeits a chance for the US gov. to regain Arab esteem. But I bet we blow it.
At the moment, an airlift of mercenaries from Africa, Syria, Yemen, and Eastern Europe is underway, and the foreign goons are deploying. Some have been hunted down and killed. Blood and revenge is in the air. Some are fleeing, driving madly down the long road to al Kufrah, that vital oasis, where they can hold hostage Libya's entire oil production. Yes, Qadahfy will blow a few wells, shoot up some pipelines, break some pumps, which will likely interrupt for three (3) months.
Will oil production be cut by the Libyan crisis? Yes. But already the Saudis and Kuwaitis are ramping up, to pump enough extra oil to bridge the Libyan shortfall. But it is not sweet crude. Though there are Americans working in Libya, almost all of Libya's oil exports go to Europe. Qadahfy has charged them extortionate royalties, just like he did in 1971. Military action is difficult with some 400,000 guest workers and students, any of whom can be held hostage.
Two days ago Libyan special police starting shooting people throwing stones. Now Benghazi is free. In the west, Tripoli erupts in street demonstrations on the 21st. But Qadafy deploys his goons who shoot to kill. The tribes and religious leaders all pull together and seem unanimous in their condemnation of the Al Qadafy apparat. Or do we have it wrong? Al Qadahfy is deploying fighter jets to strafe protesters, killing an estimated 300 and wounding some 3,000.
The big surprise was the uprising in Tripoli. Apparently not that many rallied at first, some 200, but soon there were running gun battles in several parts of town. People attacked with sticks and stones, driving them back. Now Green Square is littered with 300 dead and many injured who will die because hospitals just can't cope. Euro-US medical airlifts will follow US Navy air operations, but will these happen? Am I dreaming?
Saif Qadahfy made his dreadful speech on the night of the 20th, and soon a rumor went around that Qadahfy had resigned, crowds gathered in the streets to celebrate. Saif al Qadahfy 'the Sword' made his weird speech, and the army/police returned, and, using machine guns mounted on cut-out SUVs, killed many, prompting attacks by the shebab, and their deaths, probably some 100 or so. This uprising in Tripoli adds to the legends already emanating from Benghazi and Al Bayda. But at what cost?
Saif was correct in citing the tribes and the sects: “We are a nation of tribes and sects, like no other...” Incoming reports indicate that many Libyan tribes have declared rebellion, led by elders unanimously opting for the overthrow of the Qadahfy entity, its apparat, its murderous judiciary, and all the police/intel toughs, the mercs, and the rich beneficiaries, those involved in petroleum corruption, those who siphon off some 70% of state oil revenues.
Saif Al Qadahfy's speech on Feb. 20th reveals much and augurs poorly for a peaceful transfer of power. On the 20th, Speculum sent requests to elected reps to intervene: US carrier battle groups (2) are already within strike range of eastern Libya, and SF units are on alert. US F-18s can sever the road to Tripoli, and hit armor concentrations, should Qadahfy and his sons and killers opt to massacre his own people once again. Obviously the world just can't step aside when a whole army is turned on an unarmed people who are demonstrating peacefully.
Regrettably, petroleum is such a factor in our lives that all the nations have sidled up to tyrants, autocrats, even as these leaders do little with all the revenues they receive, for the people. The Arab malaise was imposed by our own dependence on oil.
Back in 1970, when we first studied Col. Mu'ammer Qadahfy, he was intent on distributing the oil wealth, and famously, he would hand out new appliances and electronic equipment. Apartments were the main means by which loyalty was rewarded, much like Soviet Russia. Qadahfy has been building infrastructure, and his 'coming over' against terrorism, has brought in some $25 b. in investments. People of Benghazi have a big new power plant, giving the people electricity 24/7. But look at photos from Libya and you'll see how few cars are on the streets, and those cars present are late-models, with tinted windows and special license plates.
Two weeks ago the leading Muslim clerics issued a warning to the government not to kill protesting citizens. This of course they did, wantonly slaying women and children. So the muftis issued a 'raft' of fatwas condemning the Qadahfy regime. Many followed their directives to rise up and slay the killers. Tank after tank was knocked out by Molotov cocktails in Benghazi. Automatic weapons were wrestled out of the hands of soldiers and the secret police. Apparently, demonstrators are still able to communicate after Qadahfy shut down all internet servers and cell phone towers. It is through the land lines and some satellites that these angry crowds can conduct complex maneuvers, feints, sudden targeted assaults, and feigned withdrawals.
ALGERIA -
A mature mob would be more patient than one led by teenagers. And so we see in Algeria, some communication between the various parties, legal and illegal. Mr. Bouteflika was made president by the army, in 1999, but he himself is not from the army. In 2004 he defeated the army FLN's Ali Benflis, and was elected in a landslide. Elections in 2009 saw him loose support, especially since rigging was strongly suspected. Strangely, he's been criticized by the FLN, that relic of the war against the French, and if Mr. Bouteflicka loses control of events on the ground, the army can step in. But will not that heavy-handed return to military law, prompt uprising and civil war?
The Algerians of course are wary of war. Some 250,000 died from 1992 to 1998 in a civil war notable in its brutality. A number of political parties have been pursuing prescriptions for the various issues facing the populace, but the shebab in the streets, reinforced by their mothers, can't tolerate curfews. Of course it the refusal of these young people to obey the army's curfew, which made folks in Tunisia realize that they, too, could successfully defy the army, demonstrate 24/7 and bring down the government. The Egyptian protesting democrats did the same thing, disobeying the army and police on the night of the Jan. 25th, which is why they call their revolution the January 25th Revolution.
Algeria gets money from oil and gas, but obligations like high pensions for retired army officers, just eat into the nation's discretionary spending.
Tunisia -
On the 6th of Feb. 2011 the ruling party of Zine Ben Ali was banned, forcing the exodus of hundreds of privileged friends, some $9 billion leaving the country in the two weeks since. The interim prime minister Ghannouchi, who like Ben Ali has served since 1989, is under enormous pressure to work out a new government, one that represents all those ignored. The youth, many organized by Islamicists, insist that all those associated with Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) be removed from office immediately. How fast can these prospective leaders move? Not fast enough.
Secondly, the rule of law has not returned to all places in Tunisia. Murders are up as thieves are resisted with force by neighborhood watch organs. We all recall the three days Feb. 4-6, when Tunisians had to fend off organized criminals driving stolen cars. Egypt has, or had, the same issues – organized criminal groups taking advantage of the commotion, the lack of police, to make their moves.
As we speak, various criminal and terrorist groups are watching closely to see if the shebab on the streets are vulnerable to impatience, and may prompt them. As the Ikhwan return to Tunisia and come out from then shadows in Egypt, we see their young being used as spear-points. Many amateur Mid East 'buffs' think the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) presents a serious threat, or that they are harmless social workers deserving a place at the table.
Our understanding of the Al Ikhwan al Muslimiyya is not so simple. It is and is not a unified organ. Which augurs poorly or well. We know that at least one cell of terrorists is actrive: the bombing of a Christian church in Alexandria in early January prompted violent riots, the burning of a mosque. You have your pick: it was either the Gama'a al Islamiyya or Hizb-e-Tahrir or Al Qaida.
The MB made one big mistake, back in 1929, when a presumptuous schoolteacher named Hassan al Banna, turned the established Muslim reform tradition on its head, rejecting everything western, and claiming that old Islamic ways of dress and speech and prayer-in-front-of-others, will lead to political mastery, the overthrow of secular regimes, and the rigorous implimentation of the Shari'a.
Speculum keeps pointing out the stupid error of the Ikhwan, why their work has been so destructive. It was Sayyid Qutb who, apeing the psycho-path ibn Taymiyya, told all Brothers to fight the Shi'i and to condemn other, more secular Muslims, to hell, licensing their murder.
Clearly the Brothers need to publicly renounce their dumbed-down innovation.
As Speculum readers well know, the authenitic Islamic reform tradition runs from Sheikh Ahmed in Iran, to Sayyid Jalalad Din al Afghani, also Iranian, to Muhammed Abduh, to Rashid Rida. All these men advocated non-violent solutions to colonial occupation, and a needed crititque of the clergy, the religion. They could see as few can, that Muhammed's practicdes at Medina, are not those proffered and enforcfed by the Islamic religion. I know of no place on earth where the simple laws of the Prophet determine land-ownership, relations with children and women, tolerance ethnic and sectarian, and the auto-construction of cities.
Tunisian Ikhwan leaders are returning from London, which of course incubates innumerable expats and opposition newspapers and media, from almost all nations.
Morocco -
King Muhammed has been granting reforms over the past decade, so the varied opposition, which demonstrated in Rabat on the 20th, is pressing for more limited changes, like a more representation in parliament, and less military involvement in southern adventures in the Spanish Sahara. Morocco has the most lively interplay of political parties – some 40 representing every niche, it seems – so change will be consensual. King Muhammed is known to be a modest man, who has been challenging his father's favorites, those rich young heirs, to invest in their country.
Egypt -
Will the people of Egypt be able to overcome Nasser's legacy? Though Nasser helped bring about Egyptian independence, he instituted a socialist plan, made the army the supreme power, banned parties, and chased out many 'foreigners' – talented and/or rich Turks, Jews, Greeks, English, Albanians, - thereby cutting available capital and emboldening a dumb-down version of Pan Arabism, which Nasser tried to promote.
The Egyptian people have had forty years to study Nasser's legacy, and few admire him now, having seen through and solved for themselves, state-heavy deviations, be it the mistakes of heavy industrial investment, or state-heavy institutional socialism. The limits of symbolic appeal became obvious, and the treaty with Israel was grudgingly accepted. Surely, any military moves towards war will cancel funds and labor necessary to make the economy viable.
Some protesters till believe that the army is their friends, but many more suspect the army. Field Marshall Tantawi Behind the scenes and not publicized, is the jockeying for power on behalf of some twenty 'players.' Many seem to be puppets with strings attached, that is, they carry ideological or class baggage, be it socialism or crony capitalism. The rivalry has only grown, encouraged no doubt by the military and prompted by the shebab on the street.
Muhammad Al Baradei has linked up with the Ikhwan and others, which casts suspicions on Al Baradei's image as a technocrat, a scientist. Is he going for symbols at this late date?
Palestine -
The Palestinian president, Mahmud Abbas, in Ramallah, asks for the resignation of his cabinet. He'll usher in a younger bunch. He acted very fast to head off popular anger. Meanwhile, in Gaza, Hamas 'Zeal' is following the Iranian line: an obvious attempt to take advantage of the unrest, while secretly worrying. The educated people of Teheran have been fighting in the streets for basic liberties since 2009.
The Palestinian issue becomes more not less relevant, now that Israelis need not worry about 'wayward crazies' blowing themselves up; or the world's demands for some chance for an independent country called Palestine. Maybe one out of ten feels for the Arabs.
So do not be surprised if other Arab movements become more and more anti-Israel, and anti-American. It's another tragic detour. If Jordan and Egypt shake free of their treaties with the Jewish state, then a military build-up will begin, and a different paradigm emerge.
As the Chinese master Sun Tzu said years ago “Do not corner your enemy. Always leave for him a way out.” Israeli greed for more land is the cause for this hatred of America, and Jews. The main cause of the rising anti-Semitism, is just theft of another nation. This whole idea, hatched after WWII, of forming two states, Israel and Palestine, was, of course, an American idea. But why can't the Americans enforce their own design and purpose?
Will this Arab uprising turn anti-American? It would be better to put like this: does American hypocrisy prelude future negotiations? Does the Israeli theft of land and water, approved recently by the Americans in a UN vote, cancel out any good will on behalf of the Arab people.
Iran sends two warships through the Suez canal, something that could not have happened last month. On Israel's northern border, Lebanon had just changed its government, admitting in a militant coalition of Hizbullah and Palestinian refugees.
Yemen -
Two weeks of violent protests and police attacks, has led the young democrats to adapt 'sit down' tactics. Less provocative, the protesters spare themselves the truncheons and gas, while narrowing their message – the entire regime of Ali Saleh has to go. That's too big a jump for this poor nation. Sana'a, al Hudaydah, Aden, al Mukalla, and Ta'izz may have a combined twenty thousand modern-minded protesters, a small minority. They'll help spread specific North American notions re democratic self-rule into the Hadramaut and along the western coast, the Tahima, both more sophisticated than Sana'a. Both are sophisticated cultures, quite different and diverging. But this demand for a complete surrender of Saleh, while he is making some concessions, augurs poorly for the future. Yemen's democratic movement is losing its secular features and falling under the sway of younger, militantly organized mock-Islamic shebab. Adolescents do not possess adult brains, the frontal cortex is still sorting itself out, so kids they just don't listen; they act impulsively, demonize older folk, people not like them; think in black-and-white terms. They are impatient and think magically, believing that removing the entire government will lead to the peaceful pursuit of western democracy. They can be manipulated, and are, by the Ikhwan, the Brothers.
Yemen needs science – and patience. Development assistance gives way to humanitarian relief. Sana'a is not the only city on the verge of running out of fresh water. Energy is another problem – too expensive. So most Yemenis live without electricity or supplies trucked in. Urban commuters have few buses, so can't to work, or to the cafes where, if unemployed, as most are, they hang out, provided they can afford a coffee or a tea.
South and North are so different, and the Saleh regime so alone in the middle. The South is over-sophisticated, open to South Asian culture, and Soviet socialism, while the north is solidly royal – the kingship of the Zaydi imams. To the east are the more remote regions beyond Ma'rib. Here the Saudi forces remain ready to strike mock-Muslims calling themselves al Qaidah of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi forces are ready to intervene in Bahrain and Kuwait, also. At the momdent, Adm. Mike Mullen is in Riyadh, not the best place to command US Navy intervention in Libya.
Bahrain -
The assault on peaceful demonstrators last week at night at the Pearl Circle was probably instigated from some older member of the the Khalifa clan, not 'King' i.e. Emir Salman Hamad al Khalifa. He has been the best of the monarchs, trying again and again to work things out with an obstreperous elected lower house. The Shi'a keep going for it – the complete removal of the Sunni Khalifa dynasty and cabinet. Who's right?
The Sunni Emir and all behind him. The Sunnis Khalifas have been in Bahrain for some 240 years. They were nomads who, like their Kuwaiti, Qatari and UAE counterparts, migrated to the coast from the Najd desert after three years of no water. The Shi'a were merchants coming from Iran and Iraq, or workers brought in by the British, to work in Manama's port. (Some were in Bahrain for generations also).
We in the West fall for our own assumptions, calling only Israel democratic, when in Arabia bedouin chiefs are usually elected, when most every shura or community meeting ends with a show of hands. We call this 'primitive' democracy, and discount it. Now, believing the Arabs have no experience with ruling themselves, Americans see monarchs and emirs and all those working for them, as anti-democratic, obsolete, and fated to pass. The Arab elected leader is proud to keep his doors open for anyone who needs help. Chivalric behavior (mur'u'a) amongst the Arabs is even deeper than the impulse of 'adab. If you don't know what 'adab is, you don't know anything about Muslim people.
The Bahrain mob has a front and a back. The front is full of liberal educated democrats, saying “We are neither Sunni or Shi'i. We are both together.” In the back, however, are the Shi'a radicals. They cannot claim poverty – the Emir has been generous – or even unemployment – Bahrain is bustling. It has long served as Saudis' No.1 vacation destination. Liquor and prostitutes has served the Bahrainis well, and this is one area where the Emir must reform its 'customs,' recognizing Muslim sensibilities.
I don't know if Shi'a clerics do the bidding of the Iranians. They may have in the past, but the Iranian regime has really been discredited, and these clerics have no doubt matured. The violence last week has turned these clerics into legal instruments, as fatwas are issued for the complete removal of the Sunni regime. Well, this will not fly. There are many pro-Khalifa citizens, including many Shi'a.
Kuwait -
On the 18th the Kuwaiti authorities moved to break up a spontaneous demonstration of some 1,000 'stateless persons,' using rubber bullets, water cannon and gas. Curiously, the demonstration was sited well outside Kuwait City.
Iran -
Just as in the early 19 C. Iranian Shi'a intellectuals designed and set in motion the modern Islamic reform tradition, so now does Iran remain the source and font of rebellion against usurping clerics bent on power. Where is Ruhollah Khomeini when we need him? He'd have no tolerance for the present regime, for he hated police repression. And he hated those who used Islam to further their selfish ideologies, and those who stole from the treasury, or wasted the public money and youth on needless wars and provocations.
Now the democrats of Teheran prepare to sacrifice themselves in a coming big protest. But look what's happening – the hard line clerics rallied and pledged to try and execute Iran beloved opposition leaders. That's Musavi and Khatami and Karrubi, and others. Heaven forbid!
As closet Zarathushtris, the Persians are primed for the final showdown.
Kazakhstan -
Lifer premier/president Nursultan Nazarbaiyev has been maneuvered into stepping down, granting needed democratic reforms. We are not clear why that happened. Apparently his security organs pushed him to resign to upstage the gathering mob.
By John Paul Maynard
Friday, February 18, 2011
Escalation of the Uprisings in Bahrain and Libya
Middle East Speculum Report by John Paul Maynard
Arab Revolutions 2011 Escalation Feb. 18 2011
These three days (Feb.17-19) featured simultaneous demonstrations in most Arab nations, except Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE and Mauritania. Non-Arab Iran, Djibouti and Kazakhstan are also in turmoil. The causes are all shared: unemployment, soaring food and fuel costs, a crippling lack of affordable housing, cronyism, corruption and misrule, and police oppression – the lifting of emergency powers put in place by the army – plus constitutional reforms allowing for some sort of representation.
Egypt has only been doing this for some 6,000 years, so it is not surprising that no one voices any personal wish to be president, publicly. An uprising without leaders suggests that the government, too, will and can be free of official and military 'bids,' or any strong man.
History has not seen such a phenomena: a whiplash of protest, spreading all over the Arab world, simultaneously. No one knows where it will end. It is clear, however, that progressive people will be free to demonstrate whenever and wherever they want. Big demonstrations are also happening in Belgium and the United States (Wisconsin).
The shebab (youth) are forming their own countries. The Muslim youth are the best organized. But remember, teenagers do not have adult brains – the frontal cortex is still sorting itself out. So expect impulse, a black and white way of thinking, demonization, sports-team allegiances. Armed with cell phones and the internet, these adolescents can apparently move crowds of tens of thousands, tactically.
But the government can intercept these messages, and move quickly to the threatened building. That's what happened in Egypt on the night of 9th of Feb., when the shebab tried to seize the parliament building. The government had tanks brought up. This same thing happened in Bahrain on the 18th-19th of Feb., and in Libya from the 17th to the 19th. Of course the progressive patriots of democratic Iran demonstrated these large-scale tactical movements, dispersing to another part of town, when the government thugs reach a critical mass.. (Note: this is day three of big running demonstrations and street battles in Teheran).
LIBYA -
Qadahfy turns his special forces and commandos on the people, shooting them in many places, not just al Baida, and Benghazi. It's the third day of escalating protests, and it is estimated that over one hundred democrats have been killed. But some police and army units may side with the people.
Protests started growing, in al Baida and Benghazi, till on the 18th, huge crowds – a cool one hundred thousand perhaps – flooded and took over, town squares and offices. Riot troops were fighting neighborhood by neighborhood, and in the Benghazi kasbah, even the rats are fleeing.
Qadahfy has done nothing to reform, unlike all the other potentates, except Iran. He has blocked his own top officials from many needed changes. Now he prays to God that his army holds.
Qadahfy would like to go back to the Fezzan, just to get away from the commotion, to think things through, but must stay in Triboli, where his top cops are instructed no doubt, to keep a sharp eye on their junior officers. That's Qadahfy's worst nightmare – that his younger troops and intel pol go for over to the people.
There were pro-government demonstrations, in Benghazi and Tripoli, but much smaller. Just a month ago any protester with a sign or a chant would have been shot (or worse) by the regime. But now Qadahfy cannot kill too many, for he has been following, since 2006, the bitter resentment and sense of vengeance, of the families and friends of those killed (some 1,200) in Baida security HQ in 2006.
All those many shura and committees and trade unions that Qadahfy set up, they were just 'rubber stamps.' But now look what has happened: these group are gaining some independence, even power. It seems east Libya might break free of control by Tripoli.
Qadahfy has been in power for 42 years, longest in the world. He wants 'in' to world forums.
So he just may graciously hand over some of his powers, not for his people, but to keep his command together, and avoid being pilloried by the Euro-American media, NGOs and governments.
BAHRAIN -
Bahrain's leaders exhibited poor form by viciously attacking protesters on the Pearl roundabout, Manama. That happened in early morning of Feb.17, while protesters slept in their tents. Four were killed, and today, the 18th, we here of running battles with the police and army, with many casualties. The authorities give no warning before opening fire. The hospitals are inundated, with many victims still lying on the pavement, no one able to get to them. Emir Hasan Khalifa apologizes on the air, appealing to 'the nation.'
The royal Khalifa clan always warned the Americans that democracy will end once the Iranian-backed Shi'a gain representation. Looking back over the past two decades, one can see earlier struggles, just as vicious as the present. In 1992 the government opened to Iran, setting up economic joint ventures, but by 1994, it was clear that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards commanded certain virulent Shi'i anarchist 'Islamists,' on the Island. A National Guard was created, led by Hamad Khalifa, till he appointed himself, not as emir, but as king. Vicious repression in March 1995, saw police use rubber bullets, tear gas, and the arrest of leaders. A policeman had been murdered and a Shi'a convictred and hung.
