Assessing Reconciliation

ون فقط صعودا أو هبوطا على جانبي منع عودة الاضطرابات المصالحة إلى مصر. عناق الحشود في سوريةأي ركود -- المتطرفون فقط صعودا أو هبوطا على جانبي منع عودة الاضطرابات المصالحة إلى مصر. عناق الحشود في سورية

Either Up or Down – No Stasis

Progress is made or there is a descending process wherein a society may become more intolerant of beliefs different than one's own. The revolution itself may be a necessary movement to free up citizens' rights, but it should lead to some form of representational government, a achievement won through talks, not combat.

There are international efforts trying to somehow resolve or pacify extremely disturbed factions. In Yemen, president Saleh threatens to return from hospital in Riyadh, Said Arabia, to resume one-man rule.

In Libya, the UN is trying to mediate an end to the civil war, as the French tried last month, with no results. Libya looks like a stalemate, but close analysis shows the Libyan National Transitional government gaining a small advantage, supported as the rebels are, by the NATO fighter bombers.

In Syria, Turkey has offered its good offices, providing sanctuary for civilians fleeing from murderous Syrian army and police forces. The Ba'athi regime held reconciliation meetings on at least two occasions, but opposition leaders refused any such talks.

In each of these situations, reconciliation was and is rejected. Swhy? First, too much blood has been shed. Second, the regimes in question express no real flexibility: they will not step down from power; nor do they support any transition which would compromise their power and influence.

Which side does Time favor? This is a rather apostate un-Islamic formulation of an important question. The regimes in Libya, Syria and Yemen assume time is on their side. Looking up from their bunkers they believe that they, and tens of thousands of supporters, can out-last popular un-democratic movements.

The two Al Qaddafi leaders, Saleh of Yemen, and Bashar Al Assad of Syria, have made a bet that their security forces are, will be, ultimately faithful. Yet in each case the army has splintered. The despots control the grounds around them, and their bodyguards are not standard soldiers. They rule in close associations with their sons, in Libya and the Yemen, while Al Assad rules with his brother Mater.

My point is that, while it looks like a stalemate in these three Arab nations, it is not – the people are slowly gaining. Day after day, Qaddafi, Al Assad and Ali Saleh look like they can and do stand fast, but closer inspection reveals that the armies only control the grounds on which they are in any given moment. Isolated roadblocks expose those troops to attack. There are not that many cars and trucks in the first place, in these countries.

Since each of these three nations produce(d) oil, one would expect many automobiles and trucks. But that's not the case. Only the privileged owned cars and trucks: the governments made it difficult to own such even if one had the money.

Lack of cars and trucks and buses is an indicator of repression and not some environmental safeguard. The rebel democrats are not fighting for the right to own and drive a vehicle – or are they? Owning a car is better than having an uncle in the air force, although it is best to have both.

Libya, Syria and the Yemen need rationalize their political economies. The manner of their resisting indicates the regimes have no such intentions. They may say they support democracy, i.e, multi-party representational rule, but any such 'change' would no doubt keep them in power. For these despots, giving up power peacefully just does not trump survival and the wish to control.

In Egypt and Tunisia, continued demonstrations are focused on just this discontent with those who inherited full absolute power following the revolution. Marshall Hasan Tantawi in Egypt was never seen as a leader by the democrats. But he has the guns and radios, and a rigid, exclusive command structure. We will see whether free elections take place in September. Unrest will cause Tantawi to cancel them.

Such deep unrest is the reason why neither Egypt or Tunisia helps the Libyan rebels, directly. A battalion of Egyptian soldiers with a battalion of MIA tanks, landed by boat at, say, Misuratah, would cause a rapid contraction of the Qaddafi regime. But, alas, such a maneuver is not in the cards.

Then there is the third situation: Gulf Arab monarchies determined not to give away their tribe-based power. Saudi Arabia is preparing to promulgate an anti-terrorism law. The spokesman for the Human Rights First Society, Alm Ugaiteeb, calls such a law “a massacre of freedoms.”

King Abdullah ibn Aziz is greatly worried, first by the Iran-influenced Shi'a in the east of SA, then second, an invigorated al Qaeda nested in eastern Yemen, expanding to the north and the south.

These are the bad dreams of the Saudi royals, American bad dreams as well. Because the terrorists exploit the unrest, the opposition must clearly discipline their ranks, keeping the terrorists out. These revolutions owe nothing to the Muslim clergy. So they cannot let the clergy get into high places, because most of those personally ambitious, don't hesitate to defame their opponents – the sinful people who clip their beards and wear western clothes.

Morocco might seem like a happy exception: King Muhammad VI is driving hom,e some limited elections. but he'll retain rule over the army, the clergy, the banks, the yoiuth clubs, and much more.

In Saudi Arabia, the king is pushing through an 'anti-terrorism law,' which will provide a clear legal means to arrest, detain, torture, imprison and even execute protesters.

In Egypt, another protest was broken up. The protesters are angry that so many officials and police were exonerated for murderous acts back in January-February. They do not like Gen. Hasan Tantawi pulling the strings behind the scene. Readers of this blog has often heard complaints against 'Tantawi the Sphinx.' (After a violent attack by police in Alexandria, new crowds gathered at Tahrir Squaere, and tried to march on the defense ministry - to get Tantawi.

Algeria (Al Jaza'ir) resembles Morocco in ushering in reform without too many dead. President Boutiflika went through a big change of heart some eight years ago. Originally set up as a straw man for the Algerian armed forces, he turned 180 degrees – to the people. But he can't alienate army and police. Every day there are demonstrations somewhere in Algeria, usually in the suburbs around Algiers and Oran, but inland also, especially in Kabylie – the eastern hills where the Berbers live. The imposition of the Arabic language as the nation's official 'tongue,' alienated and polarized the Berber. Though many Algerians think they are Arabic, the dominant genomic source is Berber. Algeria is a land of mutually hostile languages: Arabic, French, Berber. It is the only Arab nation to have had to fight for its independence. And it went through a terrible civil war from 1992-1998. It has money, and the coastal population is integrated with the world economy.

But Algeria's problems are endemic, systemic, the lawful results of chaos, and the failure of law-and-order. It became a police state. But it took massive demonstrations and strikes to get the government to lift its emergency powers.

-John Paul Maynard