Violence flared again 1997. The evidence showed that Iran had direct control of core factions of disaffected Shi'a, and aimed to overthrow the monarchy. The Saudis were ready to intervene, and in fact, Saudi police were on the streets. The Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF) will not split over rights.
A Sunni crowd gathered at the Great Mosque, voicing support for the government. They know that weapons were found last night, when the Pearl tent city was 'collapsed.'
The violence over the past few days around Manama shows how seriously the Bahraini authorities take the protests. The protesters say they are not sectarian at all. But we know how easy it is for a few 'mock-Muslim crazies' to move outside the law.
Not poverty but psychological frustration and indignation have brought different groups together to protest the Khalifa dynasty, its refusal to put in place a functioning parliament. Seventy per cent of Bahrain is Shi'i, , some 26% are Sunni, plus tiny percentages of foreigners, Christians and even some Jews. Till now, political action in Bahrain pivots on sectarian/cultural issues, with a loose Shi'i coalition of some tens of thousands, expressing varying degrees of reform. The Khalifa family and their clients were 'over-prepared,' having hired hundreds of Syrian, Yemeni and Pakistani mercenaries to keep the riffraff down. But it is the educated secular people, families, which constitute the manifestation. Will they be hijacked by the Iranian-support Shi'i policial 'masters?'
It did look like a murder of the innocents, but not quite. Many of the protesters were armed by the 18th. One witnessed observed a protester aiming a laser at a helicopter. Like other uprisings, there is a smart gentle 'head and voice,' secular educated folk, but, as one looks deeper, there are others in the shadows – Islamic groups, like the dumbed-down Muslim Brotherhood, anarchists, members of extremist parties and secret cells. In Bahrain, conflict between the Shi'a majority and the Sunni government, has been going on for over twenty years. I have little doubt that Iranian intelligence has a presence in the Manama Pearl Circle demonstrations.
Yet Hamad Khalifa is not off the hook. He proclaimed himself 'king' instead of emir, in 2002. He was the former police chief, for a decade. Bahrain had troubled parliamentary elections in 2007, basically a 50-50 toss up between the Free National Movement (FNM and the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). As in Egypt, explicit Muslim parties are banned. They need be vetted.
Spreading more of the wealth, through subsidies, and employment, has helped keep the lid on, till now..
EGYPT -
One week after Mubarak resigned, protesters are frustrated, because the power structure remains, the same cabinet, the same army and police commanders. Nor has the military offered to bring on protester candidates, to set up a new government. Now the army is being criticized for delay.
Today the 18th Feb. featured a big celebration 'manifestation, following Friday prayers.' Crowds were large, possibly one hundred thousand. Feelings towards the army is changing.
These revolutions should never lose their core aims. In each case the uprising stemmed from secular democrats, many educated, and their aims had nothing to do with ethnicity, class, or religious affiliations. Their complaints were political and economic.
In Egypt there is no chance that the Muslim Brothers will go for it – everybody is watching them - but eight or ten years from now, they may be in the government, fighting demonstrations also.
YEMEN -
Four dead, three in Aden, one in Ta'izz, which means the uprising has spread. Indeed, the independence movement of the south, will be using the peoples' frustrations, to push through their own agenda. Years ago we would fear communist penetration, more recently the Muslim Brotherhood, but South Yemen is different culturally from North Yemen, being more globally aware and sophisticated. They've received ancient influences from South Asia, and then from the British.
On the 18th, the bigger demonstrations (12,000 in Sana'a) prompt attacks by pro-gov. Protesters, with many injured, several killed. The numbers demonstrating have been increasing each day for some four days. Where will it lead? Ali Abdullah Saleh has been meeting with the various opposition groups over the past five years. He said he would not run again, and work to set up a representative government.
But his police are firing live ammunition, in Aden, in Ta'izz, where some twelve thousand are in open rebellion, and in Sana'a where we see an escalating situation.
Ali Saleh says he'll leave after safeguarding the Yemeni state. He must negotiate, but this takes time, and the demonstrators are impatient. Every delay looks like government stone-walling.
In the eyes of the demonstrators, there are stars, great aspirations to a normal life, but Yemen is very poor, its oil all but pumped out, and most critical, just a few years before water disappears in Sana'a.
JORDAN -
Big pro-government demonstrations attack anti-government demonstrators, eight injured, Feb.18th. The opposition is a new group – Islamists, students, bedouin, leftists – with no experience working together, are making a bid for representation. They demand reforms, like the re-institution of the teachers union, free elections for professional associations (once hotbeds of extremism), and other reforms, like a democratically-elected parliament and prime minister. The divisions inside Jordanian society are manifold. The king is a kind of umbrella that can cover all these identities. So the anti-gov. Jordanian protesters are not calling for regime change. Just reform. And that's been tried before.
The Ikhwan are strong in Jordan. In fact, the royal family has had major struggles with them. When Brothers are appointed to high positions, they go for it, secretly at first. They tolerate no others, not even the sufis. That's because the Brothers were infected with the evil takfiri ideology of Hasan al Banna and Sayyid Qutb. It was a big dumbing down. These fools thought that everything Western was corrupt and evil; that Shi'a should be eliminated, as well as any other 'atheists.' The readl Islamic reform tradition of course runs back through Rashid Rida, Mohammed Abduh, and Sayyid JalaladDin al Afghani. They taught that the big obstacle was not western science and political theory, but the backward retrenchment of the ignorant clergy. To them, Western technology and sciences should be mastered, and incorporated in a new Islamic society free of ignorance and intolerance..
The demonstrators also called for breaking the peace treaty with Israel.
ALGERIA -
It appears to be a big stand-off between dissidents and the police/army. The democrats tried to break in to Algiers on the 14th, but were pursued and beaten back. Algerians are very wary, remembering the civil war that killed some 200,000, from 1992 to 2002.
I trace the world-wide uprising to a decision by some protesters to disobey an army curfew outside Algiers on Jan. 23th. Even the old FLN (who fought the French) are criticizing Pres. Abdelaziz Bouteflika. He's promised to lift emergency law – as long as there is no emergency.
Algeria has enormous wealth from oil and gaqs; but has done effectively nothing to ease the suffering of its burgeoning population. Food subsidies can be raised, but new homes take years, decades in Algeria. This systemic shortage of affordable housing was identified by us in 1989, as a potent force for the disaffection of young people.
DJIBOUTI -
On the 18th, huge demonstrations estimated at thirty thousand, march through the streets. President Ismail Omar Guelleh recently voted himself chief-of-state for life.
Which countries will see revolution? Nations undergoing revolutions include Tunisia and Egypt. No other regimes have gone down. All, however, are promising and indeed granting democratic and social demands, except Iran, Libya. The Arab Gulf states plus Syria are giving out cash and gifts. But will the protesters be bought off? Certainly relief from a 30% rise in food prices in one year will cool people off. In the other countries, change has been thwarted for the time being. Or is being worked out.
A biological cause: some 20 years back, infant mortality fell dramatically in most Middle East and North African countries. Now all nations have millions of educated men and women, looking for any work, or just food to eat and a decent place to live, free of parents. The median age in Djibouti is 18.
FLASH – reports received of a huge demonstration in Madison, Wisconsin.
By Speculum Staff in Amherst, Massachusetts.
Arab Revolutions 2011 Escalation Feb. 18 2011
These three days (Feb.17-19) featured simultaneous demonstrations in most Arab nations, except Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE and Mauritania. Non-Arab Iran, Djibouti and Kazakhstan are also in turmoil. The causes are all shared: unemployment, soaring food and fuel costs, a crippling lack of affordable housing, cronyism, corruption and misrule, and police oppression – the lifting of emergency powers put in place by the army – plus constitutional reforms allowing for some sort of representation.
Egypt has only been doing this for some 6,000 years, so it is not surprising that no one voices any personal wish to be president, publicly. An uprising without leaders suggests that the government, too, will and can be free of official and military 'bids,' or any strong man.
History has not seen such a phenomena: a whiplash of protest, spreading all over the Arab world, simultaneously. No one knows where it will end. It is clear, however, that progressive people will be free to demonstrate whenever and wherever they want. Big demonstrations are also happening in Belgium and the United States (Wisconsin).
The shebab (youth) are forming their own countries. The Muslim youth are the best organized. But remember, teenagers do not have adult brains – the frontal cortex is still sorting itself out. So expect impulse, a black and white way of thinking, demonization, sports-team allegiances. Armed with cell phones and the internet, these adolescents can apparently move crowds of tens of thousands, tactically.
But the government can intercept these messages, and move quickly to the threatened building. That's what happened in Egypt on the night of 9th of Feb., when the shebab tried to seize the parliament building. The government had tanks brought up. This same thing happened in Bahrain on the 18th-19th of Feb., and in Libya from the 17th to the 19th. Of course the progressive patriots of democratic Iran demonstrated these large-scale tactical movements, dispersing to another part of town, when the government thugs reach a critical mass.. (Note: this is day three of big running demonstrations and street battles in Teheran).
LIBYA -
Qadahfy turns his special forces and commandos on the people, shooting them in many places, not just al Baida, and Benghazi. It's the third day of escalating protests, and it is estimated that over one hundred democrats have been killed. But some police and army units may side with the people.
Protests started growing, in al Baida and Benghazi, till on the 18th, huge crowds – a cool one hundred thousand perhaps – flooded and took over, town squares and offices. Riot troops were fighting neighborhood by neighborhood, and in the Benghazi kasbah, even the rats are fleeing.
Qadahfy has done nothing to reform, unlike all the other potentates, except Iran. He has blocked his own top officials from many needed changes. Now he prays to God that his army holds.
Qadahfy would like to go back to the Fezzan, just to get away from the commotion, to think things through, but must stay in Triboli, where his top cops are instructed no doubt, to keep a sharp eye on their junior officers. That's Qadahfy's worst nightmare – that his younger troops and intel pol go for over to the people.
There were pro-government demonstrations, in Benghazi and Tripoli, but much smaller. Just a month ago any protester with a sign or a chant would have been shot (or worse) by the regime. But now Qadahfy cannot kill too many, for he has been following, since 2006, the bitter resentment and sense of vengeance, of the families and friends of those killed (some 1,200) in Baida security HQ in 2006.
All those many shura and committees and trade unions that Qadahfy set up, they were just 'rubber stamps.' But now look what has happened: these group are gaining some independence, even power. It seems east Libya might break free of control by Tripoli.
Qadahfy has been in power for 42 years, longest in the world. He wants 'in' to world forums.
So he just may graciously hand over some of his powers, not for his people, but to keep his command together, and avoid being pilloried by the Euro-American media, NGOs and governments.
BAHRAIN -
Bahrain's leaders exhibited poor form by viciously attacking protesters on the Pearl roundabout, Manama. That happened in early morning of Feb.17, while protesters slept in their tents. Four were killed, and today, the 18th, we here of running battles with the police and army, with many casualties. The authorities give no warning before opening fire. The hospitals are inundated, with many victims still lying on the pavement, no one able to get to them. Emir Hasan Khalifa apologizes on the air, appealing to 'the nation.'
The royal Khalifa clan always warned the Americans that democracy will end once the Iranian-backed Shi'a gain representation. Looking back over the past two decades, one can see earlier struggles, just as vicious as the present. In 1992 the government opened to Iran, setting up economic joint ventures, but by 1994, it was clear that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards commanded certain virulent Shi'i anarchist 'Islamists,' on the Island. A National Guard was created, led by Hamad Khalifa, till he appointed himself, not as emir, but as king. Vicious repression in March 1995, saw police use rubber bullets, tear gas, and the arrest of leaders. A policeman had been murdered and a Shi'a convictred and hung.
Violence flared again 1997. The evidence showed that Iran had direct control of core factions of disaffected Shi'a, and aimed to overthrow the monarchy. The Saudis were ready to intervene, and in fact, Saudi police were on the streets. The Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF) will not split over rights.
A Sunni crowd gathered at the Great Mosque, voicing support for the government. They know that weapons were found last night, when the Pearl tent city was 'collapsed.'
The violence over the past few days around Manama shows how seriously the Bahraini authorities take the protests. The protesters say they are not sectarian at all. But we know how easy it is for a few 'mock-Muslim crazies' to move outside the law.
Not poverty but psychological frustration and indignation have brought different groups together to protest the Khalifa dynasty, its refusal to put in place a functioning parliament. Seventy per cent of Bahrain is Shi'i, , some 26% are Sunni, plus tiny percentages of foreigners, Christians and even some Jews. Till now, political action in Bahrain pivots on sectarian/cultural issues, with a loose Shi'i coalition of some tens of thousands, expressing varying degrees of reform. The Khalifa family and their clients were 'over-prepared,' having hired hundreds of Syrian, Yemeni and Pakistani mercenaries to keep the riffraff down. But it is the educated secular people, families, which constitute the manifestation. Will they be hijacked by the Iranian-support Shi'i policial 'masters?'
It did look like a murder of the innocents, but not quite. Many of the protesters were armed by the 18th. One witnessed observed a protester aiming a laser at a helicopter. Like other uprisings, there is a smart gentle 'head and voice,' secular educated folk, but, as one looks deeper, there are others in the shadows – Islamic groups, like the dumbed-down Muslim Brotherhood, anarchists, members of extremist parties and secret cells. In Bahrain, conflict between the Shi'a majority and the Sunni government, has been going on for over twenty years. I have little doubt that Iranian intelligence has a presence in the Manama Pearl Circle demonstrations.
Yet Hamad Khalifa is not off the hook. He proclaimed himself 'king' instead of emir, in 2002. He was the former police chief, for a decade. Bahrain had troubled parliamentary elections in 2007, basically a 50-50 toss up between the Free National Movement (FNM and the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). As in Egypt, explicit Muslim parties are banned. They need be vetted.
Spreading more of the wealth, through subsidies, and employment, has helped keep the lid on, till now..
EGYPT -
One week after Mubarak resigned, protesters are frustrated, because the power structure remains, the same cabinet, the same army and police commanders. Nor has the military offered to bring on protester candidates, to set up a new government. Now the army is being criticized for delay.
Today the 18th Feb. featured a big celebration 'manifestation, following Friday prayers.' Crowds were large, possibly one hundred thousand. Feelings towards the army is changing.
These revolutions should never lose their core aims. In each case the uprising stemmed from secular democrats, many educated, and their aims had nothing to do with ethnicity, class, or religious affiliations. Their complaints were political and economic.
In Egypt there is no chance that the Muslim Brothers will go for it – everybody is watching them - but eight or ten years from now, they may be in the government, fighting demonstrations also.
YEMEN -
Four dead, three in Aden, one in Ta'izz, which means the uprising has spread. Indeed, the independence movement of the south, will be using the peoples' frustrations, to push through their own agenda. Years ago we would fear communist penetration, more recently the Muslim Brotherhood, but South Yemen is different culturally from North Yemen, being more globally aware and sophisticated. They've received ancient influences from South Asia, and then from the British.
On the 18th, the bigger demonstrations (12,000 in Sana'a) prompt attacks by pro-gov. Protesters, with many injured, several killed. The numbers demonstrating have been increasing each day for some four days. Where will it lead? Ali Abdullah Saleh has been meeting with the various opposition groups over the past five years. He said he would not run again, and work to set up a representative government.
But his police are firing live ammunition, in Aden, in Ta'izz, where some twelve thousand are in open rebellion, and in Sana'a where we see an escalating situation.
Ali Saleh says he'll leave after safeguarding the Yemeni state. He must negotiate, but this takes time, and the demonstrators are impatient. Every delay looks like government stone-walling.
In the eyes of the demonstrators, there are stars, great aspirations to a normal life, but Yemen is very poor, its oil all but pumped out, and most critical, just a few years before water disappears in Sana'a.
JORDAN -
Big pro-government demonstrations attack anti-government demonstrators, eight injured, Feb.18th. The opposition is a new group – Islamists, students, bedouin, leftists – with no experience working together, are making a bid for representation. They demand reforms, like the re-institution of the teachers union, free elections for professional associations (once hotbeds of extremism), and other reforms, like a democratically-elected parliament and prime minister. The divisions inside Jordanian society are manifold. The king is a kind of umbrella that can cover all these identities. So the anti-gov. Jordanian protesters are not calling for regime change. Just reform. And that's been tried before.
The Ikhwan are strong in Jordan. In fact, the royal family has had major struggles with them. When Brothers are appointed to high positions, they go for it, secretly at first. They tolerate no others, not even the sufis. That's because the Brothers were infected with the evil takfiri ideology of Hasan al Banna and Sayyid Qutb. It was a big dumbing down. These fools thought that everything Western was corrupt and evil; that Shi'a should be eliminated, as well as any other 'atheists.' The readl Islamic reform tradition of course runs back through Rashid Rida, Mohammed Abduh, and Sayyid JalaladDin al Afghani. They taught that the big obstacle was not western science and political theory, but the backward retrenchment of the ignorant clergy. To them, Western technology and sciences should be mastered, and incorporated in a new Islamic society free of ignorance and intolerance..
The demonstrators also called for breaking the peace treaty with Israel.
ALGERIA -
It appears to be a big stand-off between dissidents and the police/army. The democrats tried to break in to Algiers on the 14th, but were pursued and beaten back. Algerians are very wary, remembering the civil war that killed some 200,000, from 1992 to 2002.
I trace the world-wide uprising to a decision by some protesters to disobey an army curfew outside Algiers on Jan. 23th. Even the old FLN (who fought the French) are criticizing Pres. Abdelaziz Bouteflika. He's promised to lift emergency law – as long as there is no emergency.
Algeria has enormous wealth from oil and gaqs; but has done effectively nothing to ease the suffering of its burgeoning population. Food subsidies can be raised, but new homes take years, decades in Algeria. This systemic shortage of affordable housing was identified by us in 1989, as a potent force for the disaffection of young people.
DJIBOUTI -
On the 18th, huge demonstrations estimated at thirty thousand, march through the streets. President Ismail Omar Guelleh recently voted himself chief-of-state for life.
Which countries will see revolution? Nations undergoing revolutions include Tunisia and Egypt. No other regimes have gone down. All, however, are promising and indeed granting democratic and social demands, except Iran, Libya. The Arab Gulf states plus Syria are giving out cash and gifts. But will the protesters be bought off? Certainly relief from a 30% rise in food prices in one year will cool people off. In the other countries, change has been thwarted for the time being. Or is being worked out.
A biological cause: some 20 years back, infant mortality fell dramatically in most Middle East and North African countries. Now all nations have millions of educated men and women, looking for any work, or just food to eat and a decent place to live, free of parents. The median age in Djibouti is 18.
FLASH – reports received of a huge demonstration in Madison, Wisconsin.
By Speculum Staff in Amherst, Massachusetts.
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
MIDDLE EAST SPECULUM REPORT - 16 February 2011
First scan Western Asia and North Africa, at all the ferment. We were watching Algeria all through the autumn, because bombs had exploded there, justifying heavy police action once again. And it was the refusal of the protesters outside Algiers to obey the government's curfew, and the unwillingness of tactical commanders, to use live ammunition on its own people. That's what ignited the Tunisians, who did just the same. Then there occurred that heinous bombing of a church in Alexandria, followed by riots between Christians and Muslims, and the firebombing of a mosque. That was the shock, I think, that kicked these particular people to protest. The young Ikhwan associates may have piled on oncew Tahrir Square became the arena, but the initial crowd was democratic, if not representative. About 1.3 million Egyptians participated in the demonstrations at the Ishma'ili Maydan (Tahrir Square).
Twitter, Facebook, the internet, cell phones and texting, not only provided information but also were used to rally, coordinate and even command the crowds. This tactical use of the net was pioneered by the Iranians last year, and today (Feb.15), when the police could not keep up with rapidly deploying crowds letter by a young crowd with Blackberries and other hand-held cyber tools. On January 25th, in Cairo, the protesters defied the police and army, just as they had seen done, and soon there was unrest through the region.
It is important to look at the other political and economic events occurring concurrently with the Arab revolts, just to gauge the force, the breadth and depth of those revolts. Lebanon, for example, has seen a drastic change in government earlier in December.. The west-hoping coalition fell as ministers resigned. Hizbullah, allied with militant Palestinian organs, has moved in and risen up as the most weighty player on the Lebanese scene.
Unrest in Iran has been simmering all along, since last year's protests. On the 15th of February several crowds coallesced. The police and then the Basij responded, but they were outnumbered. Why were there not more police and Basij?
At the same time, the hardline marji'un, the Shi'i clerics, gathered for a hate fest, with clenched fists held in the air while chanting death to America. In fact, these clerics are pushing through fatwas allowing Teheran police to pick up Mrrs. Karrubi and Khatami, then execute them.
Where is Ruhollah Khomeini when we need him? He would take his cane and chase out all the imposters. Khomeini hated police action – it hurt democracy – he hated anyone using the wealth or power of the state for their own status, power or wealth.
We have a sneaking suspicion that the authorities are having problems getting enough police and Basij to attack the people. The steady executions of protesters may have soured some of them.\
Iran is playing hardball in Afghanistan, cutting refined-fuel exports. All the westerners are dependent on petroleum, if only through an airlift. Kabul is literally breaking apart, into sections and suburbs, because people can't get to work. The few buses are overloaded. The winter has been a drag for most, for there is neither enough wood or oil to cook and keep warm.
Our proposal to create a 'smart town' from scratch in the Kabul area was presented to Hamid Karzai two weeks ago. Of course we don't expect to hear from him. But he knows he has no hope of providing housing for all the government-funded teachers and students, except by utilizing auto-construction methods. All Near East and North Africa nations need 'smart towns,' towns which can provide their own food and fuel, and which are connected to the world wirelessly.
WHO IS RUNNING EGYPT?
There exists already a spectrum of groups, ranging from the Committee of Wise Men to the Armed Forces Supreme Council. The first is a broad spectrum of the protesters, including scientists, doctors, Muslim lawyers, literary figures, historians, and one or two media-savvy youths. The second is the High Shura of the Uniformed Classes. The supreme Council has as members three judges from the Egyptian Supreme Court, plus Mr. Sobhi Saleh, representing the Ikhwan, all led by Tariq al Bishri. Mr. Bishri was first known as a leftist who later got into Islam. He has long been intrigued by the possibility of integrating modern ways with Islamic ones. Another member is a Coptic Christian.
The shebab on the street watch and listen warily. Messages flash from Cairo to Alexandria to Suez. On the 15th of February, strikes broke out in many places – employees protesting for higher wages. The costs to Egypt just keep rising. Already food has gone up 29% just this past year, before the chaos of the protests. Gasoline is ready to mount even higher in price, not just because there is less oil to sell, but because of investors' fears. Some $25 billion has alre4ady left the country. Bankers in Europe and the Caribbean are luring these fat cats to their tax-free havens, then freezing their deposits.
But what about the shebab, the youth? Over half of Egypt's citizens are under 25 years of age. Every year the government but find millions of jobs for its graduates, but of course, in our present system, be it capitalist or socialist, cannot just create jobs, except as great expense. For years the Egyptians hired all graduates, but paid them not enough to live on. Nor did the government build even half the houses necessary. And with Egypt's birthrate soaring, we are seeing a huge lack. The money required to meet minimum social needs has been spent elsewhere.
As in so many nations, the problems stem from a very partial 'austerity remedy' proffered by the World Bank, the IMF and many western organs. The idea was to cut subsidies, so the price would rise, and then the farmers would get money, to presumably increase their fields. But fertile land in Egypt is not there to grow, not even the Western Desert; the farmers grew no more produce, so the people had to pay a new higher price. Then there was the drought in Russia last summer, which cut the wheat. Egypt is, or was, the world's biggest wheat exporter. Also, US policies re ethanol cut wheat, corn and soybean production, and meant less food on the market.
Over one fourth of Egyptians are chronically undernourished, some starving. Alexandria has sea breezes to clear the pollution, but Cairo's air is poisonous, particularly the inversions accompanying sandstorms. Some 40% of Cairenes suffer from a respiratory problem, at some point in a year. If you have been to Cairo recently, you know the traffic is wildly congested. And still millions hope to own their own cars.
So, after three weeks of revoklution, who are the players? Who will they be?
Muhammed al Baradei has occupied a place on the Council of Wise Men. Mr. al Baradei is a controversial figure. Many Egyptians say he doesn't even know the Egyptian scene, but tpo others, that means he is clean of any involvement with the Mubarak 'Bonanza.' His hands are clean.
The Israelis are fearful, the Americans a bit angry: they say he intentionally allowed the Iranians to hide their activities. He was at first open to the Iranians, then progressively, he lost faith in them.
Mr. al Baradei's brief as secretary of the UN Nuclear Energy watchdog agency included promoting the peaceful use of nuclear power, so he looked at Iran from that perspective, also.
Our first remembrance of him was back in 2002, when he finally got access to Iraq. He was certain he'd find WMD. His teams looked in all the right places, and there was no evidence of any nuclear program. But we thought he was duped.
It is as if there were two groups lined up facing each other in long lines. One group consists of those who worked for the government or who benefited from a special relationship with it, or with the armed forces. The other group are all the unofficial citizens who participated in a leaderless revolutiion.
Ahmed Sadiq the PM is in the first group, and he is hardly appropriate as a new adviser.
Till recently, Egypt has had no legal opposition party. And if the young protesters have their way, there will be a National Movement of Change, a single big tent under which all the factions can sit. But that augurs poorly for a multi-party democracy.
One thing that shocked both Tunisian and Egyptian protesters, was the breakdown in law and order once the police remained in their barracks. Some 5,000 Tunisians were so scared they sailed or rowed all the way to Italy's Lampadusa Island.
LIBYA -
For those who follow Libyan affairs, the outbreak of mass violence in the city of Beghazi comes as no surprise. The demonstration occurred outside town, at the Security HQ. It was a sit-down demonstration to protest the detention of several dissident democrats. It is also the anniversary of the Bengazi Massacre, Abu Salim massacre, in 2006, when 1,200 were executed.
The government mobilized a couple hundred pro-Qadafy protesters, and these rallied as the police chased the anti-government protesters through the casbah. Over night we received reports that Libyan organizers are using cell phones and Facebook, texting and twitter, to rally a big demonstration on Feb.16th.
Libya has a huge number of unemployed youth. Highly disaffected. Numerous atttempts at rebellion, attacks on security forces, on Qadahfy, most led by Islamist groups, were all quelched by security forces. Many seized just disappear.
This big demonstration led by disaffected youth, aims to recapitulate the Tunisian model, though all know that the Colonel's police will not hesitate to use lethal force. His own movements are secret, and he has had 3 decades to prepare his forces to put down protests. But as in Iran, the people press on, as hopeless and as dangerous as the situation seems.
Impressed by US Marine, Army and Air Force operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Qadahfy gave up his proto-WMD projects, and by 2004, sanctions against the Libyan government were lifted, and soon, it was off the US terrorist list as well. Quite a bit of private investment monies have come in to the country since then., and Qadahfy and his team have been setting up new industries.
Qadahfy has long been seen as a nutcase, especially his 'green' blend of socialism, Islam and tribal practices and laws, but he's not a freak. He is a military strong man, a tyrrant who tolerates no other party than his People's Jamahiriya: 'a state of the masses...governed by the people through local councils; in fact, a military dictatorship.' (The World Fact Book,CIA).
Qadahfy has long sought a 'third way' between capitalism and socialism. He says he had adaopted elements from Islamic law, but Libya is not run as an Islamic country. Why? Because men own the houses. Because waqf laws have long been banned.
Libya is small, just 6.2 million. One would think that its oil and gas would help the people. Indeed, the Libyan citizen is theoretically wealthy - $8,400 per adult per year. More than in the Persian Gulf or Nigeria, Qadahfy has spread the money around, usually in the form of appliances, electrical gadgets and occasional vehicles. Or privilege housing or resort vacations. Its oil is sulphur-free, making it sell at a premium. (Years ago, in 1973, New England's legal need for low-sulphur crude forced Richard Nixon to accept Qadahfy's new high prices, leading to another doubling of the oil price.)
Qadahfy has been slowly privatizing firms, and he has set up numerous small industries in recent years. So Libya produces its own steel, cement, and plastic fabrication, slowly substituting for imports. That, as well as oil and gas. In 2005, Libya exported some $32 billion, oil and gas. Such money in a small country could go far, but still, no one knows where the money goes, except to pay off thugs and informers, the army. But about some $5 billion has been invested in new industry since 2006.
Well, on Thursday, Feb. 17th, the Libyan opposition will be holding their day of rage – throughout the couyntry. Qadahfy is the oldest ruling figure in the world, some 43 years in power.
The massacres in 2003 and 2006, claiming some 1,600 lives, have, and will, never be forgotten.
Ali Abdullah, of the National Front of the Salvation of Libya, states that the goal of the protesters is democratic reforms and a new constitution.
Unemployment is over 30%. Last month, hundreds of people raided an unfinished housing complex, hoping to occupy the homes. That's how desparate they are. In all these nations, the rulers decided not to invest in low-income housing, but to pursue profits by constructing luxury flats and villas.
BAHREIN -
Bahrain has a long dissident movement, so it's no surprise that the upheaval in Egypt triggers repeated protest demonstrations in Manama. Most are Shi',' with few hopes. The government is granting rises in subsidies, and cash grants of up to $6,000 per person. But why assume that these dissidents can be bought off?
YEMEN -
After a day of rage last week, the protesters are milling around, some in mosques, some in cafes, some on the street, again led by the disaffected youth, wired, who are not afraid to confront the security police and army. Judging from photos taken in Sana'a, quite a few women accompanied the men. One might think the secular educated class might be taking responsibility, but the Muslim organs, which command the youth, are just as used to cell phones and twitter as are the secular ones.
President Ali Abdullah Saleh has given ground, promising reforms, raising the subsidies given for basics. Much foreign development money has come in, but most goes to security. Water is a critical issue, as Sana'a will run out in just a few years. Drought has set in. In the south, there is a secessionist movement, while in the north, the long-dormant Zaydi Shi'a are demand a role in the government.
“In the world of the blind, the one-eyed is king.”
First scan Western Asia and North Africa, at all the ferment. We were watching Algeria all through the autumn, because bombs had exploded there, justifying heavy police action once again. And it was the refusal of the protesters outside Algiers to obey the government's curfew, and the unwillingness of tactical commanders, to use live ammunition on its own people. That's what ignited the Tunisians, who did just the same. Then there occurred that heinous bombing of a church in Alexandria, followed by riots between Christians and Muslims, and the firebombing of a mosque. That was the shock, I think, that kicked these particular people to protest. The young Ikhwan associates may have piled on oncew Tahrir Square became the arena, but the initial crowd was democratic, if not representative. About 1.3 million Egyptians participated in the demonstrations at the Ishma'ili Maydan (Tahrir Square).
Twitter, Facebook, the internet, cell phones and texting, not only provided information but also were used to rally, coordinate and even command the crowds. This tactical use of the net was pioneered by the Iranians last year, and today (Feb.15), when the police could not keep up with rapidly deploying crowds letter by a young crowd with Blackberries and other hand-held cyber tools. On January 25th, in Cairo, the protesters defied the police and army, just as they had seen done, and soon there was unrest through the region.
It is important to look at the other political and economic events occurring concurrently with the Arab revolts, just to gauge the force, the breadth and depth of those revolts. Lebanon, for example, has seen a drastic change in government earlier in December.. The west-hoping coalition fell as ministers resigned. Hizbullah, allied with militant Palestinian organs, has moved in and risen up as the most weighty player on the Lebanese scene.
Unrest in Iran has been simmering all along, since last year's protests. On the 15th of February several crowds coallesced. The police and then the Basij responded, but they were outnumbered. Why were there not more police and Basij?
At the same time, the hardline marji'un, the Shi'i clerics, gathered for a hate fest, with clenched fists held in the air while chanting death to America. In fact, these clerics are pushing through fatwas allowing Teheran police to pick up Mrrs. Karrubi and Khatami, then execute them.
Where is Ruhollah Khomeini when we need him? He would take his cane and chase out all the imposters. Khomeini hated police action – it hurt democracy – he hated anyone using the wealth or power of the state for their own status, power or wealth.
We have a sneaking suspicion that the authorities are having problems getting enough police and Basij to attack the people. The steady executions of protesters may have soured some of them.\
Iran is playing hardball in Afghanistan, cutting refined-fuel exports. All the westerners are dependent on petroleum, if only through an airlift. Kabul is literally breaking apart, into sections and suburbs, because people can't get to work. The few buses are overloaded. The winter has been a drag for most, for there is neither enough wood or oil to cook and keep warm.
Our proposal to create a 'smart town' from scratch in the Kabul area was presented to Hamid Karzai two weeks ago. Of course we don't expect to hear from him. But he knows he has no hope of providing housing for all the government-funded teachers and students, except by utilizing auto-construction methods. All Near East and North Africa nations need 'smart towns,' towns which can provide their own food and fuel, and which are connected to the world wirelessly.
WHO IS RUNNING EGYPT?
There exists already a spectrum of groups, ranging from the Committee of Wise Men to the Armed Forces Supreme Council. The first is a broad spectrum of the protesters, including scientists, doctors, Muslim lawyers, literary figures, historians, and one or two media-savvy youths. The second is the High Shura of the Uniformed Classes. The supreme Council has as members three judges from the Egyptian Supreme Court, plus Mr. Sobhi Saleh, representing the Ikhwan, all led by Tariq al Bishri. Mr. Bishri was first known as a leftist who later got into Islam. He has long been intrigued by the possibility of integrating modern ways with Islamic ones. Another member is a Coptic Christian.
The shebab on the street watch and listen warily. Messages flash from Cairo to Alexandria to Suez. On the 15th of February, strikes broke out in many places – employees protesting for higher wages. The costs to Egypt just keep rising. Already food has gone up 29% just this past year, before the chaos of the protests. Gasoline is ready to mount even higher in price, not just because there is less oil to sell, but because of investors' fears. Some $25 billion has alre4ady left the country. Bankers in Europe and the Caribbean are luring these fat cats to their tax-free havens, then freezing their deposits.
But what about the shebab, the youth? Over half of Egypt's citizens are under 25 years of age. Every year the government but find millions of jobs for its graduates, but of course, in our present system, be it capitalist or socialist, cannot just create jobs, except as great expense. For years the Egyptians hired all graduates, but paid them not enough to live on. Nor did the government build even half the houses necessary. And with Egypt's birthrate soaring, we are seeing a huge lack. The money required to meet minimum social needs has been spent elsewhere.
As in so many nations, the problems stem from a very partial 'austerity remedy' proffered by the World Bank, the IMF and many western organs. The idea was to cut subsidies, so the price would rise, and then the farmers would get money, to presumably increase their fields. But fertile land in Egypt is not there to grow, not even the Western Desert; the farmers grew no more produce, so the people had to pay a new higher price. Then there was the drought in Russia last summer, which cut the wheat. Egypt is, or was, the world's biggest wheat exporter. Also, US policies re ethanol cut wheat, corn and soybean production, and meant less food on the market.
Over one fourth of Egyptians are chronically undernourished, some starving. Alexandria has sea breezes to clear the pollution, but Cairo's air is poisonous, particularly the inversions accompanying sandstorms. Some 40% of Cairenes suffer from a respiratory problem, at some point in a year. If you have been to Cairo recently, you know the traffic is wildly congested. And still millions hope to own their own cars.
So, after three weeks of revoklution, who are the players? Who will they be?
Muhammed al Baradei has occupied a place on the Council of Wise Men. Mr. al Baradei is a controversial figure. Many Egyptians say he doesn't even know the Egyptian scene, but tpo others, that means he is clean of any involvement with the Mubarak 'Bonanza.' His hands are clean.
The Israelis are fearful, the Americans a bit angry: they say he intentionally allowed the Iranians to hide their activities. He was at first open to the Iranians, then progressively, he lost faith in them.
Mr. al Baradei's brief as secretary of the UN Nuclear Energy watchdog agency included promoting the peaceful use of nuclear power, so he looked at Iran from that perspective, also.
Our first remembrance of him was back in 2002, when he finally got access to Iraq. He was certain he'd find WMD. His teams looked in all the right places, and there was no evidence of any nuclear program. But we thought he was duped.
It is as if there were two groups lined up facing each other in long lines. One group consists of those who worked for the government or who benefited from a special relationship with it, or with the armed forces. The other group are all the unofficial citizens who participated in a leaderless revolutiion.
Ahmed Sadiq the PM is in the first group, and he is hardly appropriate as a new adviser.
Till recently, Egypt has had no legal opposition party. And if the young protesters have their way, there will be a National Movement of Change, a single big tent under which all the factions can sit. But that augurs poorly for a multi-party democracy.
One thing that shocked both Tunisian and Egyptian protesters, was the breakdown in law and order once the police remained in their barracks. Some 5,000 Tunisians were so scared they sailed or rowed all the way to Italy's Lampadusa Island.
LIBYA -
For those who follow Libyan affairs, the outbreak of mass violence in the city of Beghazi comes as no surprise. The demonstration occurred outside town, at the Security HQ. It was a sit-down demonstration to protest the detention of several dissident democrats. It is also the anniversary of the Bengazi Massacre, Abu Salim massacre, in 2006, when 1,200 were executed.
The government mobilized a couple hundred pro-Qadafy protesters, and these rallied as the police chased the anti-government protesters through the casbah. Over night we received reports that Libyan organizers are using cell phones and Facebook, texting and twitter, to rally a big demonstration on Feb.16th.
Libya has a huge number of unemployed youth. Highly disaffected. Numerous atttempts at rebellion, attacks on security forces, on Qadahfy, most led by Islamist groups, were all quelched by security forces. Many seized just disappear.
This big demonstration led by disaffected youth, aims to recapitulate the Tunisian model, though all know that the Colonel's police will not hesitate to use lethal force. His own movements are secret, and he has had 3 decades to prepare his forces to put down protests. But as in Iran, the people press on, as hopeless and as dangerous as the situation seems.
Impressed by US Marine, Army and Air Force operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Qadahfy gave up his proto-WMD projects, and by 2004, sanctions against the Libyan government were lifted, and soon, it was off the US terrorist list as well. Quite a bit of private investment monies have come in to the country since then., and Qadahfy and his team have been setting up new industries.
Qadahfy has long been seen as a nutcase, especially his 'green' blend of socialism, Islam and tribal practices and laws, but he's not a freak. He is a military strong man, a tyrrant who tolerates no other party than his People's Jamahiriya: 'a state of the masses...governed by the people through local councils; in fact, a military dictatorship.' (The World Fact Book,CIA).
Qadahfy has long sought a 'third way' between capitalism and socialism. He says he had adaopted elements from Islamic law, but Libya is not run as an Islamic country. Why? Because men own the houses. Because waqf laws have long been banned.
Libya is small, just 6.2 million. One would think that its oil and gas would help the people. Indeed, the Libyan citizen is theoretically wealthy - $8,400 per adult per year. More than in the Persian Gulf or Nigeria, Qadahfy has spread the money around, usually in the form of appliances, electrical gadgets and occasional vehicles. Or privilege housing or resort vacations. Its oil is sulphur-free, making it sell at a premium. (Years ago, in 1973, New England's legal need for low-sulphur crude forced Richard Nixon to accept Qadahfy's new high prices, leading to another doubling of the oil price.)
Qadahfy has been slowly privatizing firms, and he has set up numerous small industries in recent years. So Libya produces its own steel, cement, and plastic fabrication, slowly substituting for imports. That, as well as oil and gas. In 2005, Libya exported some $32 billion, oil and gas. Such money in a small country could go far, but still, no one knows where the money goes, except to pay off thugs and informers, the army. But about some $5 billion has been invested in new industry since 2006.
Well, on Thursday, Feb. 17th, the Libyan opposition will be holding their day of rage – throughout the couyntry. Qadahfy is the oldest ruling figure in the world, some 43 years in power.
The massacres in 2003 and 2006, claiming some 1,600 lives, have, and will, never be forgotten.
Ali Abdullah, of the National Front of the Salvation of Libya, states that the goal of the protesters is democratic reforms and a new constitution.
Unemployment is over 30%. Last month, hundreds of people raided an unfinished housing complex, hoping to occupy the homes. That's how desparate they are. In all these nations, the rulers decided not to invest in low-income housing, but to pursue profits by constructing luxury flats and villas.
BAHREIN -
Bahrain has a long dissident movement, so it's no surprise that the upheaval in Egypt triggers repeated protest demonstrations in Manama. Most are Shi',' with few hopes. The government is granting rises in subsidies, and cash grants of up to $6,000 per person. But why assume that these dissidents can be bought off?
YEMEN -
After a day of rage last week, the protesters are milling around, some in mosques, some in cafes, some on the street, again led by the disaffected youth, wired, who are not afraid to confront the security police and army. Judging from photos taken in Sana'a, quite a few women accompanied the men. One might think the secular educated class might be taking responsibility, but the Muslim organs, which command the youth, are just as used to cell phones and twitter as are the secular ones.
President Ali Abdullah Saleh has given ground, promising reforms, raising the subsidies given for basics. Much foreign development money has come in, but most goes to security. Water is a critical issue, as Sana'a will run out in just a few years. Drought has set in. In the south, there is a secessionist movement, while in the north, the long-dormant Zaydi Shi'a are demand a role in the government.
“In the world of the blind, the one-eyed is king.”
Friday, February 11, 2011
Arab revolutions broke out in 2011. There were many precursors. Though Islam did not play a part in these revolts, certain Muslim Groups, like the Ikhwan al Muslimiya, need be vetted. In Egypt, the army was always in control (since 1952) and now must enforce security while the new democrats pick their leaders.
Most of which follows was written between Feb.3 and 10, just before Hosni Mubarak announced his resignation. The situation may have changed then, but the points made in this post, prove even more useful now. Now the big questions: what kind of party platter do they serve, or is it to be one huge national party, a big tent under which all the chiefs can sit?
Notes on the Arab rebellions of 2011
The revolts breaking out across the Arab world in January did not happen in isolation. Over some twenty precursors (causes) have been identified. Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen have effected the requisite changes and resolutions, but the revolt in Egypt is still very much in process. Will the intense discussions in Cairo's Isma'ili Maydan (Tahrir Square) lead to competent democratic candidates and qualified reps? Will the Egyptian army play referee? What about the Islamic Brotherhood – will they go for it? Finally, and most critically, will the new governors of Misr find practical ways to relieve the intense economic pressures on most Egyptians? To do so they need to harness the social service resources of the Muslim Brotherhood. But the Ikhwan (Brothers) need to be vetted, qualified. And for this, regrettably, there exist no real competency in Islam possessed by any government, any Islamist, and any western social scientist. Muhammad Qurayshi was an ordinary unassuming man, without pretense. Not so these players.
Stranger than Ghosts and UFOs: Notes on the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, its Causes and Consequences by John Paul Maynard
Everyone is calling the place 'Tahrir Square' but that's a recent name. The place has been in existence since the Fatimid sultan Al-Jawher or 'The Jewel,' took possession of Fustat in 969. The Fatimids soon moved their capital from Tunisia to a new city called Cairo. The square's proper name is al Maydan al Ishma'ili. A maydan is that characteristic large open field found in most traditional Islamic cities and towns. The Ishma'ilis are Shi'i 'heretics,' here the Fatimids. They fought viciously against Abbasid imperialism and a dumbed-down conformist Sunni orthodoxy. Perhaps we've heard of Sultan Baybars, or the very imaginative, individualized non-doctrinaire Ishma'ilis. In short, the old Fatimid name connotes tolerance, a reconciliation with one's enemies, which is the opposite of freedom (Tahrir), in a way.
Modern state planners made the maydan a traffic round-a-about called 'Freedom' then surrounded it with government offices and museums. They also invited in big hotels – the most expensive. They called it cynically 'freedom square' and amazingly, western media still perpetrates the hoax, simply because they don't know Cairo or Egypt's history.
The maydan did not again become sacred land till the 25th of January, 2011, when the protesters disobeyed the state-imposed curfew, forcing the police and army to withdraw. Since then, there has been constant occupation. At times a half a million demonstrated, with signs and chants. But more often, and more interesting, were, are, the down times, when only a few hundred or a few thousand occupy the maydan. There one witnesses highly individualized behaviors. Some took odd postures in front of the cameras, or alone. Everybody had to draw something. Effigies were made, food distributed, a medical clinic working 'round the clock to care for severely injured protesters. Intense discussions were underway amongst some, but many protesters meditate in private. There are no leaders.
The media played such a role that one is tempted to say, following McLuhan, that the media is the message. Electronic communications have been democratized, so the democrats were able to organize. Individuals empowered each other. No plan or design prompted the revolution: it is organic, or if not, something uniquely odd, an enigma. It has yet to succeed. Mubarak is in office, and his intelligence, police and army firmly under his control.
There's no way see the future. It's uncharted territory. Dispassionate discussions need take place, and the politics of human needs must replace the politics of symbolic appeal. Before elections there must be a deliberative phase where representatives are selected. This must happen soon.
There is a table around which some one dozen people are to sit. Who are they? And will the present government, with all its bureaucratic weight, with its police and army, be admitted as members around this table? If not, then we are in for a rocky road.
The on-going 'happening' on the Isma'ili maydan does not die or get stale, because new people arrive all the time, and because intense discussions follow the constant news. The army has failed to secure control of the maydan, now a critical round-about for lower Cairo. The protesters can just send out a request for more people, and 10,000 will arrive within an hour or two.
Egypt's situation is so complex, its history so deep, that forgiveness should be a feature. Where's the truth and reconciliation commission? Where's, the admission of shared responsibility by government, by Muslim leaders, the leftists, the business class? Are they blaming outsiders (the US and Israel) for Egypt's malaise? The table we speak of, must have scientists, led perhaps by Dr. M. al-Baradei; historians; economists, a secular poet, and a few clergy who have not used their religion to reinforce their egos. At least one Copt should be present, and perhaps a more liberal, competent jurist from Al Ahzar University (to counter and discipline the Brothers).
This package includes three articles: An examination of the Muslim Brotherhood that refers to the lawful tradition of Islamic reform laid out in the late 19th C., in order to then vet any Muslim applying for office. The second looks at the other revolution, that of the Free Officers in 1952, to draw a few critical lessons. The third examines the precursors and probable causes of this second Egyptian revolution. All the Arab revolutions have economic as well as political similarities: high food and water and energy costs; a systemic refusal to build affordable housing; unemployment.
At first, there was no invoking in any of these revolutions, the politics of symbolic appeal. Outsiders were not demonized. Now, after three weeks, that is changing. The leftists and the Islamists are actively trying to influence the revolution. Both would hijack it if they could. But they cannot. In ten years, however, if there is no housing, no cheap food, no end to relentless inflation, no jobs, then we can expect the leftists and the self-appointed Muslim leadership, to take over the country.
In these articles, we make reference to the role of the media, the social media, their capabilities for communication and instant information, never seen before. Demagogues beware!
Young Egyptians played a big role, using FaceBook to launch the initial protests. But the Youth are highly politicized in a childish way. They, and the leftists and the political Muslims, are demanding the end of the regime. No one in high office should remain there. This is not good for Egypt. If the police are fired or kept in their command centers, criminals will run wild. Already, hundreds of criminals have been released. For some fours days, January 27-31, chaos reigned as criminals stole cars, broke into the Egyptian Museum, and mugged innocents. Neighborhoods organized their own defenses. Fear all but replaced peaceful protests for democracy. Let that be a warning. The police and intelligence services are needed now more than ever. So the impasse will persist. Tahrir Square will be continuously occupied until further notice. Since the square is a major round-about, the economic damage attributed to the uprising will slowly drive business people against them. Already Egypt has lost about 4 times more money, than the $1.3 billion given Egypt each year by the USA.
For the US government, the birds of policy come home to roost. The implications of past US policies yield lawful consequences. Five presidents looked to Hosni Mubarak for guidance and support in keeping Islamist terror cells from killing innocents. Civil war raged, with thousands of casualties. Mubarak was well aware that the pious Anwar Sadat had freed the Brothers, only to have them assassinate him.
In solving these issues, that is, in vetting Muslim groups, one must go back to Muhammed's time in Medina, to see and study the very real differences between his practices there, and those upheld by the Muslim religion, Sunni and Shi'i. My own understanding is that this great war raging from Mauritania to Mindanao, from Daghestan to Nigeria, will not subside till Muhammed's own ways receive just as must coverage as does the Muslim religion.
Muhammed was an unassuming man, without pretense. When he heard voices while meditating in a cave, he thought he was going crazy and wanted to kill himself. He never set up a clerical hierarchy. He did not see himself as a universal law-giver, which meant he left most laws stand. He did see himself as establishing a new universal religion. He had plan of conquest, nor is there any theory of war in the Qur'an. He left no teachings, no successor, no instructions. Because he was unassuming, he did not organize his patrimony. Hence the present predicament, where interpretations of Islam are all over the place; where the mullahs enforce uniformity, and the real message of the prophet is lost.
Scholars of Islam study Muhammed's Constitution of Medina, ca. 628 CE. It is not a statement of the Muslim religion, but a democratic mechanism to overcome the factions. For there were some eight Jewish tribes in the area around Yathrib (Medina), plus Christian monastics, and pagan bedouin tribes. There was also a growing argument between the Ansars (Helpers) of Medina, and the Muhijarun (emigrants) who fled with Muhammed to Medina from Mecca in Year Zero (622 CE).
The Egyptian democrats face the same kind of challenge.
How to Vet the Muslim Brotherhood: Errors of the Ikhwan, with reference to the19 C. reformer, Sayyid Jalal ad-Din al-Afghani
To assess the Muslim Brotherhood we need see through it to its doctrinal birth. Here we dissect reformist discourse and tradition in the Muslim world. We need go back to the beginning of modern reform in Islam. Jalal ad-Din al-Afghani, the great peripatetic late-19th century Muslim reformer, held views directly opposed to the less informed later reformers, specifically Hasan al Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Sayyid al Afghani spoke in an intelligent way about how to handle the Western colonial masters, the need to come together as Muslims, the need for science in Muslim life, and insights into Islam itself, that is, the practices of Muhammed at Medina, as opposed to the ignorance of the present self-serving clergy.
The al Ikhwan al Muslimuna, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) were later imitators, impostors, who bent this original wisdom completely into its opposite: prescriptions for disaster, for poverty. Everything western was seen as corrupt. Violence against innocents was sanctioned; non-Muslims were to be slaughtered like animals,' and even Muslims were permitted to be killed simply because they were not radicals. This paper finds the requisite historical depth necessary to assess the dumbed-down thinking of the current Islamists. Only then can one engage them.
The Ikhwan is often said to be the first, the oldest and the largest of the Islamic reform organs. But that is definitely not true. They are not the true inheritors of Islamic reform. We will show step by step, how they deviated, doctrinally. The MB consists of many chapters, with many wings. It's a franchise that can set up anywhere, anytime. There are probably over 15,000 established Ikhwan groups and secret cells, from Indonesia to Morocco. In some of these countries, the MB appears to be the largest opposition group or party. But that assessment requires that we phase out all those less-radicalized Muslims, plus the secular population, both of which are larger in numbers (and reason) than the MB. In Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Libya and elsewhere, the MB is banned as a political party. Governments are wary and for good reason: the MB outfit says one thing, and does another. They, violent splinter groups of the MB, consider themselves to be above the law. The most lethal of the terror groups were, are, MB splinter groups. Need we name them all? Start with al Qaida.
As extensive as the Ikhwan may be, no more than 350 Brothers run the organization. The core leadership is much, much smaller, arrayed in several consultative bodies, all secret. No new doctrine appears forthcoming: the Ikhwan have held the same dumbed-down policies for over 80 years.
Under intense police pressure over the past 70 years, renegade Ikhwan cells became autonomous, and some were murderous. I speak of the Gama'a al Islamiyya, Hizb wal Takhrir, and of course, al Qaida and its affiliates. The Egyptian Ikhwan lost control of their hotheads after they were banned and broken up by the Egyptian national and intelligence police. Nasser banned them after they tried to kill him and other government officals, and they have been banned ever since. Their views are narrow, divisive, and fictive, like driving the Israelis into the sea. In the 1990s, Egypt kept suffering violent attacks against foreign tourists, attacks on secular intellectuals, assassination of officials, and the depredations of bedouin. There was a decade of civil war in Egypt as there was at the same time, a war in Algeria, again featuring MB-inspired groups capable of killing hundreds of civilians for no reason. Thousands of brothers were rounded up and imprisoned. Some were tortured, not from sadism, or even revenge, but to get vital information that would upset attacks on innocent civilians.
I write this on February 5th, 2011. Protesters are lying down in front of tanks to prevent them from entering Tahrir Square. Mubarak had appointed Omar Suleiman, his intelligence chief, as Vice President. The intelligence chief is in charge of receiving the Brothers as they meet today in Cairo, for 'exploratory talks.' (The small Ikhwan reps later said it not negotiate further till Mubarak has left.)
Already the Brothers are setting conditions. Today (Feb.5) they say they 'want to see if the government will do the will of the people.' Like American politicians, they always say they represent the all the people. There are further questions. If the MB rises in the government, they can influence foreign policy, canceling Egypt's peace agreement with Israel. That would open Egypt as a base to terrorists, which would trigger Israeli responses, no doubt disproportionate. Egypt would be burdened with another round of Middle East armed struggle. Ikhwan ideology also holds to the belief, the conviction, that the West is Egypt's biggest problem. For it is the West which holds Mubarak to the peace agreements with Israel. It is Western influence which prevents the establishment of Islamic law throughout Egypt. Of course all this horrifies educated liberal Egyptians, who know full well how the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 was hijacked by clerical zealots.
The Muslim Brotherhood is still blaming others: Israel, America, the secular rulers of the Arabs. It had not helped them to so be divisive. 'Judge and you'll be judged.' And why judge anyways - isn't that God's role. The Brothers do not feel that way. They all think they serve God and Islam, but it is Islam that serves men and women. God doesn't need our prayers, as the Qur'an says more than once. Where did their presumption come from?
Let us look closely at MB-patented mentation. It's unbelievably simplistic – a manipulation of raw dreamy aspirations and sentiments, such that many ignorant Egyptians come to see them as 'the resistance.' So let us look more deeply, right down to their genesis and early history.
Curiously, reference to 19th century reformers throws light on the chief danger of , and complaint against, the al Ikhwan al Muslimuna, the Muslim Brotherhood. As we'll see, these pseudo-Muslims violate the meaning of Islam right from the start. Right from the beginning, when Hassan al Banna organized the Brothers in 1928, there occurred an unfortunate slip, a deviation and a departure from current Muslim reformist wisdom, resulting in a dumbing-down and distortion inherent in Ikhwan thinking. And this mistake cost the peoples of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan dearly. The Americans, too, ended up victims of this deviance, this original perversion. '9/11 was born in the dungeons of Egypt' goes the proverb. Unless we grasp the error of Hassan al Banna, we can't assess the Ikhwan, their loyalty and intentions; or point out exactly to them where and how they deviate from both Islamic reform tradition, and Islam itself.
It is possible to qualify Muslims them for service inside the government. Contact us and we'll send you a check list of a dozen questions about Islam which together can quickly tell what kind of Islam or mock-Islam lurks in the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In summary, some questions relate to the original meaning and use of the term 'Islam.' Others relate to judging others (Judge and you'll be judged), an assumed superiority, an exclusivity – 'we are the real Islam.' Or, the Shi'a are all heretics. One set of questions asks the respondent to identify the differences between the Prophet's practice at Medina, and the Muslim religion as conventionally understood. Others present passages from the Qur'an, or well-known ahadith, relating to how politics was understood, the role of government, and other cautionary sayings, like “There is no compulsion in religion' and 'The government must consult with the people at every step,' and so forth.
The Egyptian MB keeps hiving off terror cells, even as the Ikhwan leadership condemns terror. Those leaders are responsible for the atrocities of those acting in their name: the sick Istanbuli, the psycho-path genocidal Osama bin Laden and the perverse craven Dr. Ayman Zawahiri. Violence in Alexandria proves that such splinter groups are active in Egypt. So also the recent bombing of the gas pipeline in al Arish. Let's see the Brothers move against these 'mock-Muslim' jokers.
Formal participation in the new Egyptian democracy by the Ikhwan, might present a chance to humanize, educate, their ranks and leadership. The army and police and most of the Egyptian people, are ready to pounce on the Brothers if they violate the new emerging democratic social contract, based on tolerance and mutual respect, or seek to dominate the government, or any of their discussions with other parties. If the Ikhwan are excluded – and they withdraw – then one would do well to assume that, once again, they are plotting. But the actual program for them, what they must do for Egypt, is to move against their free-ranging radicals, circulating in the blood of Egyptians mainly outside Cairo, in the Delta and in Upper Egypt. Out there in the provinces the police do not have the control they have in Cairo and Alexandria. All the more reason for the Brothers to start working for the police, mediating perhaps, resolving differences, replacing symbolic issues from economic and environmental realities.
Can the Muslim Brothers in Egypt hijack the revolution? Everybody knows Islam had nothing to do with the revolution, except perhaps as a negative factor. The bombing of a Coptic church in Alexandria in December 2010, touched off three days of Muslim-Christian riots in that city. The bombers are probably secret splinter cells of MB operatives, maybe a resurgent Gama'a al Islamiyya, or maybe Hizb wal Tahir, or al Qaida of the Magreb. Judging by recent statements to the press, the MB leaders are as angry and as presumptuous as they ever have been. (You can tell by the sound of their voices, and by their erroneous presumptions, like 'we represent the Muslims.')
I can see a scenario where, over the ensuing ten years, the Ikhwan become a dominant force in Egypt. The Americans pushed for democracy, and this is what they get: the rise of Muslim demagogues and obsolete leftists. Suppose the Tahrir protesters succeed in breaking 'the whole regime,' where the army and the police get infiltrated and neutralized, or disbanded by the democrats. Then we will likely see the Ikhwan institute very anti-Western policies. The country will likely slip into a very stupid and tragic war with Israel, over Gaza. But remember: if the economic pressures on the Egyptian populace are not relieved, if food and energy are not affordable, if there is no housing for young adults, no way of honestly making money, no check on inflation, then a downward spiral will almost certainly take place, after which the Ikhwan and the leftists will inherit the whole thing.
The politics of symbolic appeal just may surmount and replace the politics of human needs. Incredibly, after all that history teaches, this simple truth is not deployed, utilized or even discussed.
As I write, the Ikhwan are moving into Tahrir Square. They are organizing and leading prayers.
By February 7th, the protesters had become vocally anti-American. This is a result partly of the emerging Ikhwan bid for leadership of the protest, and partly the fault of American leaders. Shocked as much as everyone else, the Americans have been making nightly scripted pronouncements, many televised. These have been misinterpreted by many in the Muslim world. American oaths of democratic pluralism seem cynical to the conspiracy-minded Arabs. So now the US government's capacity to (verbally) respond has gone from very weak to negative.
Curiously, both the protesters and the pro-Mubarak faction have angrily asked the Americans to just stay out of Egypt. Soon the Egyptian state may cut loose the Americans for good. US policy towards Israel seems to them highly deceptive, cynical. Educated secular Israelis also feel abandoned by the Americans. Likud has had no problems in executing their planned annexations of land and property and roads. Unless the American begin to be even-handed (in deed as well as words), we do not see any way by which the US can restore influence in a post-Mubarak regime. Indeed, anger at the US and Israel may be the cement that holds the Arabs together, as it was in Nasser's time.
The MB might manipulate and promote anti-American, and anti-Israeli sentiments, something no one can check, because the so-called educated democrats are just as ignorant about Islam as the terrorists who act in its name. We cannot overestimate the stupidity of people, ourselves included.
We in the West consider ourselves educated and sophisticated. But Cairo is home to sophisticated thinking, also. The Arabs are well accustomed to intrigue, plots and naked grabs for power and money. (We'll see that Nasser did not play 'strong horse,' a strong man, until the people demanded that he be president, after 1954, and put him back into office after he resigned following the war with Israel in 1967. It was only then that he became really popular. Egyptians are so sophisticated that responsible leaders do not seek office, being free (supposedly) of all greed, greed for power, influence, and money.
It's common to hear Westerners talk of 'strong men' in the patriarchal or tribal context. In fact, tribal chiefs are usually elected. A show of hands at the end of a meeting is just as democratic as a paper ballot in a box, as formal elections. Indeed, there are veins of democracy running through bedouin practice, and in Islam also. But the West, believing they derive from the Judaic tradition, and assuming they are the most advanced, call Israel the only democracy in the Middle East. Of course that has been an incorrect and very destructive myth. Israel has done practically nothing in the way of peace. Obviously the Likud government is sponsoring the annexation of Arab lands, but the government of the United States foolishly thought, even till recently, that the Likud players were going to play by international rules. Not a chance in the world for that.
We worry about Islamic radicals, fanaticism and a propensity for violence. But it is easy for anybody interested in the Middle East, to examine Israeli actions, and see how ingeniously provocative and self-serving. The Jewish religious radicals of the Likud are no different, no better, than their extreme Muslim counterparts. Christianity also is full of flaws and posturing. The Bible sanctifies genocide in some 6 passages (in the books of Deuteronomy, Leviticus, Joshua, and Kings).
If US policy makers and spokesmen could come out and say “We believe that radical Zionism and radical Islam are equally at fault,” the Muslim people would go wild, and see us in a positive light. As for the good people of Israel, the ones who hope to make a just peace with the Arabs, they will be empowered as well. But tragically the doctrinal blinders of US politicians preclude any intelligent response, so it is much to be preferred, that the US government just shut up, publicly, till it corrects its own myopia and double standards. It seems to know nothing about Islam, so cannot prosecute the terrorists using Islamic law, which is easy to do.
An Arab child is worth just as much in God's eyes as a Jewish child. Why do we even have to state this obvious truth? Because Israel's way has long been, since 1947, to punish, far out of proportion, Arabs. Israel has been hijacked by religious fanatics, many from America and Russia, who have caused immense damage. And such clerical rule has not worked. Hisbullah, Hamas, and other fedayeen cannot be exterminated, though Israel military planners may 'see' that, as they are preparing a truly massive response to the next time Hizbullah or Hamas fires off a few rockets.
It was required that we draw attention to stupid policies towards Israel, as we move to focus on the stupidity of mock-Islamic terrorist. State terror is even more cruel than terror by small teams of killers. State terror kills more innocents, many times more. The Red Cross says that over 26,000 Lebanese civilians were killed by the Israelis in 1982. Some 1,400 were killed in the recent Gaza operation. Yet Americans become enraged when a teenage suicide bomber, with absolutely nothing to lose, kills a few soldiers or settlers, because some racists seized his ancestral land.
HOW TO TELL A REAL MUSLIM: CRITERIA FOR VETTING MUSLIM POLITICIANS
There are simple tests to ascertain whether some person might know about Islam -or not know. I'll try to summarize in the briefest way.
If your religion is fortifying your ego, you've gone off the rails. Islam means 'surrender' in Arabic: one must doubt oneself at every step. Or let me put it in western scientific terms: we are only as intelligent as our assumptions.' Islam, 'surrender', entails seeing through assumptions of the imaginary self and its co-opted ordinary conceptual mind. 'Surrender' is not in the discourse of these modern political Islamist groups. True Islam is not followed, but bent to serve the will to power by holy-men acting above the law. Even now the Muslim Brother's leaders are acting like spoiled children, refusing tom play along, field candidates. It knows it does not have a critical mass. Those leaders may be unaware that they are 'licensing' terror cells.
We always see the loudest clergy in any of the religions, state really stupid cruel and irrelevant sentiments, demonizing others not like them. To hell with them all. They have usurped what is only God's task: the judgment of the humans. 'Judge and you'll be judged.'
The 'Takfiri Ikhwan' following Qutb, and al Banna, and the mentally ill 10th C. jurist ibn Taymiyya, and later, Osama bin Ladin, are obnoxious and downright dangerous. Stupidly and cruelly, they twisted Islam in such a way that it was now lawful for Muslims to kill Muslims. And some 100,000 innocent Muslim people have been murdered by the Takfiris so far.
Both the Ikhwan and the police have a lot of blood on their hands. There has been a civil war against the MB in Egypt since before Egypt was independent. It was the secret police of King Farouk who assassinated Hassan al Banna, again, to revenge assassinations (1950). Nasser was never tempted to side with the Brothers, or use them, even if they both shared anti-colonial priorities. In a sense, Farouk was correct in identifying the top leader as a killer. For it was al Banna's stupid 'innovation' which led the Brothers to kill and kill, and be killed. It was Nasser who insisted that they not be allowed to launch attacks against the British in Suez, and against Israel. He also insisted that the nascent Palestinian fidayeen, be strictly disciplined, so as to not launch attacks against innocent Jews. That whole period of 1947-1967 is worthy of week-to-week study. The much beloved 'father of the Jewish nation' had absolutely no respect for Arabs and moved to kill them or just evict them or make life so miserable for innocent Palestinian people, that they had to flee to camps.
Yet still that's not the prevailing narrative in America. Israel was besieged, fighting for its life, surrounded by a dozen powerful Arab armies, some armed by the Communists. How quickly these myths are dispelled by any reference to the historical record. Israel under Ben Gurion fought wars of aggressive expansion, 'cleansed' parts of Eretz Y'Israel, and executed thousands of captured Arab soldiers. Then there followed some some six large Israel commando assaults against a much weaker Egyptian army. Sounds far fetched? These aggressive acts culminated in the 1956 war. That war, one in which the Americans sided with the Egyptians, was the logical extension of Israeli plans. Contrary to his image, Ben Gurion apprenticed in outright genocide. He implemented his disrespect for Arabs. One can easily prove that power in Israel was and is usurped by greedy men using religion to justify the crime, following the base politics of symbolic appeal; and that the American Jews, backed tacitly by their US government, supported and pushed through this abomination, this hundred-years war. Since we Americans are responsible for what happened, we will pay the price. In just a few years, petroleum will be too expensive for ordinary Americans to burn in their cars and trucks. The OPEC and OAPEC have preferential pricing schedules which they will implement when the slack in the oil market is taken up. Even now the hens come home to roost. Israel still practices apartheid, a 'slow motion genocide.' For what Arab can live a decent life in occupied Palestine, or in Gaza? But the Ikhwan's militant wings practice genocide as well.
At this point we turn to look back at Muslim reform, to explain why and how the Ikhwan deviated and continue to do so.
Modern Islamic reform began in the later half of the19th C. and is generally attributed to one man: Jamal al Din 'Asabadadi' al Afghani, 1838-1897. He grew up in Hamadan Persia, and studied in Shi'ite medresehs in Qom and Meshed, where he was influenced by Sheikh Ahmed al Ahsa (1753-1826). The sheikh was a very unconventional thinker, critical of mere imitation, 'group think,' and the presumptions of the higher clergy. Sheikh Ahmed lived in Yazd, as did Afghani a half century later. Yazd of course is the center of the Iranian Zarathushtris, non-Muslim monotheists. Hence his bizarre ideas about personal guardian angels, the wanderings of higher bodies in the cosmos, a vigorous expansive after-life. This exotic tradition eschewed any sectarian chauvinism. Both Sheikh Ahmed and Sayyid al Afghani saw the battle as against conventional Islam, the corrupt presumptuous clergy.
Al Afghanis became a mujtahid, one competent to assess legal cases using fiqh and shari'a. He began to wander, going both west and east from Iran. First to Afghanistan, to meet with Naqshbandiyya and Qaderi masters, residing in Kabul, Ghazni and Qandahar. Then to Peshawar, Lahore, and Delhi. He worked for the Qajar (Mongolian) shah, Nasir ad Din, as an adviser, but was disillusioned. He was in Mecca in 1865. Fluent in Turkish, Persian and Arabic, al Afghani lectured in Turkey, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. He had to flee to Paris, as the feudal Mameluke emir moved against him. Even though he grew up during the colonial period, al Afghani did not recommend violence or armed resistance, but civil actions, like boycotting British-run tobacco merchants in Iran. His professional writing appeared during a long exile in Paris, where he published a periodical on reform in the Islamic world, together with M. Abduh, his prime disciple who was to carry on a real reform effort, in Egypt.
How paradoxical it is that Sayyid al Afghani, surrounded by imperial powers, recommended basically a non-violent approach to them, and a rigorous critique of Islam religion and law which would de-fang the clergy and roll back their usurped incompetent reactionary domination. The modern Islamists blame the imperialists with greater vehemence even though the nations of the Middle East have been free and independent for over half a century.
Sayyid al Afghani said that the West should be studied, its technology and knowledge adopted if they can help, and swestern democracy, liberalism and superiority in science acknowledged. Then the liberal parties of the West can be persuaded, with good argument, to just get the hell out of the Middle East and South Asia. Or at least change their act.
Al Afghani had a genuine message, one thought through. Integrate science into faith. He taught that Islam should adapt to the modern age, to basically rip off the West of everything useful. Then the Imperial parties of European states can be confronted, morally, scientifically, and then persuaded to end their occupations. After all, the West took much from Islam – science – so now Muslims take from the West.
To al Afghani, the Muslim world was not strong or smart enough to fight the big European parties and powers, including Russia, and the reason for that weakness, in his view, was the Muslim religion itself, the clergy. He knew Arabic well, so could read for himself the original legal texts. He studied Muhammad's practices at Medina and Mecca 622-632 CE. How they differed from the Muslim religion as it was put together rather haphazardly by his successors, the khalifas and the jurists. Al Afghani was a devout Muslim who liked to quote Bistami “I have seen the devil and he is a Muslim.” For him – as it must be for us – Islam was, is, a sacred call to surrender the ego, the small self, the personality, in order to engender in the body, essence.
Also characteristic of cruel and stupid 'Muslim' serial murderers is their belief in very dubious hadith or a very selective approach to the Qur'an; they are emotional, not intellectual. They are committed, not impartial, objective scientists. The MB ranks maybe humble men and women, but their leaders, driven into secrecy, once again plot and scheme to 'play' the revolution, hoping later usurp constitutional authority. They've always condemned everything western, and if they are eventually championed by the people, it will be because the Ikhwan can play on anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments to win followers and 'authenticity.' Why are they able to do that? Because the US government has once again done absolutely nothing to prevent the further annexation of Arab land in Arab Palestine.
Al Afghani held both the European imperialists and the Muslim clergy responsible. He did not fault the Jews, because he lived before Zionism became a political force. He moved directly against the earlier Wahhabi craze, in arguing that, whether Shi'a or Sunni, it does not matter. That is not an issue. He said the clerics used this division to garnish their prestige. Hence Muslim weakness.
The threat came from outside, from the West. “We must meet them on the basis of our wisdom and their wisdom.” Curiously, al Afghani's words to his Western friends (incl. Ernst Renan) were even more liberal: “So long as humanity exists, the struggle will not cease between religion and philosophy, a bitter struggle from which, I fear, free thought will not emerge victorious.”
Al Afghani's main student was Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), an Egyptian journalist, a scholar who eventually became chief mufti of Egypt. He lived with Al Afghani in Paris, where they published a reformist news magazine. He admitted that, culturally, the Middle East was backward, the main reason being taqleed, or 'thoughtless imitation of tradition.' He said some prescient things about the malaise of affluence in the West. But he admired science. Incredibly, 'Abduh suggested that science be applied to Islam, that Islam, too, was a science, be it self transformation or social healing by law. There could be no contradiction between reason and revelation, between God and His Creation. Basically, he said it was possible to live as modern Muslims, using science and education to achieve Islamic goals. The main obstacle to this realization is the clergy.
'Abduh's chief disciple was Rashid Rida. He was born in 1865, in Tripoli, Lebanon. He studied with 'Abduh in Cairo, where he published a magazine called Al Minar, or, the Lighthouse. Rida also said western science should be used to perfect Islam. The Muslim lands were not stagnant but ill-informed about their own origins. Reform meant embracing scientific criteria of truth, proof, and inquiry. Rashid Rida told the truth about Islamic violence, that it originated when the Ummayad chieftan Muy'awiyah wrested the caliphate from Ali. Hence the Sunni-Shi'a split and most of the violence. He argued that recognition of past errors bring Muslims together.
Rashid Rida's chief disciple was Hasan Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. He was not a professor or a cleric, but a schoolteacher. A showman. His grasp of Islam was superficial. And started blaming others for Egypt's problems. Jihad was required against everything western. He had no coherent political theory, but worked along the lines of symbolic appeal. He was a populist.
But it was Hasan Banna who taught Sayyid Qutb, often seen as the transitional figure. Qutb, too, was to be executed for inciting violence, murders, against high state officials (in 1966, after a plot on Nasser's life). He was stupid enough to revive ibn Taimiyya's long-dead theory and practice of takfir, whereby another Muslim is deemed not to be a Muslim but an infidel, to be killed with impunity. This stupid idea fanned the flames, killing many Muslims.
The next rung on the tree, is the punk Istanbouli, who led the Ikhwan team that assassinated Anwar Sadat for making peace with Israel. Then there was Ayman Zawahiri, still Number Two of the al Qa'eda. They were all people who thought they knew, even represented, Islam, an errant assumption which permitted them to act outside the law. Can they be trusted now?
Bear in mind that the Muslim Brotherhood was just one of a number of reform ideologies now arising amongst the Arabs. Kemal Attaturk was, of course, Nasser's teacher. Arab nationalism morphed the Ba'ath or Renaissance form, invented by a Christian (Michel Aflaq) at the American University of Beirut. There were also extensive nets of communists, and several socialist parties, some of which are still functioning. The one thing these groups all had was a blaming of others, a demonization of the other. Much time has passed, and Egypt has matured. The Ikhwan had a brief period of power after the 2005 elections, where they held 24% of seats, but failed completely in the most recebnt elections. Their leader, M. Mahdi Akef, was player till 2010 when the Ikhwan mysteriously lost their support.
The Ikhwan tried to kill Nasser. He had Sayyid Qutb hung. Since then, the pressure has not let up. The Ikhwan are prohibited as a party. Was this correct? Yes, they failed to meat some of the basic requirements of a democratic party. Up fronbt, they all looked innocent. Indeed, they were, are, devoted servants, providing many social services, so they do deserve a place at the ruling table.
The sorry fact is that there are well over 25, 000 Ikhwan cells in Egypt alone, each of which has its own take on events. There are MB cells plotting right now to kill certain Europeans and Americans. Did not 9/11 grow out of the dungeons of Egypt?
The US government was correct in publicly calling for the removal of Mr. Mubarak. All along the Americans (and probably the Europeans also) have been suggesting he open up the country to 'genuine' democracy. But the president would always cite the danger of the Ikhwan gaining control in the chaos. And he was right at the time. But now it is a bit different. Everybody has matured, it seems. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, led by M. Mahdi Akef 2004-2010, and Muhammed Badie from 2010 on, are quick to say that they are interested in serving locally, providing services.
As I write, on Feb.5, the Ikhwan announce that they are ready to join the government. That augurs poorly for Egypt in western eyes, but such participation can be of great advantage to Egypt.
It remains against the law, for the Muslim Brotherhood to run as or even exist as a political party. Most brothers are not all that politically aggressive, but some are pursuing deadly destinies. The explosion Feb.4th of a gas pipeline at Al Arish in the Sinai may be their work. There are scores of secret cells ready to act with brutal violence against those targeted by their leaders.
The long period under Mubarak can be studied month by month, to see the deadly cycles of violence: Ikhwan attacks, Egyptian secret police arresting and torturing them. Groups breaking into cells, like franchises of terror. The Ikhwan leaders were driven into exile, or arrested, tortured, and released; then arrested, tortured and released in another cycle. Many Brothers never made it out of those prisons and torture chambers. It's leadership understood instinctively, that it might be better to not even get into politics. It is enough to provide the array of comprehensive services that the Brotherhood provides to and for the sick, the elderly, the destitute, the refugee.
Indeed, there has been a maturation of views in Egypt. A sophisticated city has become even more sophisicated. Secular and sectarian, Muslim and Copt, the government and the people – each proving pliable and giving toward the other. The new Egypt was deeply offended in December, 2010, when a Coptic church was bombed in Alexandria, triggering sectarian riots, sectarian confrontations of the most ominous kind, riots of a deadly nature. Over 300 had died in the 2011 Revolution by February 5th. Another hundred have disappeared. Some 2,000 have been wounded.
What sparked the January 2010 Arab revolutions?
The uprising in Tunis, plus more recent violence in Alexandria, were the two main contributing factors to the January 25th 2011 Revolution. But behind them were others, less direct perhaps, but just as powerful. These are basically: higher food prices, a shortage of housing, inflation, unemployment, lack of decent services, poor education and health care limited to the rich;and the heavy suppression of the people under emergency law, for decades. Other complaints include: obvious corruption by those associated with the president, his ministers, and certain members of the parliament. Plus the growing gap between the rich and the poor, that is, the death of the middle class. These were, are, all contributing factors.
Other factors, more subtle, go unmentioned. Bad air in Cairo give most resident respiratory problems. Water is scarce, usually for sale, if you can get it. The media's influence was drastic, yet so far not studied. Cell phones, internet blogs and news services, MySpace and FaceBook, texting and twitter – web cams and 24-hour news by video, TV or radio – together these more personalized media assist the propagation of the message. People came together just fooling around with their cell phones or checking e-mail and internet news hourly. The Egyptians found the government is dominating TV and radio. The social media accelerated the pace and broadened the base of the uprising, causing sparks to fly off and land in other lands, where they start pro-democratic fires. Electricity, radio waves and the use of discrete frequencies permitted Algerian demonstrators to talk with Tunisians. Then the Tunisians, running into unexpected success, coached and encouraged their counterparts in Egypt.
Behind the revolt in Tunis, were the larger series of demonstrations in Algeria. Like Egypt, Algeria has been under emergency powers for some two decades. Rights of expression and assembly, the right to bear arms, a society free of corruption and the violent abuse of the police and army, were the political reasons for the Algerian unrest. Economically, the issues were basically the same: higher food prices, 30% unemployment and the long-term tragic lack of affordable housing.
The Algerians, however, are war weary and war wary. They did not demand that the government change faces. Curiously, Boutiflika canceled emergency law, returning the constitution, almost simultaneously with the Feb.3rd attack of the Egyptian protestors by pro-Mubarak toughs, some riding camels and horses.
But what about 'economic' factors – survival? The soaring price of food and fuel, the long, continued lack of housing, the failure of Israel to do anything for peace, the Palestinian tunnels and Egypt's policies of border control, the Iranian revolt by the people two years ago, the break up of the Sudan, and the continued fighting there. The murder of a young Mr. Sayyid in Alexandria in mid January set the spark that led to the manifestations of the Isma'ili Maydan.
But what about the Muslim Brotherhood? The Ikhwan metastacized, setting up chapters around the Arab, then Muslim, worlds. Secular Syria, defending tolerance of religion, moved on them after they repeatedly assassinated scores of young cadets. I heard about that in Aleppo, from a small group of Algerian and Syria air force cadets. Then I spent a brief two days in Hama, in January, 1979, visiting some of the mosques. (If you want to meet people in the Islamic world, attend prayers, then remain after prayers, seated on the carpet. People will greet you, invite you, hear you out. All these good Muslims were slaughtered some 26 months later by Syria's Revolutionary Guards. But then, incredibly, we hear that just on 26th January, 2011, the Syrian government announcing that it will distribute free stocks of food, electronic toys, and even appliances, just to head off trouble.
Fear and loathing in Damascus and elsewhere in Syria is the subject of an important book that will never be written. In Lebanon, there was, in early January, a change in government, one in which Hisbullah and their Sunni Palestinian allies, now hold sway. Do these folks want to busy themselves with the politics of symbolic appeal while the economy collapses? The Muslim Brotherhood has deep roots in Lebanon. Indeed, they're found in all Arab countries. In Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the MB became mutually supportive. They're still being weeded out. Another unwritten book tells that story, one with implications, i.e., the 9/11 'consequence.'
The Brotherhood is big in Africa. Let us hope that African wisdom trumps Wahhabi divisive posturing. Otherwise, they'll be a new crop of wars. It's already happening. The Ikhwan have been active in Sierra Leone, and the Cote d'Ivore, even in South Africa and Madagascar. Somalia is a bit wild for the Brothers, but I'm sure there exist imitators, crazed clerics and their talibs who see themselves fighting for God, for the spread of Islam, and so kill others not like themselves.
The Muslim Brotherhood has as its ideology, a 'blame the other' mentality, with many mechanisms of confidence. These ostentatious self-acclaiming law-usurping 'Muslim' usurpers, foolishly saw, and see, Egypt's problems as coming from non-Muslim foreigners. The Brothers foolishly see all Western influence and objects as all corrupt. All Western civilization is immoral. That's the essence of Qutb's book 'Milestones.' It is as warped as Mein Kampf.
There are good brothers and bad Brothers, and most Brothers are rather neutral. After all, their work is social service. And because they have contributed, quite a lot, they deserve a place at the table.
When they come, every word they say will be listened too carefully. Plots will be seen through. Somehow the Ikhwan must be made to change. Can they be redeemed?
The most lethal of terrorist groups were generated as splinter groups, hiving off from the MB. The best known are, or were, the Gama'a al Islamiyya and Al Takfir Wa'l Hijra and, of course, al Qaida and its affiliates. Curiously, Osama bin Laden detests the Brothers, and often speaks (spoke) against them. Why? Because the Ikhwan publicly disassociated themselves from all violence. Could that be true?
Yes, the MB leadership says and teaches non-violence, and brothers obey. Muhammed Mahdi Akef, MB chief from 2004-2010, repeatedly condemned terrorist attacks. In 2010 Mr. Akef stepped down, being replaced by Muhammed Badie. No leaders imagined the Jan. 2011 revolt, and delayed telling the MB rank and file, to join the demonstrators. Now wooed by the government, and open to the closest of inspections, the Brothers must be on their best behavior. In fact, they must correct their errors.
But can such a dumbed-down franchise, such a defuse theocratic organization, ever be open to others not like themselves? Maybe. Have they helped prevent Muslim attacks against the Copts? Yes and no. The Brothers have matured, directing their energies to social service rather than political agitation. No brother wants the job of actually running Egypt – they know they lack expertise in the social sciences. Yet instinctively most Brothers believe they have a legitimate role to play. They do. It's called social service.
What Would Nasser Do? Could He Find Common Ground Today?
The only other event in recent Egyptian history that might compare to the January 25th 2011 Revolution is the Egyptian revolution of July 23, 1952. Till then, Egypt had not been ruled by Egyptians for two and a half thousand years. Going back in time, the rulers were British, French, Turkish (Mameluke and Ottoman), Kurdish (Ayyubids), Fatimid, Arab (bedouin), Byzantine Greek, Roman, Hellenic Greek, and Persian.
Gamal Abdul Nasser has been stereotyped as a populist demagogue, a 36-year-old army hero greedy for power, who betrayed America by buying arms from the Russians; by perpetrating land reform; who hated the Jews, pulling all the Arabs together for war and terror; who brought in the army and became 'anti-democratic' by banning political parties, and who became a player in the high stakes Machiavellian intrigues of Arab nationalism; and who turned Egypt into a military state.
None of the above statements are strictly true. The real story is different. Land reform was long overdue and went ahead without much protest. The owners of the large farms were paid cash and given vouchers and permits, which they could use to hopefully start construction companies in the cities, and thereby alleviate the crushing shortage of adequate housing. This was an ingenious economic policy, a bit more advanced than our own, one based on the laws of reciprocal feeding, than what the Americans or Russians or Japanese or Chinese can do. This man Nasser, from 1953 on, tried to kill two birds with one stone, a complex imaginative set of liberating regulation that forced the really big colonial landholders, to build affordable homes with money given to them from the government. But of course, they did little in the way of affordable housing. Almost all the construction projects were luxury apartments.
As for greedy power-hungry Nasser the populist, Nasser with assets totaling a little over $6,000. He much preferred to let others lead, like the prime minister/president M. Naqib (Naguib). In the early years, the Egyptians were just two of some nine army and air force officers, most war heroes of the 1947-48 war with Israel, who were able to keep hidden their plot while recruiting key commanders. They were nationalists, anxious to bring out from the shadows, the Egyptian nation and people. Britain still occupied Suez: over 80,000 troops guarding the canal.
Nasser much preferred to work from the shadows, and tried not to be chief. General M. Naguib was set up as figurehead, leaving Nasser and his technocrats free to examine carefully the economic malaisde, and determine what to do. Today Egyptians say they, the people, were suppressed and sleeping under the patriarch, Hosni Mubarak, for three decades. But when Nasser operated, the Egyptian people were much more suppressed, so deadened and exploited, that Nasser knew they didn't have the fire necessary for change. Now they have that fire, but do they have Nasser's competency in social engineering?
It was of course the Free Officers who instituted military government in Egypt. Everybody else was either bought off, suppressed, or just forlorn and fatalistic. Nasser feared he could not get people motivated to actually end feudalism, converting big colonial corporate farms into many private plots. Though Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) were socialists, they nonetheless were out to make individual Egyptians into small capitalists. No doubt that's because Egypt is largely a Muslim country. In Islam, the poorest vendor gets access to the market.
Even though Egypt had no enemies, it built up a large army. It needed to be able to fend off British, French and Israeli attacks. It felt it had to respond to the eviction of some 1.2 million Palestinians by the Israelis. But he saw the possibility of using the army to incubate and run industries and capitalist agriculture. (I can't find any precursors to this 'experiment' except in the much older sultanates and nomadic empires, including the Ottomans and Mamelukes.)
There was something innocent and naive about Nasser. Like many people in the Muslim world back then, he admired America. He saw the United States as a counter to British, French, Israeli and Russian plots and attacks. Nasser and the army wanted American weapons. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made the transfer of any weaponry to Egypt contingent on its joining an anti-Soviet pact, an alliance with the imperial powers. But Nasser had already signed neutrality agreements with the Arab League, so could not conform even if he wanted to. That was held against the socialist Egyptian government. The Egyptians called in the Russians for help, which of course changed the situation in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict got locked into the big showdown between Communism and free market capitalism. The survival of humankind on earth was put at great risk.
Furthermore, Nasser moved to liquidate the Communists. He rightly saw them as a threat to the middle class, of which he was one and with which he strongly identified. He was much more effective in limiting Bolshevism than the Shah, and he did it without the massacres perpetrated by another 'player' behind the scenes, young Saddam Hussein. Saddam did not rise through army like Nasser did. Furthermore, the Ba'ath party had similar aims as Nasser, namely, the creation of an independent state, socialist in its concerns but capitalism in its aspirations.
The 1950s were a time of secret Machiavellian maneuvers, crass radio propaganda, double crosses, deception and blackmail. The Palestinians were all packed into some 40 refugee camps, and beginning to fight back. The other Arab colonies received independence, but not Egypt. The reason was not so much British control, but the fact that King Fuad actually effected a tolerant democracy, led by the liberal Waqf. But the represented the great feudal landlords. The army rose up. Nasser banned the parties because they were so deceptive, promising what they could not do. He moved against the leftists, the Communists, and he banned the Muslim Brotherhood, in 1954.
The Muslim Brotherhood was well-established in Egypt by the late 1930s. Following the dumbed- down, simplistic and highly divisive ideology of the Ikhwan, the Brothers tried to muscle in on the Palestinian issue, by deploying their own fedayeen to fight the Jews. Nasser moved to control both the PLO and the Muslim Brotherhood, insisting that the Palestinians discipline themselves, and that the Ikhwan be prohibited from launching terror attacks of its own. Nasser didn't even let the Brothers fight the British occupiers in Suez. He knew they were lousy soldiers, dream-driven.
The big powers were no less desperate, or so it seemed at the time. The Cold War really began in Iran, 1946-47, in Iran. The newly elected nationalist prime minister M. Mossadeq, foolishly cut oil exports to Great Britain, violating current contracts. Most of Britain's oil was still coming through the Gulf. That's why the Brits and the American pulled off the 1953 overthrow of Iran's elected government. Kermit Roosevelt, the American operator, was friends with Nasser and visited him even as he and the Brits were plotting to overthrow Mossadeq (and his clerical and communist backers). Islam began to be seen as a bulwark against Communism.
Curiously, in 1952, the American government pressured King Farouk to check the corruption of his ministers, and transform Egypt into a western-style democracy, with Muslim politicos having some say and sway. But Nasser despised the Ikhwan. Their message divisive, dangerous, and not really in keeping with Muhammed's practices. After the Brothers tried to kill him, Nasser locked up their leaders and hung their chief ideologue, Sayyid Qutb. With Egypt being too hot, the Brothers metastasized as Egyptian Ikhwan fled to other Sunni Arab countries. Today they play covert and overt roles in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Lebanon, Morocco, northern Sudan and Morocco.
The Egyptian revolution of 1952 was a fight against feudalism, and Nasser put the best of his energies into reconfiguring available resources. He realized Egypt needed better, uncorrupted businessmen; to him, even the Mameluke aristocrats running the big corporate farms, had a role in the revolution. Some 6% of the population owned 65% of the land.
Nasser understood there were two revolutions: the first to dispose the King and expel his British masters, the second, to dismantle the structures of feudalism – serf bondage. Nasser acted to ban all political parties which may have made him look like a Bolshevik, but the one dominant party, the ruling Waqf, were all tied to the big landowners and industrialists, working within the British colonial system. The whole thing had to go. A similar quandary faces the new revolutionaries, who may be tempted, wrongly, to exclude all government personnel from a new government.
Clearly, as Nasser said, two revolts were necessary. The first was to achieve independence, the second, to knit together rival factions. There was a third – to devise the correct prescriptions to economic problems eating at the people. Maybe the third revolution was, is, the real challenge. The whole system had to be carefully disentangled, before a new government might prove capable of providing for the people. Egypt's burgeoning population had ever more pressing needs – food, fuel, housing, education, capital – and fulfilling these needs could not take place amidst constant ideological bickering and rivalry between competing parties. No do the politics of symbolic appeal help.
Today the situation is even more pressing. Today, the Egyptian poor are just as destitute as they were when they worked as serfs. Cairo had just several million people in 1950. By 1990 it had 38 million and by 2010 the population had exceeded 84 million. And of course the people are concentrated along the thin strip of fertile land on each side of the Nile, so the density of population is excessive.
Whoever runs Egypt has to reckon with the Ikhwan. The Ikhwan were not involved in the initiation of this recent revolution, but already, by February 5th, issued angry declarations of autocratic intent. The voices of the MB spokesmen and leaders are full of spite towards Israel and Egyptian secularism. Of course they seek vengeance against the secularists in the government. Already they are doing their best to steal the whole affair, as happened in Iran. Nasser would stand for any MB role.
We study Zaghoul (Nasser's code name) because decisions he implemented impact on the situation today. The revolutionaries in Tahrir Square believe they have power, but actually the army stands a very strong power behind the scenes. No doubt the army is splitting, and no doubt young democrats, likely educated in America or Britain, will seek to lead the army into helping fill the very pressing needs of the Egyptian population. But how can that happen?
Because the army does not drain the treasury, Egypt's debt was only 93.6% of GNP in a 2005 estimate. That's less debt proportionately than the US (102% GNP), and much less than the United Kingdom. The UK in 2005 had an external debt of$7 trillion plus, while Egypt, with a poor population some 20% larger than the UK, had debts of only $29 billion.
International monetary pressures, that ultimate reckoning of nations, forced Egypt to devalue its currency, making all imports more expensive, and causing inflation. One very real factor behind the 2010-11 January 25th Revolution, was, is, the soaring price of wheat and corn. The terrible drought in Russia during the spring and summer and autumn of 2010 caused that government to cancel wheat exports. The Egyptian people went without. Rents also soared. Water of course is a huge hassle, for poor Cairenes.
The Egyptian government has not been able to fully educate its youth, care for its sick and hungry, or help provide jobs. People turn to new spiritual identities. The Muslim Brothers step in. Our hope is that the government can harness the thousands of Muslim organs in a new bid to take care of its people's most basic needs.
What would Nasser do? He had basically the same resources, the same pressures (like debt and inflation). The population had not yet ballooned. Following the 1952 revolution, Egyptians were free to join up symbolically with their Arab counterparts, forming the Arab League and the UAR and other unions, fighting to preserve some semblance of dignity after the defeats of 1948. 1956 and 1967.
This generation of Egyptians did not have to spend its free money on military adventures. The peace has allowed Egypt, Jordan and Israel, even parts of Palestine, to prosper. Today, Cairenes are much more globally informed. They are weary and wary of the left and the right. Socialism and capitalism must go together. A socialist society needs plenty of cash and it can get this by sacking the rich, or by fostering innovation, a free market, and the mobilization of its people. Capitalism of course marginalizes many, causing destitution and exploitation. The market will not create enough jobs, especially in the 21st C. global economy. But that world economy is also changing. Gasoline will doubtless be too expensive for ordinary people to burn much of, and many modest folks around the world, can't get enough cheap food and housing.
Let us hope that the politics of symbolic appeal are replaced by a pragmatic bid to lessen suffering, keep people in their homes, provide them with food to buy, some basic medical services. But just as important, is what Egypt does with its hyper-dynamic young educated investors. Can the government help them incubate firms?
Most amazing, to me, an Arabic scholar who has studied Islam's legal traditions, a non-Muslim social scientist, is that Islam has, hidden away in its heritage, some legal formulae for the mass auto-construction of new housing, the science and the tolerance, and the generation of so many jobs that everybody who wants one can have one.
As far as Islam is concerned, it will have to be Al Aksa University which provides the guidance on these issues. And even they don't know much non-Muslim science, like the archaeology of pre-Islamic Arabia, its diversity, and its 'pocket' civilizations: Nabatea, Ghassan, Lakhmid (places where Muhammad no doubt visited or heard of). The Ikhwan know even less.
Islam means surrender, surrender of the self, so any Muslim who is reinforcing his ego by appropriating Islam to his self or sect, has gone off the rails. There are other tests as well. Just listening to some Ikhwan leaders on Feb. 5, the day they met with Vice President Omar Suleiman, showed the sect's arrogance and anger, plus its emotionalism.
Egypt will mellow in its Islam. Islam will be put to use. The state will keep privatizing army-run factories. Investors will return. The country will become a democracy, but no one can predict what kind of political parties (their platforms) will emerge. At the table of governance, specialists are needed not simply to represent their constituents, but to provide expertise.
Dr. Al-Baradei, for example, might chair a panel on science, while a social scientist, along with Muslim organs, might manage and expand social services.
But the revolution is just a few weeks old. It'll take years before Egyptian leaders find the right combination of elements to meet housing demands and social needs. Do they have the time? These new technocrats need be as clever as Nasser was in his approach to land control. For there are many countervailing factors, unseen but in play behind the scenes: the army, the secret police, diplomatic pressures, and a zoo of different types of ideologies, so what one hears at this point, is a disputatious babble. Nasser often spoke in English during negotiations. Asked why, he said Arabic is great for arguments, vendettas and wars, but weak in the terms of peace.
Nasser was joking. Arabic has over 30 words for peace and tranquility. But the language is so strong, not just in its phonology, but its permutations of roots, creating so many kinds of concepts, that Arab negotiators are apt to spend hours qualifying terms.
As in many modern Arab nations, the young are learning English at the expense of their Arabic. This is partly the result of the social media. But it is also a bid to join up with the western world.
-JPM, Feb.8, 2011
The author has conducted research in eight Muslim countries, plus Russia and Serbia. He has taught in colleges in Vermont. Since 1988, he has authored and published the Middle East Speculum Report, a newsletter now on line. He holds degrees from Wesleyan and Harvard Universities.
His most recent studies are found at middleeastspeculum.blogspot.com
Most of which follows was written between Feb.3 and 10, just before Hosni Mubarak announced his resignation. The situation may have changed then, but the points made in this post, prove even more useful now. Now the big questions: what kind of party platter do they serve, or is it to be one huge national party, a big tent under which all the chiefs can sit?
Notes on the Arab rebellions of 2011
The revolts breaking out across the Arab world in January did not happen in isolation. Over some twenty precursors (causes) have been identified. Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen have effected the requisite changes and resolutions, but the revolt in Egypt is still very much in process. Will the intense discussions in Cairo's Isma'ili Maydan (Tahrir Square) lead to competent democratic candidates and qualified reps? Will the Egyptian army play referee? What about the Islamic Brotherhood – will they go for it? Finally, and most critically, will the new governors of Misr find practical ways to relieve the intense economic pressures on most Egyptians? To do so they need to harness the social service resources of the Muslim Brotherhood. But the Ikhwan (Brothers) need to be vetted, qualified. And for this, regrettably, there exist no real competency in Islam possessed by any government, any Islamist, and any western social scientist. Muhammad Qurayshi was an ordinary unassuming man, without pretense. Not so these players.
Stranger than Ghosts and UFOs: Notes on the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, its Causes and Consequences by John Paul Maynard
Everyone is calling the place 'Tahrir Square' but that's a recent name. The place has been in existence since the Fatimid sultan Al-Jawher or 'The Jewel,' took possession of Fustat in 969. The Fatimids soon moved their capital from Tunisia to a new city called Cairo. The square's proper name is al Maydan al Ishma'ili. A maydan is that characteristic large open field found in most traditional Islamic cities and towns. The Ishma'ilis are Shi'i 'heretics,' here the Fatimids. They fought viciously against Abbasid imperialism and a dumbed-down conformist Sunni orthodoxy. Perhaps we've heard of Sultan Baybars, or the very imaginative, individualized non-doctrinaire Ishma'ilis. In short, the old Fatimid name connotes tolerance, a reconciliation with one's enemies, which is the opposite of freedom (Tahrir), in a way.
Modern state planners made the maydan a traffic round-a-about called 'Freedom' then surrounded it with government offices and museums. They also invited in big hotels – the most expensive. They called it cynically 'freedom square' and amazingly, western media still perpetrates the hoax, simply because they don't know Cairo or Egypt's history.
The maydan did not again become sacred land till the 25th of January, 2011, when the protesters disobeyed the state-imposed curfew, forcing the police and army to withdraw. Since then, there has been constant occupation. At times a half a million demonstrated, with signs and chants. But more often, and more interesting, were, are, the down times, when only a few hundred or a few thousand occupy the maydan. There one witnesses highly individualized behaviors. Some took odd postures in front of the cameras, or alone. Everybody had to draw something. Effigies were made, food distributed, a medical clinic working 'round the clock to care for severely injured protesters. Intense discussions were underway amongst some, but many protesters meditate in private. There are no leaders.
The media played such a role that one is tempted to say, following McLuhan, that the media is the message. Electronic communications have been democratized, so the democrats were able to organize. Individuals empowered each other. No plan or design prompted the revolution: it is organic, or if not, something uniquely odd, an enigma. It has yet to succeed. Mubarak is in office, and his intelligence, police and army firmly under his control.
There's no way see the future. It's uncharted territory. Dispassionate discussions need take place, and the politics of human needs must replace the politics of symbolic appeal. Before elections there must be a deliberative phase where representatives are selected. This must happen soon.
There is a table around which some one dozen people are to sit. Who are they? And will the present government, with all its bureaucratic weight, with its police and army, be admitted as members around this table? If not, then we are in for a rocky road.
The on-going 'happening' on the Isma'ili maydan does not die or get stale, because new people arrive all the time, and because intense discussions follow the constant news. The army has failed to secure control of the maydan, now a critical round-about for lower Cairo. The protesters can just send out a request for more people, and 10,000 will arrive within an hour or two.
Egypt's situation is so complex, its history so deep, that forgiveness should be a feature. Where's the truth and reconciliation commission? Where's, the admission of shared responsibility by government, by Muslim leaders, the leftists, the business class? Are they blaming outsiders (the US and Israel) for Egypt's malaise? The table we speak of, must have scientists, led perhaps by Dr. M. al-Baradei; historians; economists, a secular poet, and a few clergy who have not used their religion to reinforce their egos. At least one Copt should be present, and perhaps a more liberal, competent jurist from Al Ahzar University (to counter and discipline the Brothers).
This package includes three articles: An examination of the Muslim Brotherhood that refers to the lawful tradition of Islamic reform laid out in the late 19th C., in order to then vet any Muslim applying for office. The second looks at the other revolution, that of the Free Officers in 1952, to draw a few critical lessons. The third examines the precursors and probable causes of this second Egyptian revolution. All the Arab revolutions have economic as well as political similarities: high food and water and energy costs; a systemic refusal to build affordable housing; unemployment.
At first, there was no invoking in any of these revolutions, the politics of symbolic appeal. Outsiders were not demonized. Now, after three weeks, that is changing. The leftists and the Islamists are actively trying to influence the revolution. Both would hijack it if they could. But they cannot. In ten years, however, if there is no housing, no cheap food, no end to relentless inflation, no jobs, then we can expect the leftists and the self-appointed Muslim leadership, to take over the country.
In these articles, we make reference to the role of the media, the social media, their capabilities for communication and instant information, never seen before. Demagogues beware!
Young Egyptians played a big role, using FaceBook to launch the initial protests. But the Youth are highly politicized in a childish way. They, and the leftists and the political Muslims, are demanding the end of the regime. No one in high office should remain there. This is not good for Egypt. If the police are fired or kept in their command centers, criminals will run wild. Already, hundreds of criminals have been released. For some fours days, January 27-31, chaos reigned as criminals stole cars, broke into the Egyptian Museum, and mugged innocents. Neighborhoods organized their own defenses. Fear all but replaced peaceful protests for democracy. Let that be a warning. The police and intelligence services are needed now more than ever. So the impasse will persist. Tahrir Square will be continuously occupied until further notice. Since the square is a major round-about, the economic damage attributed to the uprising will slowly drive business people against them. Already Egypt has lost about 4 times more money, than the $1.3 billion given Egypt each year by the USA.
For the US government, the birds of policy come home to roost. The implications of past US policies yield lawful consequences. Five presidents looked to Hosni Mubarak for guidance and support in keeping Islamist terror cells from killing innocents. Civil war raged, with thousands of casualties. Mubarak was well aware that the pious Anwar Sadat had freed the Brothers, only to have them assassinate him.
In solving these issues, that is, in vetting Muslim groups, one must go back to Muhammed's time in Medina, to see and study the very real differences between his practices there, and those upheld by the Muslim religion, Sunni and Shi'i. My own understanding is that this great war raging from Mauritania to Mindanao, from Daghestan to Nigeria, will not subside till Muhammed's own ways receive just as must coverage as does the Muslim religion.
Muhammed was an unassuming man, without pretense. When he heard voices while meditating in a cave, he thought he was going crazy and wanted to kill himself. He never set up a clerical hierarchy. He did not see himself as a universal law-giver, which meant he left most laws stand. He did see himself as establishing a new universal religion. He had plan of conquest, nor is there any theory of war in the Qur'an. He left no teachings, no successor, no instructions. Because he was unassuming, he did not organize his patrimony. Hence the present predicament, where interpretations of Islam are all over the place; where the mullahs enforce uniformity, and the real message of the prophet is lost.
Scholars of Islam study Muhammed's Constitution of Medina, ca. 628 CE. It is not a statement of the Muslim religion, but a democratic mechanism to overcome the factions. For there were some eight Jewish tribes in the area around Yathrib (Medina), plus Christian monastics, and pagan bedouin tribes. There was also a growing argument between the Ansars (Helpers) of Medina, and the Muhijarun (emigrants) who fled with Muhammed to Medina from Mecca in Year Zero (622 CE).
The Egyptian democrats face the same kind of challenge.
How to Vet the Muslim Brotherhood: Errors of the Ikhwan, with reference to the19 C. reformer, Sayyid Jalal ad-Din al-Afghani
To assess the Muslim Brotherhood we need see through it to its doctrinal birth. Here we dissect reformist discourse and tradition in the Muslim world. We need go back to the beginning of modern reform in Islam. Jalal ad-Din al-Afghani, the great peripatetic late-19th century Muslim reformer, held views directly opposed to the less informed later reformers, specifically Hasan al Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Sayyid al Afghani spoke in an intelligent way about how to handle the Western colonial masters, the need to come together as Muslims, the need for science in Muslim life, and insights into Islam itself, that is, the practices of Muhammed at Medina, as opposed to the ignorance of the present self-serving clergy.
The al Ikhwan al Muslimuna, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) were later imitators, impostors, who bent this original wisdom completely into its opposite: prescriptions for disaster, for poverty. Everything western was seen as corrupt. Violence against innocents was sanctioned; non-Muslims were to be slaughtered like animals,' and even Muslims were permitted to be killed simply because they were not radicals. This paper finds the requisite historical depth necessary to assess the dumbed-down thinking of the current Islamists. Only then can one engage them.
The Ikhwan is often said to be the first, the oldest and the largest of the Islamic reform organs. But that is definitely not true. They are not the true inheritors of Islamic reform. We will show step by step, how they deviated, doctrinally. The MB consists of many chapters, with many wings. It's a franchise that can set up anywhere, anytime. There are probably over 15,000 established Ikhwan groups and secret cells, from Indonesia to Morocco. In some of these countries, the MB appears to be the largest opposition group or party. But that assessment requires that we phase out all those less-radicalized Muslims, plus the secular population, both of which are larger in numbers (and reason) than the MB. In Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Libya and elsewhere, the MB is banned as a political party. Governments are wary and for good reason: the MB outfit says one thing, and does another. They, violent splinter groups of the MB, consider themselves to be above the law. The most lethal of the terror groups were, are, MB splinter groups. Need we name them all? Start with al Qaida.
As extensive as the Ikhwan may be, no more than 350 Brothers run the organization. The core leadership is much, much smaller, arrayed in several consultative bodies, all secret. No new doctrine appears forthcoming: the Ikhwan have held the same dumbed-down policies for over 80 years.
Under intense police pressure over the past 70 years, renegade Ikhwan cells became autonomous, and some were murderous. I speak of the Gama'a al Islamiyya, Hizb wal Takhrir, and of course, al Qaida and its affiliates. The Egyptian Ikhwan lost control of their hotheads after they were banned and broken up by the Egyptian national and intelligence police. Nasser banned them after they tried to kill him and other government officals, and they have been banned ever since. Their views are narrow, divisive, and fictive, like driving the Israelis into the sea. In the 1990s, Egypt kept suffering violent attacks against foreign tourists, attacks on secular intellectuals, assassination of officials, and the depredations of bedouin. There was a decade of civil war in Egypt as there was at the same time, a war in Algeria, again featuring MB-inspired groups capable of killing hundreds of civilians for no reason. Thousands of brothers were rounded up and imprisoned. Some were tortured, not from sadism, or even revenge, but to get vital information that would upset attacks on innocent civilians.
I write this on February 5th, 2011. Protesters are lying down in front of tanks to prevent them from entering Tahrir Square. Mubarak had appointed Omar Suleiman, his intelligence chief, as Vice President. The intelligence chief is in charge of receiving the Brothers as they meet today in Cairo, for 'exploratory talks.' (The small Ikhwan reps later said it not negotiate further till Mubarak has left.)
Already the Brothers are setting conditions. Today (Feb.5) they say they 'want to see if the government will do the will of the people.' Like American politicians, they always say they represent the all the people. There are further questions. If the MB rises in the government, they can influence foreign policy, canceling Egypt's peace agreement with Israel. That would open Egypt as a base to terrorists, which would trigger Israeli responses, no doubt disproportionate. Egypt would be burdened with another round of Middle East armed struggle. Ikhwan ideology also holds to the belief, the conviction, that the West is Egypt's biggest problem. For it is the West which holds Mubarak to the peace agreements with Israel. It is Western influence which prevents the establishment of Islamic law throughout Egypt. Of course all this horrifies educated liberal Egyptians, who know full well how the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 was hijacked by clerical zealots.
The Muslim Brotherhood is still blaming others: Israel, America, the secular rulers of the Arabs. It had not helped them to so be divisive. 'Judge and you'll be judged.' And why judge anyways - isn't that God's role. The Brothers do not feel that way. They all think they serve God and Islam, but it is Islam that serves men and women. God doesn't need our prayers, as the Qur'an says more than once. Where did their presumption come from?
Let us look closely at MB-patented mentation. It's unbelievably simplistic – a manipulation of raw dreamy aspirations and sentiments, such that many ignorant Egyptians come to see them as 'the resistance.' So let us look more deeply, right down to their genesis and early history.
Curiously, reference to 19th century reformers throws light on the chief danger of , and complaint against, the al Ikhwan al Muslimuna, the Muslim Brotherhood. As we'll see, these pseudo-Muslims violate the meaning of Islam right from the start. Right from the beginning, when Hassan al Banna organized the Brothers in 1928, there occurred an unfortunate slip, a deviation and a departure from current Muslim reformist wisdom, resulting in a dumbing-down and distortion inherent in Ikhwan thinking. And this mistake cost the peoples of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan dearly. The Americans, too, ended up victims of this deviance, this original perversion. '9/11 was born in the dungeons of Egypt' goes the proverb. Unless we grasp the error of Hassan al Banna, we can't assess the Ikhwan, their loyalty and intentions; or point out exactly to them where and how they deviate from both Islamic reform tradition, and Islam itself.
It is possible to qualify Muslims them for service inside the government. Contact us and we'll send you a check list of a dozen questions about Islam which together can quickly tell what kind of Islam or mock-Islam lurks in the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In summary, some questions relate to the original meaning and use of the term 'Islam.' Others relate to judging others (Judge and you'll be judged), an assumed superiority, an exclusivity – 'we are the real Islam.' Or, the Shi'a are all heretics. One set of questions asks the respondent to identify the differences between the Prophet's practice at Medina, and the Muslim religion as conventionally understood. Others present passages from the Qur'an, or well-known ahadith, relating to how politics was understood, the role of government, and other cautionary sayings, like “There is no compulsion in religion' and 'The government must consult with the people at every step,' and so forth.
The Egyptian MB keeps hiving off terror cells, even as the Ikhwan leadership condemns terror. Those leaders are responsible for the atrocities of those acting in their name: the sick Istanbuli, the psycho-path genocidal Osama bin Laden and the perverse craven Dr. Ayman Zawahiri. Violence in Alexandria proves that such splinter groups are active in Egypt. So also the recent bombing of the gas pipeline in al Arish. Let's see the Brothers move against these 'mock-Muslim' jokers.
Formal participation in the new Egyptian democracy by the Ikhwan, might present a chance to humanize, educate, their ranks and leadership. The army and police and most of the Egyptian people, are ready to pounce on the Brothers if they violate the new emerging democratic social contract, based on tolerance and mutual respect, or seek to dominate the government, or any of their discussions with other parties. If the Ikhwan are excluded – and they withdraw – then one would do well to assume that, once again, they are plotting. But the actual program for them, what they must do for Egypt, is to move against their free-ranging radicals, circulating in the blood of Egyptians mainly outside Cairo, in the Delta and in Upper Egypt. Out there in the provinces the police do not have the control they have in Cairo and Alexandria. All the more reason for the Brothers to start working for the police, mediating perhaps, resolving differences, replacing symbolic issues from economic and environmental realities.
Can the Muslim Brothers in Egypt hijack the revolution? Everybody knows Islam had nothing to do with the revolution, except perhaps as a negative factor. The bombing of a Coptic church in Alexandria in December 2010, touched off three days of Muslim-Christian riots in that city. The bombers are probably secret splinter cells of MB operatives, maybe a resurgent Gama'a al Islamiyya, or maybe Hizb wal Tahir, or al Qaida of the Magreb. Judging by recent statements to the press, the MB leaders are as angry and as presumptuous as they ever have been. (You can tell by the sound of their voices, and by their erroneous presumptions, like 'we represent the Muslims.')
I can see a scenario where, over the ensuing ten years, the Ikhwan become a dominant force in Egypt. The Americans pushed for democracy, and this is what they get: the rise of Muslim demagogues and obsolete leftists. Suppose the Tahrir protesters succeed in breaking 'the whole regime,' where the army and the police get infiltrated and neutralized, or disbanded by the democrats. Then we will likely see the Ikhwan institute very anti-Western policies. The country will likely slip into a very stupid and tragic war with Israel, over Gaza. But remember: if the economic pressures on the Egyptian populace are not relieved, if food and energy are not affordable, if there is no housing for young adults, no way of honestly making money, no check on inflation, then a downward spiral will almost certainly take place, after which the Ikhwan and the leftists will inherit the whole thing.
The politics of symbolic appeal just may surmount and replace the politics of human needs. Incredibly, after all that history teaches, this simple truth is not deployed, utilized or even discussed.
As I write, the Ikhwan are moving into Tahrir Square. They are organizing and leading prayers.
By February 7th, the protesters had become vocally anti-American. This is a result partly of the emerging Ikhwan bid for leadership of the protest, and partly the fault of American leaders. Shocked as much as everyone else, the Americans have been making nightly scripted pronouncements, many televised. These have been misinterpreted by many in the Muslim world. American oaths of democratic pluralism seem cynical to the conspiracy-minded Arabs. So now the US government's capacity to (verbally) respond has gone from very weak to negative.
Curiously, both the protesters and the pro-Mubarak faction have angrily asked the Americans to just stay out of Egypt. Soon the Egyptian state may cut loose the Americans for good. US policy towards Israel seems to them highly deceptive, cynical. Educated secular Israelis also feel abandoned by the Americans. Likud has had no problems in executing their planned annexations of land and property and roads. Unless the American begin to be even-handed (in deed as well as words), we do not see any way by which the US can restore influence in a post-Mubarak regime. Indeed, anger at the US and Israel may be the cement that holds the Arabs together, as it was in Nasser's time.
The MB might manipulate and promote anti-American, and anti-Israeli sentiments, something no one can check, because the so-called educated democrats are just as ignorant about Islam as the terrorists who act in its name. We cannot overestimate the stupidity of people, ourselves included.
We in the West consider ourselves educated and sophisticated. But Cairo is home to sophisticated thinking, also. The Arabs are well accustomed to intrigue, plots and naked grabs for power and money. (We'll see that Nasser did not play 'strong horse,' a strong man, until the people demanded that he be president, after 1954, and put him back into office after he resigned following the war with Israel in 1967. It was only then that he became really popular. Egyptians are so sophisticated that responsible leaders do not seek office, being free (supposedly) of all greed, greed for power, influence, and money.
It's common to hear Westerners talk of 'strong men' in the patriarchal or tribal context. In fact, tribal chiefs are usually elected. A show of hands at the end of a meeting is just as democratic as a paper ballot in a box, as formal elections. Indeed, there are veins of democracy running through bedouin practice, and in Islam also. But the West, believing they derive from the Judaic tradition, and assuming they are the most advanced, call Israel the only democracy in the Middle East. Of course that has been an incorrect and very destructive myth. Israel has done practically nothing in the way of peace. Obviously the Likud government is sponsoring the annexation of Arab lands, but the government of the United States foolishly thought, even till recently, that the Likud players were going to play by international rules. Not a chance in the world for that.
We worry about Islamic radicals, fanaticism and a propensity for violence. But it is easy for anybody interested in the Middle East, to examine Israeli actions, and see how ingeniously provocative and self-serving. The Jewish religious radicals of the Likud are no different, no better, than their extreme Muslim counterparts. Christianity also is full of flaws and posturing. The Bible sanctifies genocide in some 6 passages (in the books of Deuteronomy, Leviticus, Joshua, and Kings).
If US policy makers and spokesmen could come out and say “We believe that radical Zionism and radical Islam are equally at fault,” the Muslim people would go wild, and see us in a positive light. As for the good people of Israel, the ones who hope to make a just peace with the Arabs, they will be empowered as well. But tragically the doctrinal blinders of US politicians preclude any intelligent response, so it is much to be preferred, that the US government just shut up, publicly, till it corrects its own myopia and double standards. It seems to know nothing about Islam, so cannot prosecute the terrorists using Islamic law, which is easy to do.
An Arab child is worth just as much in God's eyes as a Jewish child. Why do we even have to state this obvious truth? Because Israel's way has long been, since 1947, to punish, far out of proportion, Arabs. Israel has been hijacked by religious fanatics, many from America and Russia, who have caused immense damage. And such clerical rule has not worked. Hisbullah, Hamas, and other fedayeen cannot be exterminated, though Israel military planners may 'see' that, as they are preparing a truly massive response to the next time Hizbullah or Hamas fires off a few rockets.
It was required that we draw attention to stupid policies towards Israel, as we move to focus on the stupidity of mock-Islamic terrorist. State terror is even more cruel than terror by small teams of killers. State terror kills more innocents, many times more. The Red Cross says that over 26,000 Lebanese civilians were killed by the Israelis in 1982. Some 1,400 were killed in the recent Gaza operation. Yet Americans become enraged when a teenage suicide bomber, with absolutely nothing to lose, kills a few soldiers or settlers, because some racists seized his ancestral land.
HOW TO TELL A REAL MUSLIM: CRITERIA FOR VETTING MUSLIM POLITICIANS
There are simple tests to ascertain whether some person might know about Islam -or not know. I'll try to summarize in the briefest way.
If your religion is fortifying your ego, you've gone off the rails. Islam means 'surrender' in Arabic: one must doubt oneself at every step. Or let me put it in western scientific terms: we are only as intelligent as our assumptions.' Islam, 'surrender', entails seeing through assumptions of the imaginary self and its co-opted ordinary conceptual mind. 'Surrender' is not in the discourse of these modern political Islamist groups. True Islam is not followed, but bent to serve the will to power by holy-men acting above the law. Even now the Muslim Brother's leaders are acting like spoiled children, refusing tom play along, field candidates. It knows it does not have a critical mass. Those leaders may be unaware that they are 'licensing' terror cells.
We always see the loudest clergy in any of the religions, state really stupid cruel and irrelevant sentiments, demonizing others not like them. To hell with them all. They have usurped what is only God's task: the judgment of the humans. 'Judge and you'll be judged.'
The 'Takfiri Ikhwan' following Qutb, and al Banna, and the mentally ill 10th C. jurist ibn Taymiyya, and later, Osama bin Ladin, are obnoxious and downright dangerous. Stupidly and cruelly, they twisted Islam in such a way that it was now lawful for Muslims to kill Muslims. And some 100,000 innocent Muslim people have been murdered by the Takfiris so far.
Both the Ikhwan and the police have a lot of blood on their hands. There has been a civil war against the MB in Egypt since before Egypt was independent. It was the secret police of King Farouk who assassinated Hassan al Banna, again, to revenge assassinations (1950). Nasser was never tempted to side with the Brothers, or use them, even if they both shared anti-colonial priorities. In a sense, Farouk was correct in identifying the top leader as a killer. For it was al Banna's stupid 'innovation' which led the Brothers to kill and kill, and be killed. It was Nasser who insisted that they not be allowed to launch attacks against the British in Suez, and against Israel. He also insisted that the nascent Palestinian fidayeen, be strictly disciplined, so as to not launch attacks against innocent Jews. That whole period of 1947-1967 is worthy of week-to-week study. The much beloved 'father of the Jewish nation' had absolutely no respect for Arabs and moved to kill them or just evict them or make life so miserable for innocent Palestinian people, that they had to flee to camps.
Yet still that's not the prevailing narrative in America. Israel was besieged, fighting for its life, surrounded by a dozen powerful Arab armies, some armed by the Communists. How quickly these myths are dispelled by any reference to the historical record. Israel under Ben Gurion fought wars of aggressive expansion, 'cleansed' parts of Eretz Y'Israel, and executed thousands of captured Arab soldiers. Then there followed some some six large Israel commando assaults against a much weaker Egyptian army. Sounds far fetched? These aggressive acts culminated in the 1956 war. That war, one in which the Americans sided with the Egyptians, was the logical extension of Israeli plans. Contrary to his image, Ben Gurion apprenticed in outright genocide. He implemented his disrespect for Arabs. One can easily prove that power in Israel was and is usurped by greedy men using religion to justify the crime, following the base politics of symbolic appeal; and that the American Jews, backed tacitly by their US government, supported and pushed through this abomination, this hundred-years war. Since we Americans are responsible for what happened, we will pay the price. In just a few years, petroleum will be too expensive for ordinary Americans to burn in their cars and trucks. The OPEC and OAPEC have preferential pricing schedules which they will implement when the slack in the oil market is taken up. Even now the hens come home to roost. Israel still practices apartheid, a 'slow motion genocide.' For what Arab can live a decent life in occupied Palestine, or in Gaza? But the Ikhwan's militant wings practice genocide as well.
At this point we turn to look back at Muslim reform, to explain why and how the Ikhwan deviated and continue to do so.
Modern Islamic reform began in the later half of the19th C. and is generally attributed to one man: Jamal al Din 'Asabadadi' al Afghani, 1838-1897. He grew up in Hamadan Persia, and studied in Shi'ite medresehs in Qom and Meshed, where he was influenced by Sheikh Ahmed al Ahsa (1753-1826). The sheikh was a very unconventional thinker, critical of mere imitation, 'group think,' and the presumptions of the higher clergy. Sheikh Ahmed lived in Yazd, as did Afghani a half century later. Yazd of course is the center of the Iranian Zarathushtris, non-Muslim monotheists. Hence his bizarre ideas about personal guardian angels, the wanderings of higher bodies in the cosmos, a vigorous expansive after-life. This exotic tradition eschewed any sectarian chauvinism. Both Sheikh Ahmed and Sayyid al Afghani saw the battle as against conventional Islam, the corrupt presumptuous clergy.
Al Afghanis became a mujtahid, one competent to assess legal cases using fiqh and shari'a. He began to wander, going both west and east from Iran. First to Afghanistan, to meet with Naqshbandiyya and Qaderi masters, residing in Kabul, Ghazni and Qandahar. Then to Peshawar, Lahore, and Delhi. He worked for the Qajar (Mongolian) shah, Nasir ad Din, as an adviser, but was disillusioned. He was in Mecca in 1865. Fluent in Turkish, Persian and Arabic, al Afghani lectured in Turkey, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. He had to flee to Paris, as the feudal Mameluke emir moved against him. Even though he grew up during the colonial period, al Afghani did not recommend violence or armed resistance, but civil actions, like boycotting British-run tobacco merchants in Iran. His professional writing appeared during a long exile in Paris, where he published a periodical on reform in the Islamic world, together with M. Abduh, his prime disciple who was to carry on a real reform effort, in Egypt.
How paradoxical it is that Sayyid al Afghani, surrounded by imperial powers, recommended basically a non-violent approach to them, and a rigorous critique of Islam religion and law which would de-fang the clergy and roll back their usurped incompetent reactionary domination. The modern Islamists blame the imperialists with greater vehemence even though the nations of the Middle East have been free and independent for over half a century.
Sayyid al Afghani said that the West should be studied, its technology and knowledge adopted if they can help, and swestern democracy, liberalism and superiority in science acknowledged. Then the liberal parties of the West can be persuaded, with good argument, to just get the hell out of the Middle East and South Asia. Or at least change their act.
Al Afghani had a genuine message, one thought through. Integrate science into faith. He taught that Islam should adapt to the modern age, to basically rip off the West of everything useful. Then the Imperial parties of European states can be confronted, morally, scientifically, and then persuaded to end their occupations. After all, the West took much from Islam – science – so now Muslims take from the West.
To al Afghani, the Muslim world was not strong or smart enough to fight the big European parties and powers, including Russia, and the reason for that weakness, in his view, was the Muslim religion itself, the clergy. He knew Arabic well, so could read for himself the original legal texts. He studied Muhammad's practices at Medina and Mecca 622-632 CE. How they differed from the Muslim religion as it was put together rather haphazardly by his successors, the khalifas and the jurists. Al Afghani was a devout Muslim who liked to quote Bistami “I have seen the devil and he is a Muslim.” For him – as it must be for us – Islam was, is, a sacred call to surrender the ego, the small self, the personality, in order to engender in the body, essence.
Also characteristic of cruel and stupid 'Muslim' serial murderers is their belief in very dubious hadith or a very selective approach to the Qur'an; they are emotional, not intellectual. They are committed, not impartial, objective scientists. The MB ranks maybe humble men and women, but their leaders, driven into secrecy, once again plot and scheme to 'play' the revolution, hoping later usurp constitutional authority. They've always condemned everything western, and if they are eventually championed by the people, it will be because the Ikhwan can play on anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments to win followers and 'authenticity.' Why are they able to do that? Because the US government has once again done absolutely nothing to prevent the further annexation of Arab land in Arab Palestine.
Al Afghani held both the European imperialists and the Muslim clergy responsible. He did not fault the Jews, because he lived before Zionism became a political force. He moved directly against the earlier Wahhabi craze, in arguing that, whether Shi'a or Sunni, it does not matter. That is not an issue. He said the clerics used this division to garnish their prestige. Hence Muslim weakness.
The threat came from outside, from the West. “We must meet them on the basis of our wisdom and their wisdom.” Curiously, al Afghani's words to his Western friends (incl. Ernst Renan) were even more liberal: “So long as humanity exists, the struggle will not cease between religion and philosophy, a bitter struggle from which, I fear, free thought will not emerge victorious.”
Al Afghani's main student was Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), an Egyptian journalist, a scholar who eventually became chief mufti of Egypt. He lived with Al Afghani in Paris, where they published a reformist news magazine. He admitted that, culturally, the Middle East was backward, the main reason being taqleed, or 'thoughtless imitation of tradition.' He said some prescient things about the malaise of affluence in the West. But he admired science. Incredibly, 'Abduh suggested that science be applied to Islam, that Islam, too, was a science, be it self transformation or social healing by law. There could be no contradiction between reason and revelation, between God and His Creation. Basically, he said it was possible to live as modern Muslims, using science and education to achieve Islamic goals. The main obstacle to this realization is the clergy.
'Abduh's chief disciple was Rashid Rida. He was born in 1865, in Tripoli, Lebanon. He studied with 'Abduh in Cairo, where he published a magazine called Al Minar, or, the Lighthouse. Rida also said western science should be used to perfect Islam. The Muslim lands were not stagnant but ill-informed about their own origins. Reform meant embracing scientific criteria of truth, proof, and inquiry. Rashid Rida told the truth about Islamic violence, that it originated when the Ummayad chieftan Muy'awiyah wrested the caliphate from Ali. Hence the Sunni-Shi'a split and most of the violence. He argued that recognition of past errors bring Muslims together.
Rashid Rida's chief disciple was Hasan Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. He was not a professor or a cleric, but a schoolteacher. A showman. His grasp of Islam was superficial. And started blaming others for Egypt's problems. Jihad was required against everything western. He had no coherent political theory, but worked along the lines of symbolic appeal. He was a populist.
But it was Hasan Banna who taught Sayyid Qutb, often seen as the transitional figure. Qutb, too, was to be executed for inciting violence, murders, against high state officials (in 1966, after a plot on Nasser's life). He was stupid enough to revive ibn Taimiyya's long-dead theory and practice of takfir, whereby another Muslim is deemed not to be a Muslim but an infidel, to be killed with impunity. This stupid idea fanned the flames, killing many Muslims.
The next rung on the tree, is the punk Istanbouli, who led the Ikhwan team that assassinated Anwar Sadat for making peace with Israel. Then there was Ayman Zawahiri, still Number Two of the al Qa'eda. They were all people who thought they knew, even represented, Islam, an errant assumption which permitted them to act outside the law. Can they be trusted now?
Bear in mind that the Muslim Brotherhood was just one of a number of reform ideologies now arising amongst the Arabs. Kemal Attaturk was, of course, Nasser's teacher. Arab nationalism morphed the Ba'ath or Renaissance form, invented by a Christian (Michel Aflaq) at the American University of Beirut. There were also extensive nets of communists, and several socialist parties, some of which are still functioning. The one thing these groups all had was a blaming of others, a demonization of the other. Much time has passed, and Egypt has matured. The Ikhwan had a brief period of power after the 2005 elections, where they held 24% of seats, but failed completely in the most recebnt elections. Their leader, M. Mahdi Akef, was player till 2010 when the Ikhwan mysteriously lost their support.
The Ikhwan tried to kill Nasser. He had Sayyid Qutb hung. Since then, the pressure has not let up. The Ikhwan are prohibited as a party. Was this correct? Yes, they failed to meat some of the basic requirements of a democratic party. Up fronbt, they all looked innocent. Indeed, they were, are, devoted servants, providing many social services, so they do deserve a place at the ruling table.
The sorry fact is that there are well over 25, 000 Ikhwan cells in Egypt alone, each of which has its own take on events. There are MB cells plotting right now to kill certain Europeans and Americans. Did not 9/11 grow out of the dungeons of Egypt?
The US government was correct in publicly calling for the removal of Mr. Mubarak. All along the Americans (and probably the Europeans also) have been suggesting he open up the country to 'genuine' democracy. But the president would always cite the danger of the Ikhwan gaining control in the chaos. And he was right at the time. But now it is a bit different. Everybody has matured, it seems. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, led by M. Mahdi Akef 2004-2010, and Muhammed Badie from 2010 on, are quick to say that they are interested in serving locally, providing services.
As I write, on Feb.5, the Ikhwan announce that they are ready to join the government. That augurs poorly for Egypt in western eyes, but such participation can be of great advantage to Egypt.
It remains against the law, for the Muslim Brotherhood to run as or even exist as a political party. Most brothers are not all that politically aggressive, but some are pursuing deadly destinies. The explosion Feb.4th of a gas pipeline at Al Arish in the Sinai may be their work. There are scores of secret cells ready to act with brutal violence against those targeted by their leaders.
The long period under Mubarak can be studied month by month, to see the deadly cycles of violence: Ikhwan attacks, Egyptian secret police arresting and torturing them. Groups breaking into cells, like franchises of terror. The Ikhwan leaders were driven into exile, or arrested, tortured, and released; then arrested, tortured and released in another cycle. Many Brothers never made it out of those prisons and torture chambers. It's leadership understood instinctively, that it might be better to not even get into politics. It is enough to provide the array of comprehensive services that the Brotherhood provides to and for the sick, the elderly, the destitute, the refugee.
Indeed, there has been a maturation of views in Egypt. A sophisticated city has become even more sophisicated. Secular and sectarian, Muslim and Copt, the government and the people – each proving pliable and giving toward the other. The new Egypt was deeply offended in December, 2010, when a Coptic church was bombed in Alexandria, triggering sectarian riots, sectarian confrontations of the most ominous kind, riots of a deadly nature. Over 300 had died in the 2011 Revolution by February 5th. Another hundred have disappeared. Some 2,000 have been wounded.
What sparked the January 2010 Arab revolutions?
The uprising in Tunis, plus more recent violence in Alexandria, were the two main contributing factors to the January 25th 2011 Revolution. But behind them were others, less direct perhaps, but just as powerful. These are basically: higher food prices, a shortage of housing, inflation, unemployment, lack of decent services, poor education and health care limited to the rich;and the heavy suppression of the people under emergency law, for decades. Other complaints include: obvious corruption by those associated with the president, his ministers, and certain members of the parliament. Plus the growing gap between the rich and the poor, that is, the death of the middle class. These were, are, all contributing factors.
Other factors, more subtle, go unmentioned. Bad air in Cairo give most resident respiratory problems. Water is scarce, usually for sale, if you can get it. The media's influence was drastic, yet so far not studied. Cell phones, internet blogs and news services, MySpace and FaceBook, texting and twitter – web cams and 24-hour news by video, TV or radio – together these more personalized media assist the propagation of the message. People came together just fooling around with their cell phones or checking e-mail and internet news hourly. The Egyptians found the government is dominating TV and radio. The social media accelerated the pace and broadened the base of the uprising, causing sparks to fly off and land in other lands, where they start pro-democratic fires. Electricity, radio waves and the use of discrete frequencies permitted Algerian demonstrators to talk with Tunisians. Then the Tunisians, running into unexpected success, coached and encouraged their counterparts in Egypt.
Behind the revolt in Tunis, were the larger series of demonstrations in Algeria. Like Egypt, Algeria has been under emergency powers for some two decades. Rights of expression and assembly, the right to bear arms, a society free of corruption and the violent abuse of the police and army, were the political reasons for the Algerian unrest. Economically, the issues were basically the same: higher food prices, 30% unemployment and the long-term tragic lack of affordable housing.
The Algerians, however, are war weary and war wary. They did not demand that the government change faces. Curiously, Boutiflika canceled emergency law, returning the constitution, almost simultaneously with the Feb.3rd attack of the Egyptian protestors by pro-Mubarak toughs, some riding camels and horses.
But what about 'economic' factors – survival? The soaring price of food and fuel, the long, continued lack of housing, the failure of Israel to do anything for peace, the Palestinian tunnels and Egypt's policies of border control, the Iranian revolt by the people two years ago, the break up of the Sudan, and the continued fighting there. The murder of a young Mr. Sayyid in Alexandria in mid January set the spark that led to the manifestations of the Isma'ili Maydan.
But what about the Muslim Brotherhood? The Ikhwan metastacized, setting up chapters around the Arab, then Muslim, worlds. Secular Syria, defending tolerance of religion, moved on them after they repeatedly assassinated scores of young cadets. I heard about that in Aleppo, from a small group of Algerian and Syria air force cadets. Then I spent a brief two days in Hama, in January, 1979, visiting some of the mosques. (If you want to meet people in the Islamic world, attend prayers, then remain after prayers, seated on the carpet. People will greet you, invite you, hear you out. All these good Muslims were slaughtered some 26 months later by Syria's Revolutionary Guards. But then, incredibly, we hear that just on 26th January, 2011, the Syrian government announcing that it will distribute free stocks of food, electronic toys, and even appliances, just to head off trouble.
Fear and loathing in Damascus and elsewhere in Syria is the subject of an important book that will never be written. In Lebanon, there was, in early January, a change in government, one in which Hisbullah and their Sunni Palestinian allies, now hold sway. Do these folks want to busy themselves with the politics of symbolic appeal while the economy collapses? The Muslim Brotherhood has deep roots in Lebanon. Indeed, they're found in all Arab countries. In Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the MB became mutually supportive. They're still being weeded out. Another unwritten book tells that story, one with implications, i.e., the 9/11 'consequence.'
The Brotherhood is big in Africa. Let us hope that African wisdom trumps Wahhabi divisive posturing. Otherwise, they'll be a new crop of wars. It's already happening. The Ikhwan have been active in Sierra Leone, and the Cote d'Ivore, even in South Africa and Madagascar. Somalia is a bit wild for the Brothers, but I'm sure there exist imitators, crazed clerics and their talibs who see themselves fighting for God, for the spread of Islam, and so kill others not like themselves.
The Muslim Brotherhood has as its ideology, a 'blame the other' mentality, with many mechanisms of confidence. These ostentatious self-acclaiming law-usurping 'Muslim' usurpers, foolishly saw, and see, Egypt's problems as coming from non-Muslim foreigners. The Brothers foolishly see all Western influence and objects as all corrupt. All Western civilization is immoral. That's the essence of Qutb's book 'Milestones.' It is as warped as Mein Kampf.
There are good brothers and bad Brothers, and most Brothers are rather neutral. After all, their work is social service. And because they have contributed, quite a lot, they deserve a place at the table.
When they come, every word they say will be listened too carefully. Plots will be seen through. Somehow the Ikhwan must be made to change. Can they be redeemed?
The most lethal of terrorist groups were generated as splinter groups, hiving off from the MB. The best known are, or were, the Gama'a al Islamiyya and Al Takfir Wa'l Hijra and, of course, al Qaida and its affiliates. Curiously, Osama bin Laden detests the Brothers, and often speaks (spoke) against them. Why? Because the Ikhwan publicly disassociated themselves from all violence. Could that be true?
Yes, the MB leadership says and teaches non-violence, and brothers obey. Muhammed Mahdi Akef, MB chief from 2004-2010, repeatedly condemned terrorist attacks. In 2010 Mr. Akef stepped down, being replaced by Muhammed Badie. No leaders imagined the Jan. 2011 revolt, and delayed telling the MB rank and file, to join the demonstrators. Now wooed by the government, and open to the closest of inspections, the Brothers must be on their best behavior. In fact, they must correct their errors.
But can such a dumbed-down franchise, such a defuse theocratic organization, ever be open to others not like themselves? Maybe. Have they helped prevent Muslim attacks against the Copts? Yes and no. The Brothers have matured, directing their energies to social service rather than political agitation. No brother wants the job of actually running Egypt – they know they lack expertise in the social sciences. Yet instinctively most Brothers believe they have a legitimate role to play. They do. It's called social service.
What Would Nasser Do? Could He Find Common Ground Today?
The only other event in recent Egyptian history that might compare to the January 25th 2011 Revolution is the Egyptian revolution of July 23, 1952. Till then, Egypt had not been ruled by Egyptians for two and a half thousand years. Going back in time, the rulers were British, French, Turkish (Mameluke and Ottoman), Kurdish (Ayyubids), Fatimid, Arab (bedouin), Byzantine Greek, Roman, Hellenic Greek, and Persian.
Gamal Abdul Nasser has been stereotyped as a populist demagogue, a 36-year-old army hero greedy for power, who betrayed America by buying arms from the Russians; by perpetrating land reform; who hated the Jews, pulling all the Arabs together for war and terror; who brought in the army and became 'anti-democratic' by banning political parties, and who became a player in the high stakes Machiavellian intrigues of Arab nationalism; and who turned Egypt into a military state.
None of the above statements are strictly true. The real story is different. Land reform was long overdue and went ahead without much protest. The owners of the large farms were paid cash and given vouchers and permits, which they could use to hopefully start construction companies in the cities, and thereby alleviate the crushing shortage of adequate housing. This was an ingenious economic policy, a bit more advanced than our own, one based on the laws of reciprocal feeding, than what the Americans or Russians or Japanese or Chinese can do. This man Nasser, from 1953 on, tried to kill two birds with one stone, a complex imaginative set of liberating regulation that forced the really big colonial landholders, to build affordable homes with money given to them from the government. But of course, they did little in the way of affordable housing. Almost all the construction projects were luxury apartments.
As for greedy power-hungry Nasser the populist, Nasser with assets totaling a little over $6,000. He much preferred to let others lead, like the prime minister/president M. Naqib (Naguib). In the early years, the Egyptians were just two of some nine army and air force officers, most war heroes of the 1947-48 war with Israel, who were able to keep hidden their plot while recruiting key commanders. They were nationalists, anxious to bring out from the shadows, the Egyptian nation and people. Britain still occupied Suez: over 80,000 troops guarding the canal.
Nasser much preferred to work from the shadows, and tried not to be chief. General M. Naguib was set up as figurehead, leaving Nasser and his technocrats free to examine carefully the economic malaisde, and determine what to do. Today Egyptians say they, the people, were suppressed and sleeping under the patriarch, Hosni Mubarak, for three decades. But when Nasser operated, the Egyptian people were much more suppressed, so deadened and exploited, that Nasser knew they didn't have the fire necessary for change. Now they have that fire, but do they have Nasser's competency in social engineering?
It was of course the Free Officers who instituted military government in Egypt. Everybody else was either bought off, suppressed, or just forlorn and fatalistic. Nasser feared he could not get people motivated to actually end feudalism, converting big colonial corporate farms into many private plots. Though Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) were socialists, they nonetheless were out to make individual Egyptians into small capitalists. No doubt that's because Egypt is largely a Muslim country. In Islam, the poorest vendor gets access to the market.
Even though Egypt had no enemies, it built up a large army. It needed to be able to fend off British, French and Israeli attacks. It felt it had to respond to the eviction of some 1.2 million Palestinians by the Israelis. But he saw the possibility of using the army to incubate and run industries and capitalist agriculture. (I can't find any precursors to this 'experiment' except in the much older sultanates and nomadic empires, including the Ottomans and Mamelukes.)
There was something innocent and naive about Nasser. Like many people in the Muslim world back then, he admired America. He saw the United States as a counter to British, French, Israeli and Russian plots and attacks. Nasser and the army wanted American weapons. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made the transfer of any weaponry to Egypt contingent on its joining an anti-Soviet pact, an alliance with the imperial powers. But Nasser had already signed neutrality agreements with the Arab League, so could not conform even if he wanted to. That was held against the socialist Egyptian government. The Egyptians called in the Russians for help, which of course changed the situation in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict got locked into the big showdown between Communism and free market capitalism. The survival of humankind on earth was put at great risk.
Furthermore, Nasser moved to liquidate the Communists. He rightly saw them as a threat to the middle class, of which he was one and with which he strongly identified. He was much more effective in limiting Bolshevism than the Shah, and he did it without the massacres perpetrated by another 'player' behind the scenes, young Saddam Hussein. Saddam did not rise through army like Nasser did. Furthermore, the Ba'ath party had similar aims as Nasser, namely, the creation of an independent state, socialist in its concerns but capitalism in its aspirations.
The 1950s were a time of secret Machiavellian maneuvers, crass radio propaganda, double crosses, deception and blackmail. The Palestinians were all packed into some 40 refugee camps, and beginning to fight back. The other Arab colonies received independence, but not Egypt. The reason was not so much British control, but the fact that King Fuad actually effected a tolerant democracy, led by the liberal Waqf. But the represented the great feudal landlords. The army rose up. Nasser banned the parties because they were so deceptive, promising what they could not do. He moved against the leftists, the Communists, and he banned the Muslim Brotherhood, in 1954.
The Muslim Brotherhood was well-established in Egypt by the late 1930s. Following the dumbed- down, simplistic and highly divisive ideology of the Ikhwan, the Brothers tried to muscle in on the Palestinian issue, by deploying their own fedayeen to fight the Jews. Nasser moved to control both the PLO and the Muslim Brotherhood, insisting that the Palestinians discipline themselves, and that the Ikhwan be prohibited from launching terror attacks of its own. Nasser didn't even let the Brothers fight the British occupiers in Suez. He knew they were lousy soldiers, dream-driven.
The big powers were no less desperate, or so it seemed at the time. The Cold War really began in Iran, 1946-47, in Iran. The newly elected nationalist prime minister M. Mossadeq, foolishly cut oil exports to Great Britain, violating current contracts. Most of Britain's oil was still coming through the Gulf. That's why the Brits and the American pulled off the 1953 overthrow of Iran's elected government. Kermit Roosevelt, the American operator, was friends with Nasser and visited him even as he and the Brits were plotting to overthrow Mossadeq (and his clerical and communist backers). Islam began to be seen as a bulwark against Communism.
Curiously, in 1952, the American government pressured King Farouk to check the corruption of his ministers, and transform Egypt into a western-style democracy, with Muslim politicos having some say and sway. But Nasser despised the Ikhwan. Their message divisive, dangerous, and not really in keeping with Muhammed's practices. After the Brothers tried to kill him, Nasser locked up their leaders and hung their chief ideologue, Sayyid Qutb. With Egypt being too hot, the Brothers metastasized as Egyptian Ikhwan fled to other Sunni Arab countries. Today they play covert and overt roles in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Lebanon, Morocco, northern Sudan and Morocco.
The Egyptian revolution of 1952 was a fight against feudalism, and Nasser put the best of his energies into reconfiguring available resources. He realized Egypt needed better, uncorrupted businessmen; to him, even the Mameluke aristocrats running the big corporate farms, had a role in the revolution. Some 6% of the population owned 65% of the land.
Nasser understood there were two revolutions: the first to dispose the King and expel his British masters, the second, to dismantle the structures of feudalism – serf bondage. Nasser acted to ban all political parties which may have made him look like a Bolshevik, but the one dominant party, the ruling Waqf, were all tied to the big landowners and industrialists, working within the British colonial system. The whole thing had to go. A similar quandary faces the new revolutionaries, who may be tempted, wrongly, to exclude all government personnel from a new government.
Clearly, as Nasser said, two revolts were necessary. The first was to achieve independence, the second, to knit together rival factions. There was a third – to devise the correct prescriptions to economic problems eating at the people. Maybe the third revolution was, is, the real challenge. The whole system had to be carefully disentangled, before a new government might prove capable of providing for the people. Egypt's burgeoning population had ever more pressing needs – food, fuel, housing, education, capital – and fulfilling these needs could not take place amidst constant ideological bickering and rivalry between competing parties. No do the politics of symbolic appeal help.
Today the situation is even more pressing. Today, the Egyptian poor are just as destitute as they were when they worked as serfs. Cairo had just several million people in 1950. By 1990 it had 38 million and by 2010 the population had exceeded 84 million. And of course the people are concentrated along the thin strip of fertile land on each side of the Nile, so the density of population is excessive.
Whoever runs Egypt has to reckon with the Ikhwan. The Ikhwan were not involved in the initiation of this recent revolution, but already, by February 5th, issued angry declarations of autocratic intent. The voices of the MB spokesmen and leaders are full of spite towards Israel and Egyptian secularism. Of course they seek vengeance against the secularists in the government. Already they are doing their best to steal the whole affair, as happened in Iran. Nasser would stand for any MB role.
We study Zaghoul (Nasser's code name) because decisions he implemented impact on the situation today. The revolutionaries in Tahrir Square believe they have power, but actually the army stands a very strong power behind the scenes. No doubt the army is splitting, and no doubt young democrats, likely educated in America or Britain, will seek to lead the army into helping fill the very pressing needs of the Egyptian population. But how can that happen?
Because the army does not drain the treasury, Egypt's debt was only 93.6% of GNP in a 2005 estimate. That's less debt proportionately than the US (102% GNP), and much less than the United Kingdom. The UK in 2005 had an external debt of$7 trillion plus, while Egypt, with a poor population some 20% larger than the UK, had debts of only $29 billion.
International monetary pressures, that ultimate reckoning of nations, forced Egypt to devalue its currency, making all imports more expensive, and causing inflation. One very real factor behind the 2010-11 January 25th Revolution, was, is, the soaring price of wheat and corn. The terrible drought in Russia during the spring and summer and autumn of 2010 caused that government to cancel wheat exports. The Egyptian people went without. Rents also soared. Water of course is a huge hassle, for poor Cairenes.
The Egyptian government has not been able to fully educate its youth, care for its sick and hungry, or help provide jobs. People turn to new spiritual identities. The Muslim Brothers step in. Our hope is that the government can harness the thousands of Muslim organs in a new bid to take care of its people's most basic needs.
What would Nasser do? He had basically the same resources, the same pressures (like debt and inflation). The population had not yet ballooned. Following the 1952 revolution, Egyptians were free to join up symbolically with their Arab counterparts, forming the Arab League and the UAR and other unions, fighting to preserve some semblance of dignity after the defeats of 1948. 1956 and 1967.
This generation of Egyptians did not have to spend its free money on military adventures. The peace has allowed Egypt, Jordan and Israel, even parts of Palestine, to prosper. Today, Cairenes are much more globally informed. They are weary and wary of the left and the right. Socialism and capitalism must go together. A socialist society needs plenty of cash and it can get this by sacking the rich, or by fostering innovation, a free market, and the mobilization of its people. Capitalism of course marginalizes many, causing destitution and exploitation. The market will not create enough jobs, especially in the 21st C. global economy. But that world economy is also changing. Gasoline will doubtless be too expensive for ordinary people to burn much of, and many modest folks around the world, can't get enough cheap food and housing.
Let us hope that the politics of symbolic appeal are replaced by a pragmatic bid to lessen suffering, keep people in their homes, provide them with food to buy, some basic medical services. But just as important, is what Egypt does with its hyper-dynamic young educated investors. Can the government help them incubate firms?
Most amazing, to me, an Arabic scholar who has studied Islam's legal traditions, a non-Muslim social scientist, is that Islam has, hidden away in its heritage, some legal formulae for the mass auto-construction of new housing, the science and the tolerance, and the generation of so many jobs that everybody who wants one can have one.
As far as Islam is concerned, it will have to be Al Aksa University which provides the guidance on these issues. And even they don't know much non-Muslim science, like the archaeology of pre-Islamic Arabia, its diversity, and its 'pocket' civilizations: Nabatea, Ghassan, Lakhmid (places where Muhammad no doubt visited or heard of). The Ikhwan know even less.
Islam means surrender, surrender of the self, so any Muslim who is reinforcing his ego by appropriating Islam to his self or sect, has gone off the rails. There are other tests as well. Just listening to some Ikhwan leaders on Feb. 5, the day they met with Vice President Omar Suleiman, showed the sect's arrogance and anger, plus its emotionalism.
Egypt will mellow in its Islam. Islam will be put to use. The state will keep privatizing army-run factories. Investors will return. The country will become a democracy, but no one can predict what kind of political parties (their platforms) will emerge. At the table of governance, specialists are needed not simply to represent their constituents, but to provide expertise.
Dr. Al-Baradei, for example, might chair a panel on science, while a social scientist, along with Muslim organs, might manage and expand social services.
But the revolution is just a few weeks old. It'll take years before Egyptian leaders find the right combination of elements to meet housing demands and social needs. Do they have the time? These new technocrats need be as clever as Nasser was in his approach to land control. For there are many countervailing factors, unseen but in play behind the scenes: the army, the secret police, diplomatic pressures, and a zoo of different types of ideologies, so what one hears at this point, is a disputatious babble. Nasser often spoke in English during negotiations. Asked why, he said Arabic is great for arguments, vendettas and wars, but weak in the terms of peace.
Nasser was joking. Arabic has over 30 words for peace and tranquility. But the language is so strong, not just in its phonology, but its permutations of roots, creating so many kinds of concepts, that Arab negotiators are apt to spend hours qualifying terms.
As in many modern Arab nations, the young are learning English at the expense of their Arabic. This is partly the result of the social media. But it is also a bid to join up with the western world.
-JPM, Feb.8, 2011
The author has conducted research in eight Muslim countries, plus Russia and Serbia. He has taught in colleges in Vermont. Since 1988, he has authored and published the Middle East Speculum Report, a newsletter now on line. He holds degrees from Wesleyan and Harvard Universities.
His most recent studies are found at middleeastspeculum.blogspot.com
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